Before Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and its companion predecessor Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, a pleading only had to provide proper notice and set forth claims that were legally sufficient. But Twombly and Iqbal added a new factual-sufficiency standard to the pleading test: The nonconclusory allegations must set forth a claim to relief that is factually plausible in light of judicial experience and common sense. The two opinions were like earthquakes that rocked academics, practitioners, and judges. Although much ink was spilled in the immediate aftermath of Twombly and Iqbal, initial assessments, when the shockwaves were still being felt, could not fully capture the adjustments, practices, rulemaking angst, and doctrinal scaffolding that have developed with experience under the new standard. Fifteen years out, the iron has cooled, and expectations and understandings have settled. Now seems like an excellent opportunity for reassessment of Twiqbal’s more enduring legacies.

This Article presents the first systematic empirical study of “conclusory pleading” as a form of plausibility analysis in the U.S. courts of appeals following Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which critics argued would harm plaintiffs by creating excessive demand for information before discovery, and by increasing judicial subjectivity and ideology in decision-making in Rule 12(b)(6) decisions, particularly in civil rights litigation. Contrary to the canonical two-step account of plausibility pleading, courts of appeals almost never evaluate whether pleadings are conclusory fact by fact before proceeding to assess plausibility. Instead, in a one-step analysis they assess whether allegations, on the whole, are generally too conclusory to be plausible, or they render that judgment as to some particular key assertion in the context of the full complaint, without rejecting any other pleaded fact. Findings suggest that any increased judicial subjectivity after Twiqbal likely stems from aspects of plausibility doctrine other than conclusory pleading, shifts in case composition triggered by Twiqbal, or the broader politicization of pleading standards.

In this brief Essay, I want to focus on one aspect of the Iqbal decision that I have taught for many years and which, in my view, is useful for thinking about the policy implications of the heightened pleading regime that Iqbal and its predecessor, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, introduced: the goal of deterring nuisance suits. Both Iqbal and Twombly famously changed the standard of fact pleading for nonfraud claims. They shifted the standard from the “possibility” regime suggested by the “no set of facts” language of Conley v. Gibson to one of “plausibility,” where the factual allegations must be nonconclusory and have some “heft.” Much has been written about just what plausibility means and whether it changed anything, either in theory or in practice. Here, I want to focus on the motivation for the change in pleading standards, specifically the strain and expenditures put on defendants in civil litigation.

In 2007 and 2009, the Supreme Court upended the long-understood notice pleading framework, replacing it with the plausibility standard introduced in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal‍. I proceed from the assumptions that the pre-Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard was, roughly speaking, the one announced in Conley v. Gibson, and that courts now generally apply the framework set forth in Twombly and Iqbal—which instructs judges to determine whether the nonconclusory allegations in a complaint plausibly show entitlement to relief—when defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The raison d’être of this Essay is my proposal, in Part II, for an amendment to Rule 12. In substance, this proposal amounts to a rebooting of efforts in the period shortly after Iqbal’s decision, to promote limited pre-dismissal discovery as a means of blunting Twombly and Iqbal’s effects on cases involving asymmetric information.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal is a doctrinally instructive case. Iqbal teaches that the test for sufficient pleadings turns on the concept of plausibility.[1] It clarifies that the previous, more permissive understanding of a sufficient pleading under Conley v. Gibson is no more.[2]Iqbal also reflects the Supreme Court’s skepticism regarding district court judges’ ability to manage complex discovery disputes effectively.[3] And it demonstrates the Court’s complex view of its rulemaking role—changing procedural rules by opinion. Yet, for civil procedure scholars, Iqbal also marks a shift in our approach to the scholarly enterprise. This Essay will explore three scholarly trends that can be derived from the academy’s response to the Iqbal decision. First, a vast array of scholars responded swiftly to Iqbal, with many civil procedure scholars taking an empirical turn. Second, Iqbal emboldened a burgeoning area of civil procedure scholarship focused on non-federal court procedure and adjudication. Third and finally, Iqbal sharpened scholars’ critical focus on procedure. While a strong “access-to-justice” perspective existed in procedural scholarship before Iqbal, that work focused less intently on immutable characteristics such as race.

‍ ‍

The concern raised by David Strauss’s Essay might be addressed by positing an alternative, broader conception of judicial review than the one he proposes, which is inspired by the influential footnote in the Carolene Products case. My alternative view on the scope and nature of judicial review does not grow out of experience with American Constitutional history (which I am no expert on), but rather from a philosophical perspective grounded in liberal and democratic theory and from a comparative constitutional experience drawn from the European and Israeli contexts. I will present my position through a defense of two distinctions that seem essential to me.

Professor David Strauss attributes the U.S. Supreme Court’s reactionary jurisprudence to a breakdown of elite consensus. He observes that lawyers and judges disagree about the proper “victims” of our political process: Are they Black, Brown, and LGBTQ+ people or, instead, Whites, Christians, and gun owners? Under such elite “polarization,” Strauss worries the jurisprudential approach that emerged from Carolene Products allows for judicial intervention on behalf of groups loaded with political power. Even then, he insists on the classic liberal defense of the courts: that courts serve as an important if imperfect check against the majoritarian domination of minorities. But critical to such defenses is the unstated conjecture that elites are more enlightened than popular majorities.

In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization and Obergefell v. Hodges, the Justices who attack substantive due process law equate it with Lochner. Today, crying “Lochner” has so much force that it is often unclear what the objection itself entails. “Lochner” warns federal judges to defer to a legislature’s judgments in enacting ordinary social and economic legislation. But the modern substantive due process cases do not concern such legislation. In this Essay, we supply an answer to the Lochner objection by demonstrating how judicial review of substantive due process claims can be democracy-promoting.

Among law students, lawyers, jurists, and legal academics, the reasoning contained in Supreme Court opinions forms the indispensable object of examination. The centrality of those opinions is instilled from the very first moments of law school, as professors direct their students to scrutinize this key paragraph, that critical sentence, even the odd momentous footnote. The rationales undergirding various Supreme Court opinions receive not mere study, but valorization, worship, and occasionally even ridicule. However, this Essay contends that such claims wildly exaggerate the actual significance of judicial opinions.

Once upon a time, not that long ago, we had a pretty good explanation for why judicial review exists. The premise is that, for the most part, important decisions in a nation like ours should be made by politically accountable officials, not by courts. Unavoidably, though, there will be defects in the democratic political process. The role of the courts is to correct those defects, to the extent they can. One such defect is that some groups may not have their fair share of political power. If that is true, then the courts should intervene to protect that group. But this account is not quite right, and it is incorrect in a way that suggests a deep problem with judicial review today.

Department of State v. Muñoz was a critically important successor to Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. In Muñoz, the Court continued efforts to shrink the protective force of the Due Process Clause. Even more significantly, the Court launched another attack on the equality principle undergirding cases including Loving v. Virginia. Through its rejection of substantive due process protections, the Court is intentionally weakening a broad swath of antidiscrimination protections and procedural due process rights.

The Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College majority opinion has been widely misunderstood as a victory for those who believe in the “colorblind Constitution.” By juxtaposing the opinion’s main rule with the exception for admitting students based on essays that discuss students’ lived experiences with race, Robinson reveals the opinion’s fundamental incoherence, as well as its furtive race-consciousness. This examination reveals the chasm between colorblind rhetoric and the inescapability of racially-forged realities.

This Essay connects Students for Fair Admissions to two earlier moments in equal protection history. The first is Japanese American internment during World War II and the Supreme Court’s creation of the strict scrutiny doctrine. The second is the affirmative action wars that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, which resulted in the current doctrine requiring strict scrutiny even for “benign” affirmative action. In all three moments—internment, affirmative action wars, and SFFA—Asian Americans were curiously exploited.

Implicit in inquiries about Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard’s relationship to precedent is an assumption about the affirmative action cases that preceded SFFA—namely, that Regents of the University of California v. Bakke and its progeny represented a victory for proponents of affirmative action. This Essay complicates that view. Our central claim is that Bakke contained many losses for proponents of affirmative action and that the specific nature of those losses set the stage for precisely the outcome SFFA instantiates.

Since the Supreme Court struck down race-conscious university admissions in 2023, magnet school admissions have become the next constitutional battleground for diversity in education. Harpalani illustrates how Asian Americans’ positioning intersected with litigation strategy and constitutional issues in Coalition for TJ v. Fairfax County School Board—an important recent ruling that deals with race-neutral public magnet school admissions policies. Harpalani aims to convince progressives to take anti-Asian animus more seriously, even as they support the admissions reforms that Asian American plaintiffs in several cases have challenged.

The Court’s unprecedented decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization relegated abortion regulation to a highly heterogeneous state institutional landscape. For lawyers, this institutional heterogeneity poses new questions of orientation, skill-building, and collaboration. In this Essay, Abrams examines the challenges facing lawyers in this new institutional landscape by focusing on one promising strategy for protecting abortion rights in conservative states: the initiative petition to amend a state’s constitution.

This article argues that amendment is the foundational if forgotten contribution of American constitutionalism. Adopting a written constitution requires making provision for its future by allowing for change: Americans devised that mechanism. The idea of constitutional repair, correction, and improvement through revision was so essential to the founding of the United States that it can best be described as a system of thought, which I call the philosophy of amendment and describe as the epitome of the eighteenth-century idea of progress.

Professor Lepore is issuing a timely and necessary warning about the need to think deeply about reforming our Constitution. The enemy, in this case, is not the British. Rather, it is ourselves, in our complacent unwillingness to engage with clear deficiencies of the present Constitution. She begins her essay with the extraordinary reminder that everything in the world is subject to decay, including the parchment on which the Constitution was originally written (for starters). That is true, of course, of the more abstract Constitution itself.

Professor Jill Lepore’s Jorde Symposium lecture paints a rich portrait of state constitutional conventions as engines of democratization during the 1800s and issues a dire warning about the United States’ ongoing amendment drought. Citing their unfamiliarity, however, Lepore declines to consider federal constitutional conventions as a possible corrective. In this response Essay, I argue: first, that Lepore’s marginalization of Article V’s convention mechanism is in tension with her own historical and normative account; second, that while Lepore’s wariness of conventions is entirely understandable given the state of our politics…

The Constitution, as I like to remind the students in my Constitutional Law I class, is very old, very short, and very vague. Among the 7,762 words of the Constitution are the twenty-seven amendments, the first and last of which were both proposed in 1789 but were ratified 201 years apart—the First Amendment in 1791, and the Twenty-Seventh in 1992.