Ethics & Independence in Trump’s War on Big Law
In his second term, President Donald Trump has launched an unprecedented assault on the nation’s largest law firms. Through a series of executive orders and highly unusual EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) actions, the Trump regime has sought to undermine the independence of the private bar. In response, targeted firms have been forced to make a choice: to appease the administration or to fight back. This Essay considers those choices—the interrelated nature of parallel settlements and suits—and the choice that the majority of firms have made to stay silent. We argue that Big Law’s independence is essential and that it is not too late for courage.
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Introduction
In the early days of the first Trump administration, thousands of attorneys rushed to international airports to advocate for immigrants caught up in the chaos of President Donald Trump’s “Muslim ban,” an executive order (“EO”) that restricted immigration from several Muslim-majority countries. Hundreds of these volunteer lawyers came from the ranks of the nation’s biggest law firms, commonly referred to as “Big Law.”[1] At the time, these Big Law firms—chiefly known for their “white shoe” law practices for corporate clients—proudly touted their role in standing up for immigrant families and the rule of law.
In the early days of the second Trump administration, the President has again targeted immigrants, this time even more viciously and lawlessly. And yet, no army of Big Law attorneys has swept in to help. In fact, Big Law found itself in the crosshairs of the Trump regime.[2] This Essay first examines how the Trump administration has sought to punish or capture Big Law. Part I offers a descriptive account of Trump’s war on Big Law, analyzing the interrelated dynamics between firms that have settled with the administration, firms that have fought back, and firms that have remained silent. Part II broadens the lens to consider how the ethics of the legal profession ought to shape these strategic considerations. Ultimately, we argue that law firms must remain independent, and we suggest that it is not too late for courage.
I. Settle, Stand, or Silence
In his second term, the President first targeted law firms with whom he had personal grievances. On February 25, 2025, Trump issued an executive memorandum suspending the security clearances of attorneys at Covington & Burling. Covington had provided pro bono assistance to special prosecutor Jack Smith in connection with criminal investigations into Trump’s role in the January 6th attack on the Capitol and his mishandling of classified documents.[3] On March 6, Trump issued an EO targeting Perkins Coie, pointing to the firm’s representation of his 2016 presidential rival, Hillary Clinton.[4] In the EO, he also directed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to investigate “large, influential, or industry leading law firms.”[5] On March 13, Trump signed a similar EO targeting Paul, Weiss, citing the law firm’s connections to former prosecutors Robert Mueller and Mark Pomerantz.[6] And on March 17, the Acting Chair of the EEOC sent letters to twenty law firms, seeking to investigate their diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs for illegal discrimination.[7]
Trump continued to target Big Law firms, issuing EOs against Jenner & Block, WilmerHale, and Susman Godfrey that threatened to revoke security clearances, cut ties with all firm clients, and block attorneys from entering government buildings.[8] Faced with these EOs, firm leaders were forced to make a choice: fight back or appease the administration.
Perkins Coie chose to fight: The firm hired Williams & Connolly, filed its complaint within days, and won a quick preliminary injunction.[9] Perkins Coie was not alone in countering the administration’s efforts. Jenner & Block,[10] WilmerHale,[11] and Susman Godfrey[12] all sued, supported by legal teams from Cooley LLP, Clement & Murphy, and Munger Tolles, respectively. Each won a quick preliminary injunction against the government.
The plaintiffs are supported by great crowds of amici, including firms, professors, retired judges, and students.[13] And as things currently stand, all four Big Law firms have won summary judgment, while the government has signaled its intent to appeal.[14]
Rather than fighting, Paul, Weiss chose appeasement.[15] On March 20, the firm’s chairman, Brad Karp, met with the President in the oval office and struck an unprecedented deal.[16] As announced by Trump, the law firm made a series of vague promises not to discriminate against politically conservative lawyers or clients, to dismantle its DEI efforts, and to “dedicate the equivalent of $40 million in pro bono legal services over the course of President Trump’s term to support the Administration’s initiatives, including: assisting our Nation’s veterans, fairness in the Justice System, the President’s Task Force to Combat Antisemitism, and other mutually agreed projects.”[17]
Eight other firms chose to follow the path charted by Paul, Weiss, agreeing to cut back their diversity efforts and to contribute a total of $940 million in pro bono hours to administration-approved political causes.[18] That course has been met with internal resistance and resignations from lawyers and law students.[19] And interpretive disputes are already brewing over the enforceability and meaning of the deals.[20]
For many observers, Perkins Coie and Paul, Weiss blazed two paths for Big Law’s response to Trump’s revanchist campaign: settle or stand. But as the story develops, we can sketch out the picture with a little more nuance.
First, law firms are responding to different types of pressure, complicating some easy narratives of courage versus capitulation. Trump aimed his memoranda and EOs at only six firms, and only Paul, Weiss actually decided to settle.[21] Four of the firms sued immediately, and Covington & Burling, the last of the six, has joined amicus briefs supporting the suing firms.[22] By contrast, most of the nine settling firms were settling their EEOC investigations only, leaving unanswered how they would have responded had they also been targeted by EOs. Strikingly, Willkie Farr and Cadwalader chose to negotiate with the administration before even receiving either an EO or the EEOC letter. Indeed, because the EEOC must keep its charges and investigations confidential, there is no public record of how many firms have received an EEOC charge, are being investigated, or settled.
Second, the paths are intertwined. The fact of the settlements has impacted the litigation. When the suing firms asked the court for emergency relief, they pointed to the fact that Paul, Weiss treated the threat as existential.[23] And, when the district judge ruled that the EO was unlawful retaliation and chilled Perkins Coie’s speech, she based her conclusion in part on the rush to settle.[24]
Conversely, the fate of the lawsuits will impact the settlements. The same judge declared the EO “null and void” and stated that the EEOC’s process lacked the “hallmarks of a legitimate investigation.”[25] These legal victories for the suing firms can only aid the settling firms too. When disputes arise over the agreements, the settling firms could argue that they agreed to the deals under duress, due to unlawful threats from Trump. Conversely, if Trump alleges that the settling firms have failed to perform, he might have to rely on the courts for a remedy, instead of reimposing unlawful EOs and EEOC investigations. Plus, if a judicial consensus emerges that the EOs and EEOC investigations are unlawful, any newly targeted firms will seem all the more craven if they settle.
Third, most Big Law firms have chosen another path: standing by. Of the twenty-four targeted firms, ten have neither announced settlements nor joined the fray. Of the Am Law 100, eighty-one firms have taken no public position.[26] By gross revenue, 18.5% have settled and 7.5% have stood up, but 74% have remained silent.[27]
Early analysis of the Trump administration’s continuing war on Big Law has focused on a binary choice between settlement and litigation.[28] But indeed, these two paths are interrelated and practice area dependent—complicating the simplest stories of courage or cowardice. Focusing on the settling and litigating firms also overlooks that the majority of Big Law firms have remained silent for now.
II. Big Law & the Rule of Law
A full analysis of the law firms’ choices would dig into lawyers’ obligations to their clients, partners’ fiduciary duties to each other, and the moral and philosophical dimensions of each path. But for the purposes of this Essay, we are especially concerned with how the firms’ responses unearth another urgent question: What is the role of Big Law in protecting the rule of law? To be clear, public service organizations, the public defense bar, and other public interest lawyers serve as the backbone of legal opposition to state violence and oppression.[29] And Big Law firms routinely defend moneyed private actors whose conduct harms the vulnerable.[30] Nevertheless, Big Law firms are also the site of the greatest concentration of resources within the legal profession,[31] and their partnerships have historically deployed these resources to vindicate legal rights against state overreach.[32] That immigration work, and asylum in particular, make up such a large share of the Big Law pro bono docket reveals that commitment.[33]
The Trump administration has sought to neutralize this dynamic. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt declared that “Big Law continues to bend the knee to President Trump . . . “ and that “he looks forward to putting their pro bono legal concessions toward implementing his America First agenda.”[34] Indeed, Trump says that he can assign work to the settling firms, calling them an “unrivaled network of Lawyers” and bragging about the aggregate amount of services that he can marshal.[35] The President has even floated using settling firms to cut new trade deals with foreign nations,[36] assist coal companies with leases,[37] and represent law enforcement officials accused of excessive force and other constitutional violations.[38] If law firm pro bono departments want to see themselves as playing an essential role in checking state power against vulnerable populations,[39] the Trump administration’s vision is precisely the opposite: the weaponization of Big Law to defend state power against legal accountability to the vulnerable.
But deep-seated values of the legal profession stand in direct conflict with the President’s vision for law firm pro bono. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, affirmed in states from Massachusetts to Florida, proclaim that “[a]n independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice.”[40] The settlements, though, undercut this core function. If Big Law firms agree to represent police departments or federal agencies (say, DHS or ICE), they may conflict themselves out of representing victims of official misconduct against those same entities.[41] This precise concern motivated the American Bar Association to file its own lawsuit against what it calls a “Law Firm Intimidation Policy” by the administration.[42]
But perhaps the most troubling development is the silence and quiet submission from most of the nation’s largest law firms. Even firms who have not settled are turning down pro bono cases for fear of Trump’s retribution.[43] Some firms have quietly removed information about their diversity and inclusion programming and deleted pronouns from their e-mail signatures.[44] These actions represent a marked retreat from attorneys’ special responsibilities to justice and to their own professional independence from the state.
That so many large firms have chosen not to speak up in the face of the Trump regime’s Big Law power grab is, itself, expressive. As many legal ethics scholars supporting the litigating firms have argued, the EOs and settlements with the Trump administration create irresolvable ethical challenges for those firms, ranging from creating client conflicts to compromising the lawyer’s duty of loyalty.[45] Organizational behavior literature tells us that employees take their ethical cues from those in power within their organizations and the culture they create.[46] When law firm leaders refuse to speak out in the face of this threat to the legal profession’s independence, those leaders may be sending a signal that immediate commercial and political concerns are more important than professional independence.
Whether Big Law firms tilt one way or the other is not simply a question of reaching the “right” answer, whether that answer is determined by ethics rules, fiduciary duty law, or moral philosophy. The shared norms and values that drive the people within any law firm—its culture and character—will shape organizational decision-making when commercial concerns and ethical rules are in direct conflict.[47] Throughout all of this, the call on Big Law is to preserve the independence of the private bar to stand up to the state against the abuse of power.
Conclusion
With litigation pending and the deals in doubt, the call for courage is not over. And firms will continue to face the choice between independence and appeasement—firms that have sued might be tempted to quietly “obey in advance” on other fronts, such as by shuttering diversity programs or quietly realigning their pro bono programs to appease Trump.[48] Firms that have settled will have additional opportunities to stand up for the rule of law, perhaps by refusing to devote pro bono hours to defending unconstitutional acts committed by ICE agents. Standing up for the independence of the private bar may look different as the procedural landscape shifts, as the legal status of the deals is thrown into doubt, and as the Trump regime changes tactics. But with each new set of choices, it is no less vital for the legal profession to meet the moment with clarity and conviction.
Copyright © 2025 Christopher D. Hampson* & Elise Bernlohr Maizel**
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law
** Assistant Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. The authors would like to express their gratitude to numerous interlocutors, including Joan MacLeod Heminway, Nancy Rapoport, J. Travis Laster, Robert Miller, Brittany Farr, & Rachel Cohen, as well as law firm and governmental sources who provided helpful background.
[1]. See, e.g., Aebra Coe, BigLaw Springs Into Action Following Immigration Ban, Law360 (Jan. 30, 2017, at 9:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/886085/BigLaw-springs-into-action-following-immigration-ban [https://perma.cc/89DJ-FXB3]. “Big Law” as a category has no precise delineation, but many people look to the Am Law 100 for a rough cutoff.
[2]. Trump’s assault on Big Law is in retribution, in part, for Big Law’s immigration efforts during his first term. Indeed, the President has accused both the immigration bar and “powerful Big Law pro bono practices” of “coach[ing] clients to conceal their past or lie,” calling for sanctions, disciplinary proceedings, and other measures against offending attorneys. President Donald Trump, Preventing Abuses of the Legal System and the Federal Court, The White House (Mar. 22, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/preventing-abuses-of-the-legal-system-and-the-federal-court/ [https://perma.cc/CLQ3-29U6].
[3]. Memorandum on Suspension of Security Clearances and Evaluation of Government Contracts, 2025 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 303 (Feb. 25, 2025); U.S. Dep’t of Just., Final Report of the Special Counsel Under 28 C.F.R. § 600.8 (2025), https://www.justice.gov/storage/Report-of-Special-Counsel-Smith-Volume-1-January-2025.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6FG-5M84].
[4]. Exec. Order No. 14,230, 90 Fed. Reg. 11781 (Mar. 6, 2025).
[5]. Id.
[6]. Exec. Order No. 14,237, 90 Fed. Reg. 13039 (Mar. 14, 2025).
[7]. EEOC Acting Chair Andrea Lucas Sends Letters to 20 Law Firms Requesting Information About DEI-Related Employment Practices, Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (Mar. 17, 2025), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-acting-chair-andrea-lucas-sends-letters-20-law-firms-requesting-information-about-dei [https://perma.cc/DP5W-WNNY].
[8]. Exec. Order No. 14,246, 90 Fed. Reg. 13997 (Mar. 25, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14,250, 90 Fed. Reg. 14549 (Mar. 27, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14,263, 90 Fed. Reg. 15615 (Apr. 9, 2025).
[9]. Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 770 F. Supp. 3d 190 (D.D.C. 2025). The law firms have argued that the EOs are unconstitutional violations of free speech, free association, the right to petition, due process, the right to counsel, and equal protection, in addition to other claims. Other commentators have pointed out that the orders look like executive bills of attainder. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Fred Halbhuber & Inbar Pe’er, No, the President Cannot Issue Bills of Attainder, Just Security (Apr. 9, 2025), https://www.justsecurity.org/110109/president-cannot-issue-attainder-bills/ [https://perma.cc/3CXD-3VMG].
[10]. Complaint, Jenner & Block LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 1:25-cv-00916 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2025) (No. 1). Jenner & Block partner Adam Unikowsky has outlined “the case for suing,” which analyzes the unconstitutionality of the EOs and the need for the private bar to maintain its independence. See Adam Unikowsky, The Case for Suing, Why Law Firms Should Remain Independent from the Government, Substack (Apr. 9, 2025), https://adamunikowsky.substack.com/p/the-case-for-suing [https://perma.cc/QWE9-LFA3].
[11]. Complaint, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP v. Exec. Off. of the President, No. 1:25-cv-00917 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2025) (No. 1).
[12]. Complaint, Susman Godfrey LLP v. Exec. Off. of the President, No. 1:25-cv-01107 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2025) (No. 1).
[13]. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Which firms, legal groups, law profs signed briefs supporting Perkins Coie in challenge to punitive Trump order?, ABA J. (Apr. 8, 2025, 8:52 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/which-law-firms-legal-groups-and-law-profs-signed-briefs-supporting-perkins-coie-in-challenge-to-punitive-trump-order [https://perma.cc/RZD6-H8JZ] (counting “more than 500 firms, more than 360 law professors, [and] nearly 350 former judges”); Brief of Amici Curiae 1129 Law Students and 51 Law Student Organizations in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Susman Godfrey LLP v. Exec. Off. of the President, No. 1:25-cv-01107 (Apr. 29, 2025) (No. 130).
[14]. Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 2025 WL 1276857 (D.D.C. May 2, 2025); Jenner & Block, LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 2025 WL 1482021 (D.D.C. May 23, 2025); Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP v. Exec. Off. of the President, 2025 WL 1502329 (D.D.C. May 27, 2025); Memorandum Opinion, Susman Godfrey LLP v. Exec. Off. of the President, No. 25-1107 (June 27, 2025), ECF No. 206; see also, e.g., Notice of Appeal, Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 25-716 (July 2, 2025) (No. 188).
[15]. Paul, Weiss had hired “litigation powerhouse” Quinn Emanuel in case it was forced to sue. See Erin Mulvaney, Josh Dawsey & C. Ryan Barber, Why Law Firm Paul Weiss Pleaded Its Case With Trump, and Not With a Court, Wall St. J. (Mar. 21, 2025 6:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/why-law-firm-paul-weiss-pleaded-its-case-with-trumpnot-a-court-4b688b96 [https://perma.cc/SSJ8-2MLP].
[16]. See Michael S. Schmidt et al., How a Major Democratic Law Firm Ended Up Bowing to Trump, N.Y. Times (Mar. 21, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/21/us/politics/paul-weiss-trump.html [https://perma.cc/J9R4-RSJ4].
[17]. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Mar. 20, 2025, 6:10 PM), https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114197044617921519 [https://perma.cc/7DU2-GVFD]. Neither the EEOC nor managing partners responded to emails inquiring whether the deals were memorialized in any other final writing, so we filed a FOIA request.
[18]. Skadden also agreed to fund at least five prestigious Skadden Fellowships in specified areas and that Skadden Fellows would “represent a wide range of political views, including conservative ideals.” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Mar. 28, 2025, 1:57 PM), https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114241348699704594 [https://perma.cc/9JQ5-XB2X]. In early June, the Executive Director of the Skadden Foundation announced she would resign “rather than endorse actions that I believe will undermine its mission.” Caitlin Oprysko & Daniel Barnes, Skadden Foundation head quits in protest, Politico (June 4, 2025, 6:22 PM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-influence/2025/06/04/skadden-foundation-head-quits-in-protest-00387484 [https://perma.cc/QSY5-AY6K].
[19]. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Resignations multiply at BigLaw firms that made deals with Trump, ABA J. (Apr. 16, 2025, 12:04 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/resignations-multiply-at-biglaw-firms-that-made-deals-with-trump [https://perma.cc/K5U9-J7W7]; Daniel Barnes, Law students say they want to work for the firms standing up to Trump, Politico (Apr. 11, 2025, 5:55 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2025/04/11/law-firms-trump-law-student-recruiting-00007900 [https://perma.cc/J29Y-94C9].
[20]. Numerous commentators have questioned whether the deals are, in fact, contracts. See Unikowsky, supra note 10. Others have zeroed in on the deals’ vague and ambiguous terms. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Paul Weiss Cut a Deal with Trump — That Doesn’t Mean It Caved, Bloomberg L. (Mar. 24, 2025, 11:29 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/paul-weiss-cut-a-deal-with-trump-that-doesnt-mean-it-caved [https://perma.cc/HHP9-M2CP]. Plus, as Professor Heen has pointed out, the settlements may run afoul of bribery laws, which would make them unenforceable and come with criminal exposure. See Memorandum from Sheila Heen, Harvard Law Sch., to Firms Under Pressure from the Trump Admin., Advice I Almost Never Give: Don’t Negotiate (Apr. 10, 2025) (on file with authors).
[21]. Some commentators have noted that Paul, Weiss’s extensive transactional practice makes the firm more heavily reliant on a friendly relationship with government than its litigation-focused peers. See, e.g., John Morley, Why Paul Weiss Struck a Deal With Trump, Wall St. J (Mar. 28, 2025, 5:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/opinion/why-paul-weiss-struck-a-deal-with-trump-law-firm-business-model-35bf7978 [https://perma.cc/AA28-ERH7].
[22]. See Weiss, supra note 13.
[23]. See, e.g., Perkins Coie, 2025 WL 1276857, at *30 (“The fact that Paul, Weiss quickly negotiated a deal . . . rather than face the potential injuries of the similar Executive Order targeting that firm . . . demonstrates the coercive power of such targeting by the Trump Administration.”).
[24]. Id. at *30, 33.
[25]. Id. at *34, 47.
[26]. This is not to say that the “silent” firms have completely shied away from actions that might anger the administration. For example, Akin partnered with the ACLU and Lambda Legal to challenge Tennessee bans on gender affirming care for minors. See Akin Partners with ACLU and Lambda Legal on Landmark Transgender Rights Case at the US Supreme Court, Akin Gump (Dec. 4, 2024), https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/press-releases/akin-partners-with-aclu-and-lambda-legal-on-landmark-transgender-rights-case-at-the-us-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/YQ5M-8Z7F].
[27]. Calculation performed by authors based on amici briefs filed in district court and the gross revenue of the Am Law 100. Numbers subject to change.
[28]. See, e.g., Katie Balevic et al., Here’s where all the firms in the Trump-Big Law fight stand, Bus. Insider (May 28, 2025), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-big-law-fight-firms-legal-dilemma-2025-3 [https://perma.cc/H2ZS-M5DQ].
[29]. See, e.g., ACLU History, Am. C.L. Union (last visited July 21, 2025), https://www.aclu.org/about/aclu-history [https://perma.cc/PGX8-W3U6] (describing the role of the ACLU in protecting civil liberties over the past 100 years).
[30]. See Elise Bernlohr Maizel, Corporate Lawyers, Disloyalty, and the Opioid Crisis, 74 DePaul L. Rev. 495, 508 (2025). See generally, David Enrich, Servants of the Damned: Giant Law Firms, Donald Trump, and the Corruption of Justice 4 (2022). In the competitive landscape of Big Law practice, one firm might be more willing to cut ethical corners than another in order to satisfy a high-dollar value client. See J. Travis Laster & Elise Bernlohr Maizel, Discovery as a Compliance Problem, 50 J. Corp. L. 53, 58–59 (2024). Indeed, some attorneys have argued that commercial concerns justify appeasing Trump. See, e.g., Mark Herrmann, An Apologist for Law Firm Capitulation?, Above the L. (Apr. 21, 2025, 12:16 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2025/04/an-apologist-for-law-firm-capitulation/[https://perma.cc/CG9B-U97Q].
[31]. The 2024 Am Law 100: Ranked by Gross Revenue, Law.com:Am. Law. (Apr. 16, 2024), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/the-2024-am-law-100/ [https://perma.cc/6NWW-AP5M](listing 54 firms with gross revenue over $1 billion).
[32]. See, e.g., The 2025 Pro Bono Report, Law.com:Am. Law (July 8, 2025), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/pro-bono-report [https://perma.cc/CL8Z-JZBJ] (reporting that 115 of the leading law firms collectively contributed 5.12 million pro bono hours in 2024); Matthew Romano, Justice Is Served: Highlights From Big Law’s Year of Impactful Pro Bono, Bloomberg L.: The Am. Law. (July 11, 2023), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XCVNCD1C000000 [https://perma.cc/RRF7-MRR7] (describing Big Law pro bono victories including advocacy for abortion rights, asylum, the rights of pretrial detainees, victims of police violence, and the rights of Indigenous peoples to access cultural heritage sites); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Megan Riley & Vitor M. Dias, Big Law’s Immigration Advocates, 2024 Ill. L. Rev. 447, 477 (2024) (“[I]mmigrants who sought relief from deportation in the federal appellate courts were more likely to succeed if the representing lawyer was from a Big Law firm compared to if the lawyer was not . . . Big Law’s possession of resources serves as a driving factor that explains this discrepancy.”).
[33]. See Abigail Adcox, What Attracts Big Law to Immigration Pro Bono Work?, Law.com:Am. Law. (July 9, 2024), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2024/07/09/what-attracts-big-law-to-immigration-pro-bono-work/ [https://perma.cc/ZV36-TZRZ] (“Immigration cases take up a significant portion of the pro bono work that law firms handle on a yearly basis.”).
[34]. Ben Protess, Maggie Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, How Trump is Putting Law Firms in a No-Win Situation, N.Y. Times (Apr. 9, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/us/politics/trump-law-firms-orders.html [https://perma.cc/FL6N-ARRP].
[35]. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Apr. 2, 2025), https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114269692330126501 [https://perma.cc/3TXS-5VFJ]. For all Trump’s braggadocio, standard principles of contract interpretation strongly suggest that the firms have not promised to accept specific clients on demand. Per ethics rules, law firms must analyze everything from conflicts to competence before agreeing to a new representation and cannot even promise representation to prospective clients before clearing those checks.
[36]. Meredith McGraw, Trump Floats Enlisting Law Firms for Pro Bono Help with Tariffs, Wall St. J. (Apr. 8, 2025), https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/stock-market-trump-tariffs-trade-war-04-08-25/card/trump-floats-enlisting-law-firms-for-pro-bono-help-with-tariffs-NXwch72Zjc35w1cKIYsD [https://perma.cc/3R7C-2VLB].
[37]. Keith Goldberg, Trump Wants to Use Firms that Cut Deals for Coal Leases, Law360 (Apr. 8, 2025, 6:43 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/2322677 [https://perma.cc/VZ2G-5NG9].
[38]. Exec. Order No. 14,288, 90 Fed. Reg. 18765 (Apr. 28, 2025).
[39]. See Scott L. Cummings, Lawyers in Backsliding Democracy, 112 Calif. L. Rev. 513, 528 (2024) (“To balance the scales of justice, lawyers are further expected to counteract systemic resource or political disadvantages by representing underrepresented groups through public interest law and supporting legal mobilization by democratic movements.”).
[40]. Model Rules of Prof. Conduct Preamble; see also Fla. Rules of Prof. Conduct Preamble; Ch. 4; Mass. R. Prof. Conduct Preamble § 11,.
[41]. See Model Rules of Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(1). Skadden’s agreement to “change its pro bono policy so that all pro bono moving forward will be done in the Firm name” would tighten Skadden’s ability to avoid conflicts by screening off individual attorneys. And even if the firms agree to represent only an individual officer, that representation might still prevent firms from ethically representing victims, particularly where attorneys would have to argue conflicting positions in the same court. See Model Rules of Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(2). This is not a hypothetical: Cadwalader offered to help the Brooklyn District Attorney defend criminal convictions on appeal as part of meeting the quota under its agreement. See Justin Henry, Cadwalader Looks to Fight Criminal Appeals to Meet Trump Pledge, Bloomberg L. (May 21, 2025, 5:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/cadwalader-looks-to-fight-criminal-appeals-to-meet-trump-pledge [https://perma.cc/N5VT-UHLR].
[42]. See Complaint, Am. Bar Assoc. v. Exec. Off. of the President, No. 1:25-cv-01888 (D.D.C. June 16, 2025).
[43]. See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Some Giant Law Firms Shy Away from Pro Bono Immigration Cases, N.Y. Times (May 6, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/06/business/trump-law-firms-pro-bono-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/UA5Q-WNR3]; Thomas Spigolon, Big Law Touted its Pro Bono Immigration Work in Trump’s First Term, Now Some Firms are Clamming Up, Law.com:Am. Law. (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2025/02/21/big-law-touted-its-pro-bono-immigration-work-in-trumps-first-term-now-some-firms-are-clamming-up/ [https://perma.cc/4BSQ-VX5P].
[44]. This kind of retreat is not legally required by federal law, even after Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, which allows admissions programs to “consider[]an applicant’s discussion of how race affected his or her life, be it through discrimination, inspiration, or otherwise.” 600 U.S. 181, 230 (2023); see also Christopher D. Hampson & Elise Bernlohr Maizel, DEI as Cultural Commitment in an Era of Backlash, 43 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 26, 27 (2024).
[45]. See, e.g., Brief of Legal Ethics Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff at 6, Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 25-716, ECF No. 133-1 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2025) (“Entering a deal with the government by which a law firm makes certain commitments, including the provision of valuable ‘pro bono’ services to causes favored by the President, makes it difficult for the lawyers in those firms to meet their ethical obligations as attorneys.”).
[46]. See, e.g., Alfredo Contreras, Aiyesha Dey & Claire Hill, “Tone at the Top” and the Communication of Corporate Values: Lost in Translation?, 43 Seattle U. L. Rev. 497, 509 (2020) (“[A] CEO may recite the values in the corporate code, but may give cues, verbal or non-verbal that send quite a different message to the company’s employees.”); Harvey S. James, Jr., Reinforcing Ethical Decision Making through Organizational Structure, 28 J. Bus. Ethics 43, 54 (2000) (“[W]orkers generally get their ethical cues by observing what their bosses do.”); Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 131, 145 (1999) (finding “significantly” improved compliance outcomes where “supervisors . . . regularly pay attention to ethics, take ethics seriously, and care about ethics and values as much as the bottom line”).
[47]. See, e.g., Elise Bernlohr Maizel, Illegal Corporate Cultures, 75 Duke L.J. (forthcoming 2025) (manuscript at 15–18) (on file with authors); Christopher D. Hampson, Bankruptcy and the Benefit Corporation, 94 Am. Bankr. L.J. 93, 124–27 (2022); Christopher D. Hampson, Bankruptcy Fiduciaries, 110 Iowa L. Rev. 1701, 1729 (2025).
[48]. See, e.g., Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny 17 (2017).
