The People the Puzzle Forgot

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    Introduction

    Even in a good year, constitutional law can be a little jarring for some students. It might be the first place they experience a disconnect between the ideals that led them to law school and the legal world’s messier realities. Many of us, regardless of our politics, want to read the Constitution as a moral document. If we find the right way to interpret it, it will show us the way toward a just society. So, when students learn that even after Brown, schools remained segregated; that even while Roe remained good law, many women were denied access to abortions; or that after Dobbs, the number of abortions in the United States increased—that can be destabilizing.

    Or they discover that Constitutional law is full of compromises and balancing and tests that come seemingly out of nowhere. A student once asked me, “Isn’t the major questions doctrine made up?”[1] When I answered, “Well, sure. But so is strict scrutiny, in a sense,” the class had to grapple with the fact that the Constitution isn’t self-executing. Justices must do the messy work of implementing its not-always-easy-to-understand provisions. And they get it both “right” and “wrong” in ways that can be frustrating.

    So even in a good year, the class can be hard. But this year was not a good year.

    This year my students read cases about presidential powers that conflicted with daily headlines,[2] and cases that reversed older ones based on curious takes on facts and history.[3] And then there was United States v. Skrmetti.[4]

    Skrmetti, a case about a Tennessee statute that bans gender-affirming medical care for trans minors, felt dishonest to my students because they knew too much. For the last several years they’ve heard the arguments about trans rights play out in politics, in the news, and often enough at their families’ dining room tables. And whether they believed that transgender teens deserve heightened constitutional protections or not, they knew that the statute was about transgender teens rather than about the list of medical diagnoses the Supreme Court focused on. The Court took a case about people and turned it into a case about scientific language. My students knew what the Skrmetti majority pretended not to.

    After the semester ended, the Supreme Court handed down West Virginia v. B.P.J.[5] That case, brought by a transgender teen girl, asked whether it violates the Equal Protection Clause to exclude “biological males”—a phrase understood by most everyone except the justices in the Supreme Court majority to mean “trans girls”—from girls’ sports. After reading Skrmetti, my students predicted the Court’s human-erasing, text-focused ultimate approach. They knew that the trans girl’s reality would be much less relevant than a narrow reading of words in the statute. And they knew that the Court would uphold the ban.

    This essay explores Skrmetti and my students’ nonplussed reactions to it. It argues that Skrmetti’s language-first approach epitomizes the way we talk about cases in law school: Human problems become legal problems become puzzles. It argues that when we—lawyers, judges, teachers— obscure the people that the law is meant to serve, we send our students limiting messages about what the law can accomplish and, in the process, disempower them as learners and eventual lawyers.

    Law teaching’s hyperfocus on language fails our students along multiple dimensions. It’s at odds with the human-centered reasons so many of them decided to join the profession. It obscures much of the “why” behind the statutes, rules, and regulations that we use to regulate human behavior, and the impact those rules have on people’s lives. It gets in the way of a robust understanding of how a doctrine was meant to, and does, work. And it leaves students with an incomplete grasp on their ultimate ability to shape doctrine—the way that lawyers and judges can move the law in ways that aren’t always obvious on first read.

    And so, finally, the essay points toward another way to teach. Despite a lifelong frustration with legal pedagogy, I needed my students’ shock upon reading Skrmetti—and the way they almost perfectly predicted the Court’s approach in B.P.J.—to force me to map out some concrete changes to class. Section Four describes the ways that, without letting go of the heart of the case method approach, I’ll use these cases to re-center humans. We will read about the social and political context in which the cases arose. We will read about the way the statutes in Skrmetti and B.P.J. impacted trans adolescents. And will explore the lawyers’ and judges’ roles in shaping the cases.

    My students will see at least this one example of the way that the law impacts real people’s lives. And perhaps see ways that, as lawyers, they will have the opportunity to help shape that impact. Students who decided to begin law school in the middle of a top-down assault on the rule of law are brave and optimistic. They deserve a teaching style that fuels, rather than dashes, their hopes.

    I. Skrmetti and B.P.J. Refuse to See Trans People

    United States v. Skrmetti was the first United States Supreme Court merits-docket case to confront the Trump-era attacks on transgender Americans. The Court could have used the case to begin to sort out the constitutional implications of these attacks. Instead, it willfully minimized those implications by wrapping the discrimination up in wordplay. As with so many of the opinions law students read and are taught to model legal analysis on, it treated the law as a word puzzle abstracted from its human context. And in doing so, it allowed Tennessee to target a tiny minority for negative treatment—precisely the kind of targeted attack equal protection jurisprudence claims to guard against.

    In 2023, Tennessee passed a statute that prohibits doctors from performing medical procedures or prescribing medications in order to “enabl[e] a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or to “treat[] purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity.”[6] Transgender adolescents sued, arguing that the statute violated their equal protection rights by singling them out and treating them differently from other teens who sought medical treatment. That equal protection claim, in turn, required the courts to decide two things: first, what categories did the statute create; and, second, whether that categorical treatment was warranted.

    To answer the first question, a lay person, regardless of how they feel about medical interventions for trans adolescents, would recognize that the statute reaches transgender minors and restricts their access to certain forms of medical care. Tennessee itself explained that the statute was designed to “encourage[e] minors to appreciate,” rather than “become disdainful” of their sex assigned at birth.[7] My students referred to Skrmetti as the “case about trans kids.” Justice Alito, in his Skrmetti concurrence, explains, “If being ‘transgender’ is defined as ‘hav[ing] a gender identity that differs from . . . sex,’ then the intent to ‘identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with’ one’s sex would appear to be the natural result or consequence of being transgender.”[8] In other words, the statute regulates the category of transgender minors. Dissenting in that same opinion, Justice Sotomayor notes, “Tennessee’s law expressly classifies on the basis of sex and transgender status.”[9] And the Sixth Circuit, hearing the case before it found its way to the Supreme Court, seemed to assume without deciding that the statute classifies on the basis of gender identity.[10] People from across the political spectrum, those who believed the statute was constitutional and those who didn’t, agreed that the statute was designed to deny transgender youth access to gender-affirming care.

    The Supreme Court’s majority opinion, though, waves that all away. Chief Justice Roberts explains that the statute classifies on the basis of medical diagnoses, not identity. It prohibits the prescription of puberty blockers and hormones to “[e]nabl[e] a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex,”[11] which is “simply a prohibition on the prescription of puberty blockers and hormones to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, or gender incongruence.”[12] Of course, to have “gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, or gender incongruence” is to be transgender.[13] But that is not enough, according to the Court, to signal treatment on the basis of being trans. Any minor, including a trans minor, can be prescribed puberty blockers to treat, for example, precocious puberty. The Tennessee statute prohibits a minor from being prescribed puberty blockers (or hormones, or to undergo surgical procedures) only if she seeks treatment for “gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, or gender incongruence.”[14] Citing Geduldig v. Aiello,[15] which had held that pregnancy discrimination is not gender discrimination because not all women are pregnant, the Court concludes that because there are trans people on both sides of the line—those who want to access gender-affirming care and those who don’t—the statute doesn’t treat trans youth differently as a group.

    Once the obvious is papered over, the answer to the second equal protection question, whether the differential treatment is warranted, is assured. Because while the Equal Protection Clause permits discrimination against marginalized groups only when such differential treatment is well-suited to serve an important goal, it grants legislatures plenty of decision-making leeway elsewhere. The Court held that, of course, a legislature can regulate health care. By ignoring the clear impact and intent of the Tennessee ban, the Court hid the truth in a way that arguably dictated the outcome.[16] And that approach created precedent.

    West Virginia’s “Save Women’s Sports Act”[17] prohibits “biological males,” as defined at birth, from participating on girls’ sports teams. While separating school sports by sex was already the norm in West Virginia, the statute, passed in 2021, made that norm a law. And, for the first time in West Virginia, the statute defined gender in a way that precluded trans kids from playing on teams that aligned with their gender identity.[18]

    Becky Pepper-Jackson,[19] a teenaged trans girl who wanted to run cross-country for her school, sued. She argued that the statute treated her, a trans girl, differently than cis girls, and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court, in West Virginia v. B.P.J., disagreed. Without much explanation, the Court cited Skrmetti to say that the law classified on the basis of sex and not gender identity. It implied that what matters are the words in the statute—“biological males”—rather than the obvious intended targets, trans girls.[20] Ultimately the Court upheld the statute as an appropriate recognition of the average physical differences between boys and girls.

    II. Students See Through Skrmetti’s Linguistic Gymnastics

    We read plenty of opinions in constitutional law that the students find wrongheaded, even odious. But most of those cases are old, older than the students, anyway. They have become a part of the firmament. Many students hate the holding in McCleskey v. Kemp,[21] that the Equal Protection Clause differentiates between knowing that racist juries will disproportionately sentence Black defendants to death, and hoping that they will do so.[22] They see the fallacy there, the way that the impact on the defendant is exactly the same regardless of whether the legislature’s knowledge edged over into intent. But they understand that constitutional arguments sometimes turn on that distinction. And so, they learn how to make knowledge versus intent arguments.

    But when they read Skrmetti last spring, my students were honestly a little dumbfounded by its “linguistic gymnastics.”[23] They are right now living through a totalizing debate about whether trans people deserve rights at all. The students’ familiarity with the way politicians have targeted a tiny minority for attack makes it easy to recognize the inadequacy of Skrmetti’s analysis. They are not confused. The students know that Justice Roberts’ assertion—that the statute reaches a diagnosis rather than people—might be technically supportable,[24] but that it isn’t true in any meaningful sense of the word. They understood it as wordplay in service of a result.

    Most students take constitutional law in their first year of law school, while they’re still learning the shape of a legal argument: what are its boundaries, what’s persuasive, what’s fair to include or exclude. Which makes Skrmetti, like so many of the cases they read that first year, foundational. They learn that legal argument can massage language until it hides the actual people involved. That the law can look more like a puzzle than an attempt to solve human problems.

    Confronted with the cynicism of this approach, students have to make a choice. They can accept it: “This must be how lawyers, think, talk, argue. And I came here to learn to be a lawyer. I need to pack away my, perhaps immature, sense of how the world works and adopt this puzzle approach to be successful. This is what the law does.” Or they can reject it: “None of this makes sense. The law clearly isn’t the tool for change I thought it was. I don’t belong here.”[25] Either way, the profession loses some part of its humanity.

    III. Language-Centric Legal Pedagogy Encourages Treating Legal Problems Like Puzzles

    Skrmetti screams legalistic wordplay, so much so that my students couldn’t ignore it. But the law-as-puzzle approach is embedded throughout American law schools. Christopher Langdell’s case method, legal education’s dominant pedagogy even 150 years after he developed it, treated law as a science.[26] All of the raw material necessary to derive legal principles and test their application to new problems, he theorized, can be found in appellate cases and not beyond. He taught us to have students read case text closely, parse the reasoning, and test its limits by tinkering with definitions and asking small what-ifs: What if we changed this one fact, this one word? What if we understood this word slightly differently? While no one today believes that law is science, we continue rely on the case method because of its efficacy in developing core lawyering skills.

    Some years ago, anthropologist Elizabeth Mertz studied legal pedagogy.[27] Over a semester, she sat in on classes at a number of law schools, and she found that when students discussed cases, their teachers demanded precision. They invited students to point to language in cases and to compare that language to the text and arguments and categories in earlier cases, carefully explaining their reasoning. But when students talked about their sense of how a ruling might impact real people, their teachers did not ask the same kind of follow up questions or reward insights in the same way.

    Teachers and students will talk about human stories, certainly, including those of the people at the center of the relevant case. But after a student raises her hand to add a piece of social context to a discussion, a law teacher, perhaps especially in the first year, might refocus her students’ attention on language. The people in a case are useful mostly insofar as their conflicts create categories to facilitate arguments, and the stories are helpful for extracting rules and principles. But the parties’ stories get left behind. This is just what happened in my class when we discussed Skrmetti. Trans students explained what the diagnosis of gender dysphoria meant, and how the process for getting approved for gender-affirming care worked. They explained that, medically speaking, there is no real difference between targeting a trans teenager (a person) and gender dysphoria (a diagnosis). The opinion itself avoided the human half of that conversation altogether.

    I remember my initial resistance to this text-is-everything kind of thinking. The standard criminal law class in 1993 spent a lot of time exploring how much an alleged rapist had to understand about a victim’s consent—or lack thereof—before he had the requisite intent to commit rape. Thirty years later I understand the point: We were learning to read a statute. What does intent mean? Intent as to what? And, perhaps, if done well, we talked about moral culpability and just what kind of intent we should demand before we put people in prison. But at the time it felt like a game. Instead of talking about what rape is and how it is used as a tool of control, we dissected what the word “consent” means. What “intent” means. And whether there was clearly communicated, legally recognized unwillingness on the part of the victim, as if someone signed on a dotted line.

    Our students come to us with experience in, and knowledge about, how the world works. They know that consent isn’t a game, and they know that restrictions on gender-affirming care don’t exist in a vacuum. But when I redirect their attention by asking, “Yes, but leaving all that aside, what does this statute say?” students learn what the law is and, crucially, what it isn’t.

    Students have to decide whether to adopt this narrower form of legal argument or not. They can become the kind of student who, as McCleskey demands, makes clever arguments about the difference between knowledge and intent but never really stops to ask, with respect to the impacted people, whether that’s a meaningful distinction. Law is a puzzle. Or they can refuse to “think like a lawyer”—demand our focus remain on the impacted people at the center of the legal dispute—and in the process disconnect just a little bit more from lawyering’s norms. Every year I watch both changes happen. I see third-year students who questioned everything as first-years, who eventually don’t even remember what they were so angry about. They’ve learned to play the game. And then there’s my student who asked, “If McCleskey and Skrmetti (and others; her list is long) is the best the law can do, why am I here? What are lawyers for?” It’s hard for me to imagine a client, someone with messy human problems that show up as messy legal problems, being well served by either incomplete approach.

    IV. A More Human-Centered Approach to Teaching

    A legal education that more fully centers people could empower law students. Here, I mean all of the people involved: the parties, the lawyers, the judges. It would elucidate the meaningful roles they’ll play in their eventual clients’ lives. And it might offer another way to understand the doctrine itself: Given their real-world impacts, are the rules, tests, and cases accomplishing what they claim to accomplish?

    For years scholars have suggested that students enter law school with pretty typical mental health profiles, but they leave more anxious, less happy, and less hopeful.[28] There’s less certainty about the why of it all, but more than one scholar has suggested that the way we define and teach “thinking like a lawyer” may have something to do with it. Larry Krieger, for example, writes:

    Thinking “like a lawyer”[involves] defining people (or “parties”) primarily according to their legal rights, and trying to understand, prevent, or resolve problems by linear application of legal rules to those rights, usually adopting a zero-sum competitive approach to outcomes. This process requires the closest scrutiny of spoken and written thought to identify any defect that may undermine an adversary’s position or create future problems for one’s client. Thinking “like a lawyer” is fundamentally negative; it is critical, pessimistic, and depersonalizing. It is a damaging paradigm in law schools because it is usually conveyed, and understood, as a new and superior way.[29]

    In other words, if thinking like a lawyer means removing the humans from the equation—it’s arguably demoralizing our students.

    The approach is at odds with the reasons many people become lawyers in the first place. Law students tell us that they come to law school to work with all kinds of people: immigrants, artists, criminal defendants, scientists, entrepreneurs, marginalized communities, veterans, and more. And then they encounter the first-year curriculum, and they learn over and over again that the people in the cases that they read are interesting and valuable insofar as they present legal problems. They don’t hear stories about the work that the lawyers did with and for those people. Or how the case impacted the parties’ lives.

    After the Supreme Court decided Skrmetti, Chase Strangio, an ACLU attorney who represented the transgender teens and their families in court, told NPR why he pressed the case. “[T]he reality on the ground,” he said, “was that families were uprooting their lives, people were losing their health care. It seemed to be, from our perspective, one of the most dire circumstances facing [trans] communities.”[30] His commitment was to the community first, and the case was his attempt to call on equal protection doctrine in service of that commitment. That attempt failed, in part, because the Skrmetti majority ignored the very people that Strangio centered and valued.

    Our students deserve to see that kind of advocacy in our classrooms. As much as we focus on text and doctrine in law school, lawyering is a fundamentally interpersonal enterprise. It involves persuading “others to act in ways that will change the world into something closer to what we desire.”[31] And it’s in the classroom, when we are telling stories (reading cases) about how the law impacts people—where we can make that process plain.

    Critics of legal education, including our own students, often decry the classroom as overly theoretical.[32] I understand what they mean: that law school focuses too much on the law and not enough on lawyering. It’s a plea for more clinics, more experiential education.[33] But the criticism is also ironic. The core reading material in the average law school classroom is a collection of cases. And cases are real. They’re documents that describe legal solutions to the real-world problems of real people. They aren’t Foucault.[34]

    If students experience even this material as theoretical, then re-centering people could be as simple as drawing out the stories in the cases themselves in three small ways.

    First, a more complete, more human, look at the cases we teach would put those cases in political and social context. Teachers are accustomed to putting cases in context doctrinally—why does this case show up at this point in the syllabus, what ideas and rules and concepts do I expect students to take away. But cases arise in a historical context as well. Understanding that context can illuminate the stakes.

    Second, in every case we assign, there are individual stories behind the legal questions. People who had reason to seek relief in court. Understanding those people, their goals and concerns, would give readers a more complete take on the legal problem and its possible solutions.

    And finally, no lawsuit is self-executing. Human decision-makers at every stage of the process impact the ultimate result for the parties and shape the law going forward. Our students may or may not be able to relate to the historical or sociological context in which these cases arise. They may or may not understand the motivations of the parties. But as emerging lawyers they are invested in the ways that lawyers and judges make decisions and affect the matters before them. These threads—the context, the parties, and the legal actors—woven together with the doctrine, produce outcomes. Making all this visible will help students understand that no result is as inevitable as a court might imply. And it will arm them with an answer to my student’s question, “What are lawyers for?”

    To see how this might work, we can return to Skrmetti and B.P.J. First, it’s worth understanding the cultural context. Since 2020,[35] legislatures have introduced thousands of bills designed to quash transgender people’s civil rights.[36] These proposed statutes limit trans people’s access to healthcare and athletics—as in Skrmetti and B.P.J.— as well as to public facilities. They would ban birth certificate and ID changes, pronoun usage, and drag. They impose LGBTQ curriculum censorship and force schools to out their trans students. The proposed regulations would leave almost no area of trans life untouched.[37] The rhetoric, from both politicians and anti-trans activists, around these proposed changes has not been nearly as restrained as the majority language in either Skrmetti or B.P.J.[38] This larger view renders societal animus toward transgender people clear. Neither Tennessee’s ban on gender-affirming health care nor West Virginia’s prohibition on trans girls playing on girls’ sports teams are unique moves. And one cannot understand the legislatures’ goals in either case apart from this years-long, nationwide onslaught.

    Second, this fuller look would encompass the parties in the cases. Students, when reading Skrmetti, would learn about plaintiff “L.W.,” for example. She was a 16-year-old transgender girl who told reporters, “[M]y dysphoria was horrible before [I started treatment]. I was really isolated because of it, which tended to hurt my mental health.” Before it was banned, gender-affirming care allowed her to “feel normal.”[39]

    While we don’t learn about Becky Pepper-Jackson in B.P.J.’s majority opinion, we do learn about her in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. When the case began, Becky was a middle-school student who wanted to run cross-country. Her mother describes her as “a bright and kind child who cares deeply about her family and friends and excels in school.” [Becky] is like many other teenagers: She is “very passionate about math and science”; her favorite videogames include Minecraft and Overwatch; and she enjoys jumping on the trampoline, running, playing with her dogs, and seeing her friends.”[40] In Becky’s words, “[s]ports are an important part of [her] experience at school,” and she is “so happy to . . . have the chance to participate.”[41]

    Becky transitioned socially when she was very young, and at nine years old was diagnosed with gender dysphoria. A year later she began taking puberty blockers, and a year after that, a form of estrogen. The only puberty Becky ever went through was a female one.[42]

    When Becky expressed an interest in trying out for the middle school track team, the principal informed her mother that West Virginia’s new statute, the “Save Women’s Sports Act,”[43] prohibited her from participating.[44] West Virginia already separated its school sports by sex, but before the ban trans athletes were allowed to play on a team matching their gender identity on case-by-case bases. The bans swapped out that individualized approach for an absolute prohibition. Children were identified as “biological males” or “biological females” based on their sex-assigned-at-birth. And “biological males” were banned from girls’ teams.[45] According to the Fourth Circuit, the law’s “sole purpose,” and “its sole effect,” was “to prevent transgender girls from playing on girl[s’] teams.”[46] Becky was denied the opportunity to run for her school.

    This broader comprehension—about the political context and about the people bringing the suits —sets students up to think more deeply about the doctrine itself: Is it accomplishing what it claims to? And it might make it easier to see the case-framing decisions the lawyers and judges made along the way. Skrmetti and BPJ presented arguably novel claims, so the lawyers—and ultimately the judges and justices—had that many more framing decisions to make. I’ll highlight just two of those decisions here: one by lawyers, another by judges.

    First, given both the language of the statutes and the nature of the restrictions, advocates in both cases had to decide just what story to tell. Who was being targeted, how do we know, and why were they singled out? A court’s eventual equal protection analysis would, in part, turn on the answers to those questions.

    In Skrmetti, for example, the plaintiffs argued primarily that the challenged statute classified on the basis of sex. Whether a doctor in Tennessee can prescribe estrogen to a teenager depends on whether that teenager is “biologically” male or female. Teens assigned female at birth can receive medically necessary estrogen, whereas teens assigned male at birth cannot. This, the lawyers argued, was straightforward sex-dependent treatment. Precedent made that framing attractive for three strategic reasons. First, the Court’s sex and gender-based discrimination cases make clear that an attempt to enforce gender norms—Tennessee admits its ban is designed to encourage teens to “appreciate their sex”—is a form of gender discrimination.[47] Second, in a Title VII context, Bostock v. Clayton County held that discrimination on the basis of gender identity is discrimination on the basis of sex and thus prohibited.[48] Third, and most importantly, in equal protection analysis sex-based classifications demand intermediate scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny is harder to pass than the rational basis that the Court ultimately applied to the diagnosis-based classification. Arguably, a higher level of scrutiny would have given the plaintiffs a fighting chance. The lawyers chose a strategy that, based on the doctrine, appeared most likely to serve their clients’ goals.

    But the doctrine also presents at least one other alternative that is worth exploring in the classroom. The advocates could have leaned harder on a claim that the statute singled out trans youth for negative treatment because they are trans.[49] That tack would have required the lawyers to marshal the historical and factual context, presented above, to prove that the classification was based on discriminatory intent or animus—both suspect or prohibited in equal protection analysis—rather than relevant factual difference. They would then have argued that as a result, heightened scrutiny of some sort should apply. I find it unlikely that this Court would hold that legislation targeting trans youth as trans youth is inherently suspect in the same way as targeting women as women is. But if the Roberts majority was willing to acknowledge what was happening, it would have had to explain its reasoning. The argument would have asked courts to look squarely in the face of the bigotry.[50]

    The goal in presenting my students with these options would not be to criticize the decisions the lawyers did make. They were close to the case and the plaintiffs and privy to all kinds of information that my students and I know nothing about. And given Roberts’ ultimate approach, he seems unlikely to have accepted an invitation to look deeper.[51]

    But surfacing these options would help students understand the strategy decisions and tradeoffs lawyers necessarily make, and it would allow for a class discussion about the strategic and doctrinal strengths of each. Which approach is more likely to succeed? Why are courts deferential in some cases and suspicious in others? What does it mean for legislation to be suspect, and what does it take to overcome that presumption?

    It’s not only lawyers who make framing decisions that impact outcomes. Judges do, too. And a more contextualized approach might make that plain, as well. B.P.J. itself offers up a rich second example of the decisions lawyers and judges make in the course of a case, highlighting what it means to center humans—or to choose not to. The majority and the dissent disagree about everything from what the statute does to how to read the precedent cases. But at the heart of their disagreements are different approaches to law and lawyering.

    The majority reads the statute literally without asking about its purpose. It repeatedly calls trans girls “biological males.”[52] And it talks about the differences between boys and girls in the abstract. Boys are stronger, faster, and bigger than girls, says the Court. To the majority, even if that claim isn’t true of all boys, it’s true of enough of them to defer to West Virginia’s judgment that girls need to be protected from competition with “boys” (including trans girls).

    The dissent asks about the actual people. It asks about who Becky is and what it meant for her to be excluded, and about the West Virginia legislators: Why did they pass this particular statute and why did they choose the language they did? And the dissent asks about the facts: Is it true that trans girls, especially trans girls like Becky who never went through a male puberty, have a competitive advantage[53] over cis girls?[54] The dissent aims to apply constitutional doctrine to the law and the facts as they exist, rather than as they might be. It does so by asking about the state’s goals and whether the ban on trans girls in girls’ sports is substantially related to those goals.

    In both opinions, the Justices made choices about focus. And just as with the lawyers’ decisions, a classroom discussion could make that clear. Students would be able to see, and debate, which approach did a better job of addressing the problems the parties presented, and even which was truer to equal protection doctrine.

    Re-centering humans in these three ways—placing the legal fight in its political and historical context, exploring the stories of the people who brought the cases, and talking about the decisions that lawyers and judges made along the way—might do what the case method alone cannot. It will both give students more tools for assessing whether a rule “works” in practice and offer some insight into why lawyers, and the decisions they make as they press a case, matter.

    Conclusion

    Where the Skrmetti Court saw medical diagnoses, my students saw the people those diagnoses described. They rejected the case’s hyper-technical focus on text and instead asked about what the relevant statute was designed to do. Whom did it hurt? Whose interests did it further? Were trans adolescents being targeted because of their gender identity? And if so, what might the Equal Protection Clause have to say about that?

    Law teaching, with its emphasis on text and categories, tends to train these people-oriented impulses out of our students. The case method offers our students a powerful and necessary, but insufficient, lawyering tool. My students saw the ways in which the Court’s overreliance on that tool dehumanized, almost literally, its equal protection analysis in Skrmetti. This allowed them to perfectly predict the likewise human-erasing, text-as-everything, outcome in B.P.J.

    The fix—the way to honor my students’ discomfort with Skrmetti’s puzzle-like approach—isn’t to jettison traditional methods altogether. Instead, I would like to see us surface the social context in which the cases we teach arise, help our students understand the people who brought the cases, and explore the decisions lawyers and judges made along the way. To blend humans and their stories back into the classroom.

    I can’t know whether this approach is enough to defeat the discouragement so many of our students feel by the time they graduate. But it does give optimistic law students, people who come to the law to help make a difference in other people’s lives, something to work with.

    Copyright © 2026 Kristen Holmquist, Teaching Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law. Huge thanks to Olivia Grimes and Metyia Phillips as well as to the Online Editors at the California Law Review. Your work made this essay orders of magnitude better. Thank you to Kathryn Holmquist-Moscato and Stefano Moscato for reading the paper over and over again. You helped me sort through and strengthen my ideas. Ana Marie Cox, without you this essay would not exist. You saw a valuable kernel, wouldn’t let me stray from it, and made sure my students’ voices came through. Thank you. And to my students. This is for you.

              [1].  To protect my students, I have anonymized their statements. Some of the statements are direct quotes. Some are composites of ideas from multiple students.

              [2].  Our syllabus included, for example, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), which held that the President cannot fire, except for cause, Federal Trade Commissioners. Except that Trump had fired Rebecca Slaughter, a Biden appointee to the FTC, without cause in March 2025. Throughout our semester together, the students and I were aware that the Supreme Court was considering the constitutionality of that move. In June 2026, the Court decided Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332, 609 U.S. ___ (2026), granting the President broad powers to remove commissioners, despite Congressional attempts to insulate commissioners of independent agencies from presidential whim. After 90 years on the books, Humphrey’s Executor was overturned.

              [3].  Two other cases that a sizable number of my students reacted strongly to were Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), and Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, 600 U.S. 181 (2023). It might be that those students simply did not agree with the Court’s conclusions. But as I explain later in this essay, there were plenty of cases that the majority of students found problematic. Dobbs and SFFA were cases that students had lived through and heard all of the political and factual arguments about. Many of them simply did not buy the majority’s description of either the history or the facts in Dobbs and SFFA.

              [4].  United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495 (2025).

              [5].  West Virginia v. B.P.J. ex rel. Jackson, 609 U.S. 958 (2026).

              [6].  Tenn. Code § 68-33-103 (2024).

              [7].  Tenn. Code § 68-33-101(m).

              [8].  Skrmetti, 605 U.S. at 565 (Alito, J., concurring).

              [9].  Id. at 579 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

           [10].  L.W. v. Skrmetti, 83 F.4th 460, 486 (6th Cir. 2023).

           [11].  Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1).

           [12].  Skrmetti, 605 U.S. at 515.

           [13].  Not all transgender individuals experience dysphoria. But in many clinics in order to be prescribed gender-affirming care, a transgender child must go through a medical process that results in a treatable diagnosis. That diagnosis will be something like “gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, or gender incongruence.” In other words, for medical purposes, those diagnoses and the fact of being transgender are one and the same. See, e.g., Salas-Humara C, Sequeira GM, Rossi W & Dhar CP, Gender Affirming Medical Care of Transgender Youth, 49 Curr Probl. Pediatr. Adolesc. Health Care. 1000683 (Sep. 2019) (citing guidelines from the Endocrine Society and World Professional Association for Transgender Health).

           [14].  Skrmetti, 605 U.S. at 507.

           [15].  Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).

           [16].  Skrmetti, 605 U.S. at 522 (applying rational basis).

           [17].  W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 18-2-25d.

           [18].  West Virginia v. B.P.J. ex rel. Jackson, 609 U.S. 958, 978 (2026).

           [19].  Because she’s a minor, the Court refers to her by her initials. But Pepper-Jackson’s name has been reported in the press. See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow, Plaintiff in Transgender Athlete Case Recently Won a State Shot Put Title, N.Y. Times (June 30, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/30/us/politics/supreme-court-transgender-athletes-plaintiff.html [https://perma.cc/V7GP-9P64].

           [20].  Remember, boys already did not play on girls’ teams in West Virginia.

           [21].  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).

           [22].  Id. at 298–99.

           [23].  These are the words a student used in class when describing the majority’s approach.

           [24].  I’d argue that even that read is too generous. The statute is pretty clear, on its face, that its targets are transgender children. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1) prohibits medical treatment where that treatment would “enabl[e] a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex.”

           [25].  See Chris J. Iijima, Separating Support from Betrayal: Examining the Intersections of Racialized Legal Pedagogy, Academic Support, and Subordination, 33 Ind. L. Rev. 737 (2000) (making a similar point).

           [26].  Marcia Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 Vt. L. Rev. 1, 11–12 (1980).

           [27].  Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).

           [28].  See Kathryne M. Young, Understanding the Social and Cognitive Processes in Law School That Create Unhealthy Lawyers, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 2575 (2021).

           [29].  Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School, and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. Legal Educ. 112, 117 (2002); see also Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 515 (2007) (arguing that law school, in part through its pedagogy, breeds a culture of competition and conformity); Susan A. Bandes, Feeling and Thinking Like a Lawyer: Cognition, Emotion, and the Practice and Progress of Law, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 2427 (2021) (arguing that thinking like a lawyer is more than a cognitive process; it requires working with emotion, as well); Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Law On Trial: An Unlikely Insider Reckons with Our Legal System (W.W. Norton 2016).

           [30].  Weekly Edition Sunday, A Documentary Follows the First Openly Trans Person to Argue Before the Supreme Court, Nat’l Publ. Radio (July 20, 2025), https://www.npr.org/2025/07/20/nx-s1-5466140/a-documentary-follows-the-first-openly-trans-person-to-argue-before-the-supreme-court.

           [31].  Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 U.C. L.A. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1984).

           [32].  Heather Gerken, Resisting the Theory/Practice Divide, 132 Harv. L. Rev. F 134, 134, 134 n.2 (2019) (citing decades of rebukes by commentators and bar associations alike).

           [33].  And this plea, for more clinical education, is not unrelated to my law-as-puzzle lament. Clinical pedagogy is client-centered. Students, often for the first time in law school, are asked to think about their clients’ needs and desires in ways that might even conflict with what the students have learned elsewhere is legally plausible. See Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 Clinical L. Rev. 369, 502–03 (2006) (stating that it is not an exaggeration to say that client-centered representation is one of the most influential doctrines in legal education today); David F. Chavkin, Spinning Straw into Gold: Exploring the Legacy of Bellow and Moulton, 10 Clinical L. Rev. 245 (2003).

           [34].  It’s of course true that a semester of reading cases across constitutional law will help students develop a theory of constitutional law, that is, an understanding of what we mean when we talk about constitutional law. And many classes will include introduction to legal theories: positivism, legal realism, critical race studies, etc. But neither of these tend to be the focus of a standard first-year doctrinal course.

           [35].  Bills targeting trans people began as a trickle before then. North Carolina passed HB2, the first state statute requiring people to use the bathroom matching their sex assigned at birth, in 2016. H.B. 2, 2015-2016 Gen. Assem., 2nd Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016), 2016 North Carolina Laws 3.

           [36].  Trans Legislation Tracker, https://translegislation.com/ [https://perma.cc/NE58-NE7J].

           [37].  Id.

           [38].  See, e.g., Andrew DeMillo, “Trans People Face Hostile Rhetoric from Lawmakers,” PBS News (Feb. 27, 2023), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/trans-people-face-hostile-rhetoric-from-state-lawmakers [https://perma.cc/U2LC-2BVB].

           [39].  Lex McMenamin, US v. Skrmetti: Trans Teens Like L.W. Just Want to Have a Normal Childhood, Teen Vogue (Dec. 4, 2024), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/us-v-skrmetti-lw-story [https://perma.cc/8ZVM-R8JK]; Devin Dwyer, Landmark Supreme Court Case Weighs Gender-Affirming Care for Trans Kids, ABC News (Dec. 4, 2024), https://abcnews.com/Politics/landmark-supreme-court-case-weighs-gender-affirming-care/story?id=116232587 [https://perma.cc/US43-HYFR].

           [40].  West Virginia v. B.P.J. ex rel. Jackson, 609 U.S. 958, 1001 (2026) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

           [41].  Id.

           [42].  Id. at 1002 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

           [43].  W. Va. Code Ann. § 18-2-25d.

           [44].  B.P.J., 609 U.S. at 1000–02 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

           [45].  Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

           [46].  Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing B.P.J. v. W. Va. State Bd. of Ed., 98 F.4th 542, 550 (4th Cir. 2024)).

           [47].  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that a sex-based classification may not rely on overbroad generalizations about who women, or men, are).

           [48].  Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644 (2020).

           [49].  The plaintiffs’ briefs did make this argument, but they made it briefly. They chose, instead, to highlight the sex-discrimination claim.

           [50].  This is exactly what the Ninth Circuit did in B.P.J.’s companion case, Little v. Hecox, 104 F.4th 1061 (9th Cir. 2024). That court stated that Idaho’s statute segregating sports on the basis of sex was targeted at trans women and was founded in animus.

           [51].  At his confirmation hearing, then Judge Roberts famously said, “Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them . . . I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes.” Chief Justice Roberts Statement: Nomination Process, posted on the United States Courts website, available at https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/supreme-court-landmarks/nomination-process/chief-justice-roberts-statement-nomination-process [https://perma.cc/86W8-KZ8Q]. But one umpire’s strike zone might be higher or lower or wider or narrower than another’s. No two are exactly the same. Roberts’ opinion in Skrmetti suggests that he might never recognize attacks on trans people as within the Equal Protection Clause’s strike zone.

           [52].  Reading Skrmetti and B.P.J. together suggests that the majority simply does not think that trans people are a cognizable category. Trans girls are a subset of boys and trans boys are a subset of girls.

           [53].  For a discussion about bans versus more nuanced approaches, see, Parker Malloy, Fine, Let’s Talk About Trans Athletes, Present Age (Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.readtpa.com/p/lia-thomas-transgender-athletes [https://perma.cc/7S2Q-GB47].

           [54].  The dissent would have affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision to remand to the district court to find these facts and apply intermediate scrutiny in light of them. West Virginia v. B.P.J. ex rel. Jackson, 609 U.S. 958, 1005 (2026) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

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