The main ambition of "Constitutional Constraints" is to open up the
subject of constitutional constraints on government officials,
including Presidents and Supreme Court Justices, as a topic for
discussion within the field of Constitutional Theory. The subject has
so far received little comprehensive discussion in the law reviews, in
part because of a division between scholarly approaches that treat
constitutional law as a system of norms and political scientific
theories that portray judges and other officials as constrained
maximizers of personal goals or preferences. This Article attempts to
incorporate the central insights of both approaches and to identify the
important, frequently unappreciated ways in which they frequently
reinforce on another.
California Law Review: CURRENT ISSUE
August 2009, Vol. 97, No. 4
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The California Law Review is the preeminent legal publication at the UC Berkeley School of Law.
Founded in 1912, CLR publishes six times per year on a variety of engaging topics in legal scholarship.
The law review is edited and published entirely by students at Berkeley Law.
Founded in 1912, CLR publishes six times per year on a variety of engaging topics in legal scholarship.
The law review is edited and published entirely by students at Berkeley Law.