The doctrinal landscape of internet-based personal jurisdiction is increasingly incoherent. Rules designed for a world of print and physical presence struggle to account for the realities of digital communication. Courts have treated virality and even conversational tagging, such as an @-mention of a forum resident, as evidence that a speaker purposefully directed their speech into that state. When speech alone is treated as the jurisdictional contact, nonresident defendants can be haled into distant courts they never expected, and lawful expression is chilled. By connecting personal jurisdiction fairness principles to First Amendment “chilling effect” principles, this Note offers a new framework for jurisdiction in the digital age—one that reflects the realities of online interaction and guards against litigation being used as a tool to silence critics.

Commercial activities, like selling a car or serving hot coffee, can generate a risk of loss to which multiple individuals are exposed. When burdens and losses are distributed across multiple stakeholders, when should negligence law tolerate or condemn the risky choice? A famous answer at the center of the first-year curriculum invokes the Hand formula: The failure to avoid a risk is negligent when the sum of the burdens of risk-avoidance is less than the sum of the expected losses. This Article argues that the Hand formula should be applied to multiparty cases by, first, disaggregating burdens and losses and comparing them on a pairwise basis, starting with the individual who bears the highest burden and the one who bears the highest expected loss.

Article II vests the executive power in the President. Yet Congress routinely empowers private plaintiffs, not just the President, to enforce public regulatory laws. Because of this, in almost every area of law—from environmental and antitrust law to civil rights and securities law—the bulk of enforcement occurs through private civil suits rather than government-initiated litigation. Our original historical investigation of “penal statutes”—a category of Founding-Era regulatory legislation that anticipated modern private rights of action—uncovers the deep constitutional foundation of this tradition of private enforcement. We conclude that private enforcement does not violate Article II, except under extremely narrow conditions.

In debates about the future of work, scholars and policymakers often treat economic efficiency and distributive justice as the principal values at stake. In this Article, I argue that neither a transaction cost-centric analysis of employment nor one focused only on distributive justice or equality fully conceptualizes all that is at stake in the institutional design and legal regulation of how we work. Here, I provide the first in-depth theorization of work as a site of relational transaction benefits, with a specific focus on law’s role in shaping them.

Amid the avalanche of recent important administrative law decisions, one case has received almost no scholarly attention: Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In part, Corner Post expands judicial review for claims that an agency regulation violates the authorizing statute or the Constitution by allowing such substantive claims indefinitely. Congress should implement a six-year time bar for administrative procedure claims that accrues at the time of agency action, so that procedural claims would be allowed only for six years following a rulemaking. Otherwise, a court might invalidate a longstanding regulation because of an agency’s years-old violation of procedural requirements, even if the regulation perfectly implements the authorizing statute and is consistent with the Constitution.