Federal jurisdiction-the "power" of the court-is seen as something separate and unique, with a litany of special effects that define jurisdictionality as the antipode of nonjurisdictionality. The resulting conceptualization is that jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality occupy mutually exclusive theoretical and doctrinal space. In a recent Article, I refuted this rigid dichotomy of jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality by explaining that nonjurisdictional rules can be "hybridized" with any-or even all-of the attributes of jurisdictionality.

This Article drops the other shoe. Jurisdictional rules can be hybridized, too, and in myriad forms. The result is a far more complex world than what the simple-but fallacious-dichotomy of jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality suggests.

Judges are human and experience emotion when hearing cases, though the standard account of judging long has denied that fact. In the post-realist era it is possible to acknowledge that judges have emotional reactions to their work, yet our legal culture continues to insist that a good judge firmly puts those reactions aside. Thus, we expect judges to regulate their emotions, either by preventing emotion's emergence or by walling off its influence. But judges are given precisely no direction as to how to engage in emotional regulation.

This Article proposes a model for judicial emotion regulation that goes beyond a blanket admonition to "put emotion aside." While legal discourse on judicial emotion has been stunted, scientific study of the processes of emotion regulation has been robust. By bringing these literatures together for the first time, the Article reveals that our legal culture does nothing to promote intelligent judicial emotion regulation and much to discourage it.

Over the past two years U.S. regulatory agencies have issued fourteen regulations that take into account the effect of industrial activities and products on the global climate. The regulatory activity so far has already set precedents on which future regulation will rest. Yet despite the potentially momentous consequences, it has received no comment in the law review literature. This Article examines the record of these agencies and criticizes the methods they have used to calculate the social cost of carbon emissions. We also develop a larger theme about the relationship between cost-benefit analysis and politics. The best case for cost-benefit analysis is that its recommendations are politically neutral in the sense of drawing on widely shared intuitions about human well-being. But cost-benefit analysis cannot cope with inherently political questions involving contested normative issues. Policymakers will have to find alternative tools when those questions predominate.

Debt collectors are increasingly using internet and mobile technologies as part of the debt collection process. While these technologies may provide conveniences for collectors and consumers alike, they also create the potential for new forms of deception and raise novel privacy concerns. Much of the problem lies in the failure to update the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Despitet he dramatic transformation of the debt collection industry over the last thirty years, the statute has remained largely backward looking, even in the face of calls to modernize the act from regulators, industry representatives, and consumer advocates.

Recently, this landscape has undergone a fundamental change. Congress vested the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) with rulemaking authority over the FDCPA. This marks an opportunity to address the pressing problems raised by debt collectors' use of new and emerging technologies, and to provide guidance regarding what protections are necessary in order to preserve consumer privacy and prevent harassment. In some cases, the challenges raised by new technology can be sufficiently resolved through the current FDCPA framework, while in other areas, reform is sorely needed.

This Comment outlines the challenges new technologies pose, analyzes the areas of tension that cannot be resolved under the current FDCPA framework, and recommends three areas of reform. First, the term "communication" should be redefined in order to applied to new communication platforms that pose a threat to consumer privacy. Second, the CFPB should reform the FDCPA to ensure that new communication technologies do not become a one-way street, by requiring that communications made through new technologies include necessary disclosures, an opt-out mechanism, and a dispute process that consumers can use through the same technology that the debt collector used to contact the consumer. And third, the CFPB should consider imposing an express written consent requirement on the use of technologies that may cause consumers financial harm.

Should the United States impose a genetic definition of "family "on refugees seeking to reunite with their families? This Comment chronicles the birth of DNA testing in the U.S. Refugee Family Reunification (Priority Three, or P-3) Program. It explores the inception of new rules that will require DNA testing for individuals processed as Priority Three refugees. Drawing on historical uses of non-DNA forensic testing in the U.S. immigration system and other areas of U.S. law, the Comment analyzes whether DNA testing will work in this context. It asks whether it is appropriate or even feasible to test family connections using DNA testing, a process which necessarily implies that family members must be biologically related to the refugee-applicant.

This Essay explores a question of superficial triviality: when sports use instant replay technology to review on-field calls, what standard of review should they employ? The conventional view is that on-field calls should be entrenched against reversal such that, if there viewing official has any doubt about the correctness of the initial call, he must let it stand even if he thinks it very probably wrong. Indeed, in the wake of officiating debacles at last summer's FIFA World Cup, commentators proposed not only that soccer employ instant replay, but also that it follow the NFL in directing officials to overturn on-field calls only when "indisputable visual evidence" (IVE) reveals that call to be mistaken. This Essay argues that common wisdom in favor of IVE overlooks important considerations against entrenchment and likely rests upon mistaken premises, and it offers several concrete proposals for reform.