When and why should a "right to" include a "right not to"? If a person has a right to engage in an activity or to receive a procedural protection, under what circumstances should he or she also have a right not to engage in that activity or to refuse that process? The basic project of this Article is to show why these questions are important in American constitutional law, to explore how doctrine and scholarship have implicitly and sometimes awkwardly dealt with them, and to suggest normative frameworks with which they can be answered. When and why should a "right to" include a "right not to"? If a person has a right to engage in an activity or to receive a procedural protection, under what circumstances should he or she also have a right not to engage in that activity or to refuse that process? The basic project of this Article is to show why these questions are important in American constitutional law, to explore how doctrine and scholarship have implicitly and sometimes awkwardly dealt with them, and to suggest normative frameworks with which they can be answered. 

Cyber-attacks have become increasingly common in recent years. Capable of shutting down nuclear centrifuges, air defense systems, and electrical grids, cyber-attacks pose a serious threat to national security. As a result, some have suggested that cyber-attacks should be treated as acts of war. Yet the attacks look little like the armed attacks that the law of war has traditionally regulated. This Article examines how existing law may be applied-and adapted and amended-to meet the distinctive challenge posed by cyber-attacks. It begins by clarifying what cyber-attacks are and how they already are regulated by existing bodies of law, including the law of war, international treaties, and domestic criminal law. This review makes clear that existing law effectively addresses only a small fraction of potential cyber-attacks. The law of war, for example, provides a useful framework for only the very small number of cyber-attacks that amount to an armed attack or that take place in the context of an ongoing armed conflict. This Article concludes that a new, comprehensive legal framework at both the domestic and international levels is needed to more effectively address cyber- attacks. The United States could strengthen its domestic law by giving domestic criminal laws addressing cyber-attacks extra- territorial effect and by adopting limited, internationally permissible countermeasures to combat cyber-attacks that do not rise to the level of armed attacks or that do not take place during an ongoing armed conflict. Yet the challenge cannot be met by domestic reforms alone.International cooperation will be essential to a truly effective legal response. New international efforts to regulate cyber-attacks must begin with agreement on the problem-which means agreement on the definition of cyber-attack, cyber-crime, and cyber-warfare. This would form the foundation for greater international cooperation on information sharing, evidence collection, and criminal prosecution of those involved in cyber-attacks-in short, for a new international law of cyber-attack.

During the past decade, federal courts have adjudicated proliferating challenges to novel policy responses to terrorism. Judges often resolve the individual rights and statutory interpretation questions implicated in those controversies by deploying presumptions or rules of thumb derived from the Constitution's Separation of Powers. These "structural constitutional presumptions" serve as heuristics to facilitate adjudication and to enable judicial bypass of difficult legal, policy, and factual questions. This Article challenges the use of such structural presumptions in counterterrorism cases. Drawing upon recent empirical research in political science, political psychology, and security studies, it demonstrates that abstract eighteenth-century Separation of Powers ideals do not translate into robust and empirically defensible generalizations for twenty-first-century security decisions. Structural constitutionalism thus cannot serve as a foundation for heuristics or shortcuts in the judicial consideration of new security measures. To the extent courts properly pass on the legality of counterterrorism policies, judges should rely instead on the ordinary tools of doctrine, statutory construction, and fact finding. The ensuing jurisprudence of counterterrorism would look much more like ordinary public law. 

In 2010, Oklahoma passed the "Save Our State Amendment," becoming the first state to officially ban "Sharia law." Despite the fact that a federal court issued an injunction blocking the measure- holding that the ban violated the Establishment Clause-nearly two dozen state legislatures have since proposed similar measures. In this Comment, I propose that the Oklahoma law exhibits an increased hysteria towards Islam and Muslims-one that creates a distinct second-class citizenry that is not entitled to the privileges associated with, and considered a necessary condition of, citizenship in a nation-state. This problematic trend represents a continuation of a longer history in which law reinforces racism toward Arabs and Muslims and threatens to isolate and alienate one of the fastest growing segments of the American population.

This Comment synthesizes current United States religious freedom jurisprudence and argues that it is inadequate for protecting religious practice. As currently applied, the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act do not sufficiently consider the perspective of the burdened religion. Religious freedom laws exist to navigate between the needs of society and the needs of religious participants. An evaluation of any prospective law should therefore consider both sides' needs. This Comment presents a framework for considering the severity of the burden that a law places on a religion and argues that the severity of the burden should be a factor in determining whether a secular law should be upheld. 

After decades of advocacy by the modern domestic violence movement, institutions such as police departments, hospitals, and family law courts-although far from perfect in their responses-are now engaged in a conversation about domestic violence as a social problem, rather than denying its existence or significance. Despite this growth in awareness, a new form of domestic violence has developed, one which has not yet been recognized and which needs to be addressed: financial abuse through consumer credit. As consumer lending has permeated American life, violent partners have begun using debt as a means of exercising abusive control, making the consumer credit system an unknowing party to domestic violence. This abuse is known as coerced debt.

Coerced debt can take a variety of forms. It ranges from abusers taking out credit cards in their partners' names without their knowledge, to forcing victims to obtain loans for the abuser, to tricking victims into signing quitclaim deeds for the family home. This Essay presents original, empirical data on the nature and scope of coerced debt, and explains how abusive partners use the complex consumer credit system to leave many victims of domestic violence with hundreds or thousands of dollars of coerced debt.