This Article examines the astonishing array of doctrines used to determine what constitutes marriage fraud. It begins by locating the traditional nineteenth-century annulment-by-fraud doctrine within the realm of contract fraud, observing that in the family law context fraudulent marriages were voidable solely at the option of the injured party. The Article then explains how, in the twentieth century, a massive expansion of public benefits tied to marriage prompted new marriage fraud doctrines to develop in various areas of the law, shifting the concept of the injured party from the defrauded spouse to the public at large. It proposes a framework for understanding these new doctrines by demonstrating that courts apply different tests for finding fraud depending on the value of the benefit sought compared to the cost to the individual of using marriage to obtain it. Furthermore, the Article argues that marriage is an ineffective means for distributing public benefits that serve specific objectives; in other words, marriage is being asked to do too much work. As a possible response to this problem, the Article concludes that lawmakers could disaggregate the components of marriage to which they attach public benefits. This would improve the efficacy of public benefits distribution without entirely dismantling the institution of marriage or jeopardizing the stability that it may provide to society.

In an effort to curb sexual assault behind bars, the Los Angeles County Jail currently houses inmates deemed homosexual and transgender in a special unit called "K6G." Professor Russell Robinson's Article, Masculinity as Prison: Race, Sexual Identity, and Incarceration, challenges this policy on a number of grounds. I focus in this Response on just two of Robinson's objections. First I affirm Robinson's proposal that carceral segregation programs, if they are to persist, will more effectively protect queer inmates from sexual assault if they do not fixate exclusively on queer identity. Homosexuality's complicated social epistemology, notoriously an "epistemology of the closet," compels this conclusion. I then reflect on some possible reasons (not necessarily justifications) for K6G's categorical exclusion of people who claim a bisexual identity. This exclusion is one of several aspects of the Jail's segregation policy that Robinson criticizes for disadvantaging individuals who diverge from a race- and class-specific stereotype of "the homosexual."

Russell Robinson has done it again. With Masculinity as Prison: Sexual Identity, Race, and Incarceration, he has given us another provocative Article, which illuminates a phenomenon in the world and, indirectly, in ourselves.

The Article represents much of what generally makes Robinson's work so compelling. First, he writes about tremendously complex subjects and attends to their many complexities in remarkably lucid prose. Second, despite his critical perspective, he does not hesitate to make prescriptive arguments. In this Article, he even ventures into the hallowed ground of constitutional argument, something he has not done since his first article on race-based casting. Third, Robinson is not afraid to offend people by taking controversial positions, yet for the most part he does not seem to court controversy. Finally, he manages to bridge multiple modes of scholarly writing, employing diverse methodologies to analyze problems rigorously and to transform readers' perspectives along the way. For example, Robinson often brings together empirical scholarship- whether extant social science data or his own empirical investigations-with narrative legal scholarship. Although this Article omits the personal narratives that sometimes characterize his writing, it is replete with evocative material from the characters he interviewed.

A short time ago, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad Genetics), one of the most important patent cases in recent history. The Myriad case addresses the controversial question whether isolated human genes related to breast and ovarian cancer can be patented. The case has garnered significant attention from various industries, the Department of Justice, the legal academy, the media, and the public. Features on the lawsuit have appeared in the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and Los Angeles Times, and approximately forty amicus briefs were filed with the court. So far, commentators and amici have focused primarily on the substantive legal issues: Should genes be patentable subject matter? How do gene patents impact medical research and health care? Do gene patents promote innovation as required by the Constitution? Yet, the Myriad case also raises important questions about the justiciability of patent declaratory judgment disputes that have received surprisingly little attention.