Legal Personhood of Potential People: AI and Embryos

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Introduction

American states continue to actively regulate artificial intelligence (“AI”)[1] despite the Trump administration’s efforts to stop them.[2] Idaho and Utah have recently enacted bills that declare that AI is not a legal person.[3] The same states that have enacted anti-AI personhood laws have also adopted laws declaring that embryos are people.[4]  

Some argue that embryos should be granted legal personhood because they have potential to become people. By the same logic, AI is also a legal person because, as it evolves, some predict that it will share characteristics with humans. How do state legislative representatives justify granting embryos legal personhood, but denying AI the same? 

From reviewing legislative history and speaking to state representatives, I found that the states use genetics as the yardstick to measure legal personhood. This concept traces back to laws adopted by state legislatures declaring embryos and other prenatal entities as legal persons. Stuck with this understanding of legal personhood, legislators extended it the same to AI—denying AI personhood because it is not a genetic human. The problem with a theory that limits legal personhood to genetics is that it is unable to explain why nonhumans, such as corporations and other entities, have long been granted legal personhood.

When legislative representatives pass laws, they should have consistent rationales for those laws. Without that, their decisions display arbitrariness, erode trust in representative bodies, and undermine the rule of law.

Scholars have articulated numerous theories of personhood, but none that I am aware of use genetics as the only attribute that qualifies an entity for legal personhood. A theory developed by Dean Jessica Berg is helpful in explaining why some nonhuman entities ought to be granted legal personhood but not others.[5] Her framework is superior to others because her analysis focuses on the interests of the entity, natural persons, and of society, rather than focusing solely on the traits of the entity in question.[6] As societal interests change, new entities may qualify for legal personhood. AI in its current form does not qualify for legal personhood. However, her framework is flexible enough to consider legal personhood for AI if, in the future, AI develops morally relevant interests, and/or granting AI personhood furthers societal interest.

In Part I, I explain the emergence of the view of legal personhood that is tied to genetics and the limitations of that perspective. Part II describes Berg’s theory of personhood and explains how she applies it to embryos and corporate entities. In Part III, I evaluate AI personhood under Berg’s theory.

I.  The Limitation of Genetics as Legal Personhood

In examining the rationale behind anti-AI personhood laws in Idaho and Utah, I found that state legislative representatives define legal personhood in terms of genetics. Anti-AI personhood laws are not the first time Idaho and Utah have used a theory of legal personhood based on genetics. The idea of legal personhood tied to genetics dates to the beginning of the anti-abortion movement. Tying legal personhood to genetics is problematic because it is unable to account for other nonhuman entities (such as corporations), which have also been recognized as legal persons in those states.

A.     Pro-embryo personhood laws

A movement for personhood of embryos at all stages of their development started in the 1960s.[7] Roe v. Wade sought to put the question of prenatal personhood to rest.[8] Yet, in the mid-1980s, states began to pass fetal personhood laws in the context of criminal law. Now the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision has given permission to states to attach personhood to embryos as well.[9] Both Idaho and Utah have statutes that suggest that embryos are people, and they justify such laws based on genetics.

In Idaho, abortion is totally banned with limited exceptions.[10] In referring to “fetus” and “unborn child,” the statute governing abortion states that “each term means an individual organism of the species Homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.”[11] Idaho defines murder as the “killing of a human being including, but not limited to, a human embryo or fetus.”[12] Idaho has proposed a prenatal personhood bill that would go further by granting full personhood to embryos from the moment of conception.[13]

Utah’s abortion laws are less restrictive than Idaho’s, but harsher than what was guaranteed under Roe v. Wade.[14] In Utah, abortion is prohibited beyond 18 weeks of a pregnancy, which is well before viability.[15] Utah’s abortion law suggests that embryos are people, but the law also takes into account the pregnant persons’ interests.[16] Any violation of the Utah abortion statute is considered homicide, which means that harming a fetus constitutes homicide if it happens outside the context of permissible abortion.[17] Additionally, Utah’s criminal homicide laws specifically state that homicide is the “the death of another human being, including an unborn child at any stage of its development.”[18] The Utah code also clarifies that it is the policy of the state that “unborn persons” are equivalent to born persons in terms of the right to life.[19]

B.     Anti-AI personhood laws.

Idaho enacted the first anti-AI personhood law in the country in July 2022.[20] That same law denies personhood to environmental elements, nonhuman animals, and inanimate objects.[21] Utah also adopted an anti-AI personhood law in January 2024, further adding that land, atmospheric gases, weather, and plants are not legal persons.[22]

The legislative history of both the Idaho and Utah anti-AI personhood law suggests that their legislative representatives believe legal personhood should be granted only to entities that are Homo sapiens; in this view, granting personhood to anything other than Homo sapiens dilutes the rights of humans. For example, Representative Tammy Nichols from Idaho, who is now a state senator, said “[w]e don’t want our children to be inferior to artificial intelligences.”[23]

I emailed Senator Nichols to enquire further about her rationale for the anti-AI personhood law. She responded with the following justification for it:

“Idaho wanted to prevent AI from receiving personhood to protect the integrity of human rights, individual accountability, and constitutional governance. Granting personhood to AI could:

·         Undermine the concept of natural rights, which are rooted in human dignity and the Creator—not algorithms.

·         Create legal confusion by giving machines the same standing as humans or corporations in courts and contracts.”[24]

Speaking during a legislative session in Utah, Representative Brooks’s also made clear that his view of legal personhood is synonymous with human beings:

“The reality is this: a person is a person, and a tree is not. Neither is an animal, neither is a stream, neither is the air . . . . We need to use definitions that are clear . . . . I bet you if you went back ten years ago, no one had a question about what a woman was and what a man was. But we do get confused. Here it is to make it clear what a human person is and those rights that come along with it.”[25]

In my interview with Representative Brooks, he expressed views on AI that were consistent with his public statement. He thought that eventually AI may manifest as human-like features, but “basic principles suggest they are not people.”[26] I further asked Representative Brooks whether embryos were people, and he simply responded that “pre-birth entities are persons.”[27]

C.     Incoherent justifications for legal personhood: embryos, AI, and corporate entities

Altogether, the logic of anti-AI, pro-embryo personhood can be described as follows:

·         All entities that are genetic “human beings” are entitled to legal personhood.

·         Only genetic human beings are entitled to legal personhood.

·         An embryo is a genetic human being and therefore entitled to legal personhood.

·         AI is not a genetic human being and therefore not entitled to legal personhood.

However, limiting the scope of legal personhood to only genetic human beings does not comport with the accepted legal personhood of nonhuman entities like corporations. Indeed, both Utah and Idaho recognize corporate entities as legal persons.[28] And state representatives emphasize in their respective anti-AI personhood laws that corporate entities ought to continue to be granted personhood. The Idaho statute noted that any “municipality, organization, corporation, or other legal entity recognized by the laws of the state of Idaho as such prior to July 1, 2022” would continue to be considered legal persons.[29] The Utah statute similarly maintains legal personhood for corporate entities by extending the definition of “legal personhood” to those “other than an individual.”[30]  

Both states appear to deal with the inconsistency of defining legal personhood in terms of genetics by simply deeming corporate and other entities exceptions to the anti-AI personhood statute. But if “a person is a person, and a tree is not,” how can a corporation still be deemed a “person” under law? Thus, state legislative representatives do not have consistent rationales for their personhood laws. In the next section, I discuss describe Berg’s theory and explain why it provides a good framework to resolve claims for personhood for AI, embryos, and corporate entities.

II. Interest Analysis Theory and Legal Personhood of Embryos & Corporate Entities

Traditionally, legal scholars have equated legal persons with those that have duties and rights.[31] More recently, Visa Kurki explains legal personhood using a “bundle theory,” where “legal personhood functions somewhat like ownership: It consists of incidents of legal personhood.”[32] While other theories of personhood largely focus on the attributes of the entity in question, Berg’s theory of personhood is compelling because it considers both the interests of the entity in question as well as the interests of society. Her theory also allows for entities who do not qualify as legal persons at any given time to attain that qualification based on evolving societal interests. Below I describe the interest analysis theory of personhood, and how Berg applies it to embryos and corporate entities.

A.     The interest analysis theory

Under Berg’s framework, there are two ways to qualify for legal personhood: natural and juridical.[33] To qualify as a natural person, an entity must be biologically human and born alive.[34] Granting personhood to an entity can deprive others of rights.[35] Thus, to justify the granting of these rights, the entity ought to have an interest such as a stake in its own welfare.[36] We assume that biological humans who are alive have an interest in their own welfare.

Entities that are not biologically human and born alive could qualify for a type of legal personhood known as juridical personhood.[37] One way nonhuman entities will be considered juridical persons is by considering the morally relevant interests of the entity. Morally relevant interests include whether the entity is sentient, conscious, or capable of suffering.[38] Late-term fetuses therefore might qualify for juridical personhood due to emerging sentience (pain perception).[39] Sentient animals—if proven conscious—could be granted rights of legal personhood, such as right to freedom from torture.[40]

Another way that an entity could qualify for juridical personhood is if it were in the interest of other natural persons and society to grant the personhood. For example, entities could be recognized as juridical persons if the failure to do so would undermine the rights of currently recognized natural persons.[41] It should be noted that the rights of juridical persons can be limited to the extent necessary to promote the persons’ interests and those of society.[42] In other words, the rights granted to juridical persons should not infringe on natural persons’ rights.[43]

B.     Legal personhood of embryos under the interest analysis theory

Qualifying as a natural person requires that the entity be biologically human and have a stake in its survival, which typically only born people do. Relying on legal philosopher Joel Feinberg, Berg argues that to have a stake in one’s survival, an entity must be sentient or consciously aware.[44] Though some may disagree, according to Berg, embryos do not consciously experience having a stake in their own survival. Some legal scholars even argue that embryos, at least when they are outside of the womb, are property.[45]

Having determined that embryos are not natural persons, Berg further argues that embryos do not qualify as juridical persons either. Unlike sentient fetuses or animals, embryos cannot suffer, think, or interact.[46] This means embryos themselves do not have morally relevant interests. Additionally, Berg argues that societal interests are not enhanced by granting juridical personhood to embryos: Recognizing them as legal persons would be purely symbolic.[47] Others might argue that some natural persons or society may have an interest in the survival of an embryo for reasons such as their moral beliefs or policy reasons such as the need for population growth. However, these interests may be outweighed by the fact that granting embryos personhood actually infringes on natural persons’ ability to access abortion and fertility treatments.[48] Although Dobbs declared that there is no protection for abortion under the U.S. Constitution, it places a burden on individuals who are not able to access abortion and fertility treatments in states where it is severely restricted.[49]

C.     Legal personhood of corporate entities under the interest analysis theory

Berg points out that “[c]orporations are the best example [of] . . . juridical persons.”[50] Corporations qualify for juridical personhood because their personhood benefits natural persons and society. Natural persons are able to pool their capital to make investments, while at the same time limiting their liability and providing a framework for self-governance.[51] Additionally, society benefits because granting corporations personhood promotes economic growth, and individuals that are harmed by the corporation have an entity to sue.

The interest analysis theory offers a consistent way to resolve questions of personhood. It is flexible to accommodate changing societal needs and perspectives. In the next section, I use the interest analysis theory to evaluate whether we should grant AI legal personhood.

III. Personhood for AI under the Interest Analysis Theory

Using the interest analysis theory, I conclude that we should not grant AI personhood. AI does not have morally relevant interests and granting AI personhood could harm natural people and society. Although I reach the same conclusion as the states that have passed anti-AI personhood laws, I do so for different reasons.

A.     AI does not have morally relevant interests

AI obviously does not qualify for legal personhood as a natural person. In determining whether AI can qualify as a juridical person, we must first consider whether it has morally relevant interests and/or the interests of natural persons and society dictate in favor of personhood. AI in its current form “remains limited to its specialized tasks. . . It does not possess consciousness, self-awareness, or general knowledge beyond what it was trained to do.”[52] It is not sentient and does not have autonomy.[53] Consequently, under Berg’s theory, AI does not have morally relevant interests and would not qualify for juridical personhood under this route.

Some authors argue that one day there will be AGI—artificial general intelligence—which will have human-level intelligence or even intelligence superior to humans.[54] But if and when AGI evolves to develop self-awareness, subjective experiences, or the capacity to suffer like replicants in the movie Blade Runner, Berg’s framework is flexible enough to evaluate interests of that AGI while balancing the relevant societal needs at that time.[55]

The other way AI could qualify for juridical personhood is if granting it personhood would benefit natural persons or society. Many people are using AI chatbots as companions for emotional support and otherwise.[56] This use suggests that humans do have an interest in AI chatbots and ensuring their continuity. Additionally, society arguably benefits in many other ways from AI since it makes tasks more efficient and allows access to greater knowledge. But the interest analysis theory also requires us consider the harm that AI can cause to people and society.[57]

B.     Granting AI personhood may harm natural people

There are many ways AI could harm people. A generative AI chatbot could hallucinate and defame someone.[58] Someone could also use it to commit cybercrimes or violate intellectual property protections.[59] A self-driving car can hurt or kill a pedestrian due to a fault in its software.[60]  

As seen with corporations, one consequence of legal personhood for a nonhuman entity is that human individuals who develop, provide capital for, or in some way control the entity are shielded from liability. As a result, when an AI tool causes harm, the harmed person cannot sue the people that developed the AI. He or she can only sue the AI.

Although this model works for a corporate entity, unlike a corporate entity, AI does not independently hold or generate assets.

Some scholars suggest that one way to address this concern is to  require it to carry assets, an insurance, or bond—then it would be able to pay parties it has injured.[61] The concern with this proposal is that there is no guarantee that the developers adequately funded the AI. Additionally, the widespread use of AI is relatively new and the technology is evolving, so the level of harm that AI is capable of is unknown. Moreover, even if AI was able to hold assets and was adequately funded to pay for the harms it causes, the individuals who were harmed by the AI would benefit by suing the developer companies directly over the AI, as the companies would certainly have more assets than it has allocated to the AI.

Alicia Lai argues that we should grant AI personhood and, like in the case of corporate entities, its veil could be pierced so that the harmed party could recover from the assets of the developer of the AI.[62] In other words, if certain parties used AI to perpetrate fraud or misrepresentation, then plaintiffs could sue the big technology companies that develop the AI. Courts, however, infrequently pierce the corporate veil when it comes to corporate entities.[63] This solution therefore does not adequately protect natural persons that are harmed by AI.

C.     Granting AI personhood may harm society

Some argue that granting AI personhood may benefit society because it would spur innovation and investments in AI technology.[64] In this view, if the creators of AI took the brunt of liability for harms their products cause, it would limit further development in technology. However, this claim is not empirically sound. The companies that develop AI are already innovating at a rapid pace with tremendous funding.[65] Thus, the fear of liability is not necessarily slowing growth. Conversely, if AI developers were protected from liability, they would likely take more risks and release products that were not properly vetted.

I should point out that there are numerous existing challenges that people who have been harmed by AI face when attempting to recover from the big technology companies. For example, there are several people and entities in the chain of accountability (coders, users, corporate entities, etc.), and legal rules have not yet clarified who in the chain is liable under what circumstances. Courts have been grappling with and addressing liability issues on a case-by-case basis.[66] Some authors argue that given the challenges of using existing law to compensate people for the harms they suffered from AI, it may be better to grant AI personhood so an injured party can more easily hold the AI accountable.[67]  This, however, depends again on whether the AI itself has sufficient resources to compensate for the harm it causes.

Recognizing the challenges in holding technology companies liable for the harms caused by their AI, California recently adopted a law that addresses liability in civil cases involving AI—it prohibits defendants from asserting that AI acted autonomously as a defense when they are sued by someone who was harmed by the AI,[68] ensuring that businesses cannot evade liability by claiming independent AI actions.

In sum, natural people and society would be harmed if AI were given legal personhood because we would leave the people unprotected from the harms caused by AI. AI therefore does not qualify for legal personhood based on natural or juridical personhood. Indeed, no court has yet granted AI personhood.[69]

Conclusion

Legislatures in Idaho and Utah have defined legal personhood in terms of genetics when justifying laws granting personhood to embryos and other prenatal entities. They then extended this logic to a denial of personhood to AI—finding that it is not a legal person because it is not genetically human. It is a fallacy to define legal personhood synonymously with human personhood, because it does not account for existing nonhuman entities that are granted personhood. Rule of law dictates that there ought to be consistency across the laws passed by political representatives. When legislative representatives pass personhood laws, they ought to develop a framework that ensures consistency across personhood laws. Failing to do so erodes trust in representative bodies.

Berg’s theory of personhood proposes a thoughtful framework that we can use to reconcile why and under what circumstances we can grant both human and nonhuman entities legal personhood. The interest analysis theory does not only just consider the characteristics or traits of the entity vying for legal personhood but also considers the interests of the entity as well as societal interests. Under the interest analysis theory, we grant corporate entities legal personhood with certain designated legal rights because it benefits natural persons and society to do so. On the other hand, AI should not be granted personhood because it has no morally relevant interests, and granting personhood could harm society.

AI is dramatically changing society and, as it becomes more autonomous, it is also becoming even more powerful. Without any federal regulations on AI and only a patchwork of state regulations, there is no legal framework in place that ensures that AI is built in a way that minimizes harm to people. Litigants have attempted to use common law to vindicate their claims with mixed success at holding the developers of AI liable. Nonetheless, granting AI personhood is dangerous because it creates a roadblock to the one route. We have to hold the companies that develop AI accountable. Legal personhood for AI gives big technology companies even more leeway to take risks that can harm individuals and society.

Copyright © 2025 Sital Kilantry, Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law and Director of the Roundglass India Center. I am grateful to Maggie Chon, Mark Chinen, Richard Delgado, Jean Stefancic, Sonia Katyal, Mark Verstraete, and all the participants in the Seattle University School of Law summer workshop series. I want to sincerely thank Angela Chung, Sean You, and the entire team that worked on this Article at the California Law Review Online. I am grateful to my research assistants Sam Mabe, Rani Jacobs, and Jai Penalver.

[1]AI is any technology/machine that can perform complex tasks that are typically associated with human intelligence. AI Overview and Definitions, Notre Dame Learning (Mar. 15, 2024), https://learning.nd.edu/resource-library/ai-overview-and-definitions/ [https://perma.cc/WCY2-NUK9].

[2] See AI Watch: Global regulatory tracker - United States, White & Case (July 21, 2025), https://www.whitecase.com/insight-our-thinking/ai-watch-global-regulatory-tracker-united-states [https://perma.cc/9XSH-WYM2]; Clare Duffy, US Senate votes to strike controversial AI regulation moratorium from Trump agenda bill, CNN Bus. (July 1, 2025), https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/01/tech/senate-strikes-ai-regulation-moratorium-agenda-bill [https://perma.cc/E85A-RTYB]. Recently, Donald Trump issued an executive order of questionable legality that threatens states with defunding if they continue to regulate AI, though its enforceability remains to be seen. Cody Venzke, Trump AI Action Plan Raises Legal Questions, Potentially Violates Constitution, Tech Pol’y (July 31, 2025), https://www.techpolicy.press/trump-ai-action-plan-raises-legal-questions-potentially-violates-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/KB7R-UBYU].

[3] Idaho Code Ann. § 5-346 (West 2022); Utah Code Ann. § 63G-32-102 (West 2024). Similar laws have also been proposed in Missouri, South Carolina, and Washington. For Missouri, see Mo. H.B. 721, 103d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2025); South Carolina, S.C. H.B. 3796, Gen. Assemb., 126th Sess. (S.C. 2025); Washington, H.B. 2029, 2025 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2025).

[4] An embryo is defined as “the unborn human offspring, esp[ecially] during the early stages of development . . . . The term is now narrowly applied to the human organism . . . usually in the second week after fertilization and just prior to implantation . . . until the end of the eighth week, when the organs begin to develop and it is termed a fetus.” Embryo, Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/embryo_n?tab=meaning_and_use#5706260 [https://perma.cc/X3UG-JC3U] (last visited Aug. 22, 2025).

[5] See generally Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for Legal Personhood, 59 Hastings L.J. 369 (2007).

[6] See generally id.

[7] See Mary Ziegler, Personhood: The New Civil War Over Reproduction ix (2025).

[8] Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (holding that “the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,” includes only born or post-natal people).

[9] See Cynthia Soohoo, An Embryo is Not a Person: Rejecting Prenatal Personhood for a More Complex View of Prenatal Life, 14 ConLawNOW 81, 84-89 (2023); see generally Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022).

[10] See Idaho Code § 18-622 (2024).

[11] Id. § 18-604(5).

[12] Id. § 18-4001.

[13] H.B. 367, 68th Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 1979)

[14] Roe v. Wade had set viability as the standard before which states could not prohibit abortion, which is typically around 24 weeks of gestation. 410 U.S. at 160, 163–64.

[15] Utah Code § 76-7-302(2)(a) (2024).

[16] Id. § 76-7-314.5.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. § 76-5-201.

[19] Id. § 78B-3-109 (“The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to encourage all persons to respect the right to life of all other persons, regardless of age, development, condition, or dependency, including all persons with a disability and all unborn persons.”).

[20] Idaho Code Ann. § 5-346 (West 2022) (“Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, environmental elements, artificial intelligence, nonhuman animals, and inanimate objects shall not be granted personhood in the state of Idaho.”).

[21] Id.

[22] Id. § 63G-32-102 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a governmental entity may not grant legal personhood to, nor recognize legal personhood in: (1) artificial intelligence; (2) an inanimate object; (3) a body of water; (4) land; (5) real property; (6) atmospheric gases; (7) an astronomical object; (8) weather; (9) a plant; (10) a nonhuman animal; or (11) any other member of a taxonomic domain that is not a human being.”).

[23] Rebecca Boone, Bill would bar Idaho’s lands and animal from ‘personhood,’ AP News (Feb. 15, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/united-states-environment-animals-idaho-402c779428a74a6ec9e7994ee977005c [https://perma.cc/255G-HQDY].

[24] Email from Mila Woods, Senate Volunteer for Sen. Nichols, to author (May 7, 2025) (on file with author) (responding to author’s question about the rationale behind denying personhood to AI).

[25] Utah State Legislature, House Floor Audio, Day 15, at 00:47:45 (audio recording, Jan. 30, 2024) (statement of Rep. Brooks) https://le.utah.gov/av/floorArchive.jsp?markerID=124928 [https://perma.cc/XQJ7-KR22].

[26] Id.

[27] Telephone Interview with Rep. Walt Brooks, Utah State Rep. (Apr. 28, 2025) (notes on file with the author).

[28] Idaho Code § 30-21-102(35) (2024); Utah Code § 16-10a-302 (2024).

[29] Idaho Code § 5-346 (2024) (“Nothing in this section revokes the status of legal person in or of any . . . corporation[] or other legal or business entity recognized by the laws of the state of Idaho.”)..”).

[30] Utah Code Ann. § 63G-32-101 (West 2024) (“‘Legal Personhood’” means[] the legal rights and obligations of a person other than an individual under the law[].”).

[31] See, e.g., Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 28 (1913).

[32] See generally, e.g., Visa A.J. Kurki, A Theory of Legal Personhood 13 (2019).

[33] Berg, supra note 5, at 372.

[34] Id. at 372.

[35] Id. at 374.

[36] Id. at 376. In very rare cases such as Anencephalic infants, the interests of others could be considered when determining if an entity qualifies for legal personhood as a natural person. Id. at 377.

[37] Id. at 373.

[38] Id. at 375-76.

[39] Id. at 395.

[40] See id. at 404.

[41] See id. at 382.

[42] Id. at 380-81.

[43] Id. at 381.

[44] Id. at 376.

[45] See generally Mollie Cornell & Teresa Baron, The Law and Ethics of a Property Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 44 Legal Stud. 332 (2024) (arguing that frozen embryos may be subjects of property rights).

[46] Berg, supra note 5, at 389.

[47] See id. at 390-92.

[48] See id. at 391.

[49] See generally Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022).

[50] See Berg, supra note 5, at 373.

[51] Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 Ill. L. Rev. 785, 787 (2013).

[52] Muhammad Tuhin, What Is Narrow, General, and SuperAI?, Sci. News Today (Apr. 27, 2025), https://www.sciencenewstoday.org/what-is-narrow-general-and-super-ai [https://perma.cc/EWD6-JQ7T].

[53] Fei-Fei Li & John Etchemendy, No, Today’s AI Isn’t Sentient. Here’s How We Know, TIME (May 22, 2024), https://time.com/6980134/ai-llm-not-sentient/ [https://perma.cc/6M6D-FYBL]. 

[54] Dan Milmo, ‘Godfather of AI’ Shortens Odds of the Technology Wiping Out Humanity Over Next 30 Years, The Guardian (Dec. 27, 2024), at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/dec/27/godfather-of-ai-raises-odds-of-the-technology-wiping-out-humanity-over-next-30-years [https://perma.cc/4WRH-GK9N].

[55] Berg, supra note 5 at 405.

[56] See, e.g., Windsor Johnston, With therapy hard to get, people lean on AI for mental health. What are the risks?, NPR (Sept. 30, 2025), https://www.npr.org/sections/shots-health-news/2025/09/30/nx-s1-5557278/ai-artificial-intelligence-mental-health-therapy-chatgpt-openai [https://perma.cc/U3KJ-Q5QF].

[57] Berg, supra note 5, at 385-86.

[58] Gary F. Marcus, Taming Silicon Valley: How We Can Ensure That AI Works for Us 54-55 (2024).

[59] Id. at 56-59, 65-67.

[60] See Troy Griggs & Daisuke Wakabayashi, How a Self-Driving Uber Killed a Pedestrian in Arizona, N.Y. Times (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/20/us/self-driving-uber-pedestrian-killed.html [https://perma.cc/P29R-NMHL].

[61] Mark Fenwick & Stefan Wrbka, AI and Legal Personhood, in The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence 288, 302 (Larry A. DiMatteo et al. eds., 2022).

[62] Alicia Lai, Artificial Intelligence, LLC: Corporate Personhood as Tort Reform, 2021 Mich. St. L. Rev. 597, 637-40 (2021).

[63] Piercing the Veil, Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/piercing_the_veil [https://perma.cc/5PY3-W2BY] (last visited Nov. 17, 2025).

[64] Tanner W. Mathison, Recognizing Right: The Status of Artificial Intelligence, 19 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 105, 153 (2023) (“Legislators must consider how best to regulate AI without stifling innovation and corporate production. One method is by granting AIs a form of legal personhood.”).

[65] Peter Waters, Andrew Low, & Jen Bradley, Global trends in AI investment and enterprise deployment, Gilbert + Tobin (Apr. 22, 2025), https://www.gtlaw.com.au/insights/global-trends-in-ai-investment-and-enterprise-deployment [https://perma.cc/K6XZ-QTKP].

[66] See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Vicarious Liability for AI, 99 Ind. L.J. 317, 333–34 (2023).

[67] See e.g., Mark Fenwick & Stefan Wrbka, AI and Legal Personhood 3030, in The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence: Global Perspectives on Law & Ethics (Larry A Dimatteo, Cristina Poncibò, & Michel Cannarsa eds., 2022) (“To conclude, this chapter examined the idea of AI personhood and suggests that we shouldn’t dismiss personhood too quickly, given the complexities and uncertainties of the issues at stake and the complexities and limitations of any liability-based solution.”).

[68] AB 316, 2025 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2025).

[69] Copyright and Artificial Intelligence, Part 2: Copyrightability, U.S. Copyright Off. 6-7 (2025), https://www.copyright.gov/ai/Copyright-and-Artificial-Intelligence-Part-2-Copyrightability-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG4G-V93H]. Indeed, the copyright office has refused to grant a copyright on a work created by AI on the grounds that AI is not an “author” for purposes of the copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution.