Gold Mining Sustainability in Colombia: Prioritizing a Mercury-Focused Approach

Currently, there exists a “Grand Canyon” of judicial disagreement between the Fourth and Fifth Circuits on whether reverse search warrants (1) are searches under the Fourth Amendment and (2) are constitutional. Reverse search warrants are digital dragnets in which Google or other internet companies query massive amounts of data for the government to find someone suspected of a crime. For example, to determine who robbed a credit union in Midlothian, Virginia, the government asked Google for a “geofence” warrant in which Google scanned through the location history information of 592 million people stored on Google’s servers. Reverse search warrants also include keyword warrants, in which data companies like Google examine trillions of user searches to find individuals the government suspects of criminal activity.

This issue, on which state supreme courts are also divided, is now before the U.S. Supreme Court and awaiting decision as a question of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Fourth Amendment protects from unreasonable searches and seizures. Since the advent of the modern “reasonable expectation of privacy” framework for searches and seizures in the late 1960s, courts have struggled with how to apply this test, resulting in a patchwork of constitutional protections. The disagreement and ensuing lack of clarity between the Fourth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit is emblematic of the varying results of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” framework. In the Fourth Circuit, a district court found that reverse warrants lack probable cause but that the good faith exclusionary rule applied. A panel of Fourth Circuit judges then held reverse warrants not to be a search under the Fourth Amendment, and the en banc Fourth Circuit later affirmed the district court in a fractured, one-sentence decision with eight different concurring opinions and no clear majority. The en banc court was divided as to whether a search occurred. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit found reverse warrants to be a search and to be a constitutionally banned “general warrant.”

This Note proposes a different way of bringing clarity to this judicial disagreement. Instead of falling back on the “reasonable expectation of privacy” approach, courts should follow a property-based approach when it comes to questions of user data stored on the servers of internet companies. The property conception would provide a different path to resolve the disagreement by concluding that users have property-like protections in the data that reverse search warrants target and that this data qualifies as a “paper” under the Fourth Amendment, and thus the government must get a warrant to obtain this data.

This Note makes two main contributions. First, it surveys and analyzes the state of reverse search warrants in federal and state courts. Second, this Note proposes applying a property-based concept of privacy to the constitutionality of reverse search warrants, a concept that courts and academic literature have explored less than the “reasonable expectation of privacy” approach.

Part I of this Note provides an overview of what reverse search warrants are and how geofence and keyword warrants work on a technological level. Part II outlines a history of the Fourth Amendment and its interactions with emerging technology. Part III analyzes the procedural history and ensuing divide between the Fourth and Fifth Circuits and discusses the Fourth Amendment approaches state courts have applied to reverse search warrants. Part IV argues for a property-based theory of a search under the Fourth Amendment, but crucially not at the expense of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” framework. Following the lead of the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Seymour, this Note proposes that users have a possessory interest in their data, anchored in the right to exclude.

Table of Contents Show

Introduction

Few things seem as good as gold. The precious metal has strong economic, cultural, and technological significance. Gold metal maintains close associations with currency and also stands as an alluring symbol for social status and beauty through its use in jewelry.[1] Its steady valuation over time makes gold a useful hedge against inflation for business investors.[2] Scientifically, the metal serves practical purposes in medical tools, aerospace technology, electronics, automobiles, and so on.[3] It is a steadfast feature of modern society, with a rich history that suggests its worth is unlikely to dissipate.[4]

However, artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) practices gravely undermine the sustainability of the gold supply chain.[5] Up to 20 percent of the world’s gold comes from ASGM, which is conducted by individuals and small enterprises with limited capital and capacity.[6] Human health and safety risks pervade in large pockets of the gold mining industry, often related to toxin exposure and lack of physical protection in ASGM.[7] Furthermore, these operations cumulatively generate adverse environmental consequences, including degrading forest health, contaminating water, and compounding impacts on ecosystem biodiversity across many countries.[8] In particular, the use of mercury—a low-cost liquid metal that amalgamates with gold—in smaller gold mining operations greatly heightens these risks.[9]

Mercury use in gold mining appears cost-effective and labor efficient on its face. The ease with which liquid mercury binds with gold to form an amalgam makes it a productive tool for small-scale gold mining methods, such as water-and-pan mining.[10] When burned, the gold and mercury amalgamation evaporates its mercury components, leaving solid gold deposits.[11] Yet with time, concentrated or sustained mercury exposure through respiratory inhalation and direct skin contact can devastate human health.[12] Mercury is toxic to humans, capable of causing serious brain, nervous system, gastrointestinal, skin, and kidney damage.[13] Mercury also runs off into the soils and waterways surrounding such mining operations, which can lead to mercury poisoning in nearby communities that eat and drink from such waterways.[14]

In recent years, large-scale gold mining operations have adapted to more stringent regulatory oversight to mitigate environmental and human health impacts, including mercury-related impacts.[15] But smaller gold mining operations have not adapted.[16] ASGM proves difficult to legally formalize through a regulatory licensing regime because ASGM operators characteristically have limited access to capital to finance such licensing.[17] The ASGM sector also supports the livelihood of many miners, so without other potential sources for income, overly stringent mining reform and enforcement of such mining laws could increase costs and spell economic disaster for local workforces.[18] Additionally, the dispersed and rural nature of ASGM creates challenges for resource-constrained governments to monitor and enforce ASGM from a regulatory perspective. Without buy-in for such licensing regimes, the government lacks a fundamental legal tool for protecting human health, safety, and environmental conditions.[19] In consequence, both illegal ASGM (which occurs despite legal prohibitions or regulations) and informal ASGM (which occurs without legal regulation) are present.[20]

In ASGM hotspots like Colombia, Peru, Ghana, and the Philippines,[21] repeated national failures at industry reform beg the question of how the global community could better approach gold supply sustainability issues.[22] In 2013, international collaboration through the Minamata Convention on Mercury (the Minamata Convention) bolstered strategic support to address these concerns.[23] Article 7 of the Minamata Convention attempted to support development of national strategies to mitigate mercury use in ASGM operations.[24] It mobilized capacity-building efforts and governmental planning to tackle ASGM harms in key global hotspots.[25] But over a decade later, the Minamata Convention still fails to make significant progress in eliminating ASGM injustices.[26] Slow treaty ratification appears to be one hurdle slowing the deployment and influence of the Minamata Convention.[27]

Although the Minamata Convention has experienced delays in mitigating social and environmental abuse within ASGM, this Note argues that countries should nevertheless press on with the Convention’s strategy because mercury contamination causes the most potent mining harms. Additionally, technological advancements bring promise that mercury may become simultaneously easier to replace in mining processes and more practical to monitor compared to alternative forms of gold supply chain monitoring. In effect, mercury elimination appears to be the path of least resistance and will have the most impact for ensuring gold supply chain sustainability. A strategy of targeting upstream issues through mercury trade regulation rather than focusing on downstream gold trade regulation will be more effective in combating ASGM harms.

This Note uses Colombia as a case study to illustrate this argument and provides subsequent policy recommendations for how to further expedite mercury mitigation in ASGM.[28] This Note’s policy suggestions are twofold. First, countries like Colombia should prioritize actions that improve the efficiency of litigation and adjudication pathways for mining law violations, with an emphasis on protecting environmental defenders. Second, instead of adopting strategies that trace the origins of gold or regulate the gold trade through certification, this Note suggests focusing on identifying mercury pollution as an indicator of gold supply chain discrepancies. Such mercury-based policy improvements may be easier to detect and could empower those communities most vulnerable to ASGM’s harms. Collectively, these improvements could catalyze a much-needed sector-wide shift toward sustainable ASGM management.

I. Concerns with Informal Gold Mining and Mercury Use

A. Human Health and Safety Impacts

Human health and safety risks plague the ASGM industry, particularly as mercury use pervades these gold mining practices.[29] Despite known health impacts, mercury use continues to persist in the ASGM sector because mercury is an efficient and low-cost amalgam for gold mining purposes.[30] As of 2018, the ASGM sector accounted for approximately 38 percent of global mercury emissions.[31] Mercury is liquid at room temperature and binds with gold-containing particles in ore upon contact to form a solid.[32] The gold and mercury amalgam can then be separated through a heating process wherein the mercury solid burns off, leaving only pure gold.[33] This proves an effective method to sift out gold from other minerals during mining.

But while efficient for mining, mercury use has detrimental impacts for both miners on the ground and nearby communities sharing waterways and other natural resources with mining operations.[34] Those most heavily impacted by such harms often are socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals, Indigenous communities, and minority groups.[35] For example, in Colombia, Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities face disproportionate impacts from the ill effects of gold mining, both as miners and as communities proximal to mining operations.[36] Mercury exposure causes many of the worst health impacts from ASGM operations, but the lack of industry formalization also raises risks of other health and safety concerns.[37]

1.   Mercury-Related Health Impacts

Mercury—a naturally occurring metal—is toxic to humans, capable of causing serious brain, nervous system, gastrointestinal, skin, and kidney damage.[38] In particular, the neurotoxic effects of mercury in humans can be devastating, especially for fetal exposure during pregnancy.[39] Neuron damage from mercury primarily impacts the cerebellum and impairs coordination, sensory perception in extremities, speech, and mobility.[40] Certain forms of mercury can also bioaccumulate in the human body.[41]

Specific health impacts depend on the magnitude and duration of mercury exposure, as well as the method of exposure.[42] In the gold mining industry, key exposure pathways include mercury inhalation by miners, direct skin contact to miners, and consumption of foods—such as fish—containing methylmercury in communities surrounding gold mining operations.[43] Organic mercury exposure through methylmercury has potent neurological effects, the symptoms of which develop on a delayed timeframe following exposure.[44]

Human health externalities from such practices come at a huge cost. Prolonged or acute inhalation of mercury vapor during the burning process can cause tremors, insomnia, mood swings, mental impairment, headaches, and neuromuscular and nerve impacts, among other issues.[45] For laborers physically pan mining the gold, mercury can be absorbed through the skin and can be especially harmful with repeated exposure.[46] Dry pit mining and compressor mining that uses mercury also raises skin exposure risks for laborers.[47] While health experts consider skin contact with liquid mercury less potent than mercury vapor inhalation, exposure nevertheless is serious. Prolonged or repeated physical contact with liquid mercury can cause health issues such as skin rashes, memory loss or other mental disturbances, and muscle fatigue.[48]

Additionally, mercury ingestion through consuming fish or drinking water has wide-ranging community health impacts in regions near ASGM operations. Mercury poisoning from ingestion can cause similar impacts to those seen from inhalation, such as cognitive and motor dysfunction, nerve damage, insomnia, and memory loss.[49] Ingesting sufficient levels of methylmercury during pregnancy can cause life-long cognitive impairment and other disabilities that impact fine motor skills, attention, and memory for children exposed in the womb.[50] The Minamata Convention, which seeks to protect human health and the environment from mercury’s adverse effects, even derives its namesake from a Japanese city that was victim to widespread mercury poisoning.[51] In 1968, the Japanese government determined that contaminated industrial wastewater caused the bioaccumulation of mercury in fish and shellfish that led to widespread community illness.[52]

2.   Other Gold Mining Health and Safety Impacts

Beyond mercury impacts, other human health and safety risks appear prevalent in informal and illegal ASGM operations. Without adequate formalization of the sector, miners lack the benefit of regulatory oversight and legal safety protections that come with formalization. Certain forms of gold mining, such as compressor mining, prove particularly risky.[53] For example, compressor mining involves a search for gold ore below the water table, wherein laborers submerge themselves in water and mud pits, traveling vertically downwards to access mineral deposits.[54]

Such dangerous activities, often conducted with limited technology and safety precautions, can lead to drowning, decompression sickness, and skin infections. Furthermore, miners can develop lung cancer due to the inhalation of carbon monoxide fumes from diesel compressors.[55] Generally, informal or illegal ASGM gold mining raises risks associated with manual labor overexertion, unsafe equipment handling, and other related malpractices.[56] Formalization of the ASGM sector not only serves as a mechanism to monitor and mitigate mercury usage but also to improve bodily protections for laborers.

While this Note primarily focuses on opportunities to mitigate mercury use in Colombian gold mines, the pursuit of mercury-free mining often intertwines with other public health and safety considerations in ASGM. Many priority actions discussed in Part IV support a mercury phaseout and simultaneously address general miner and community safety issues.[57] However, from a human-rights angle, some health and safety concerns prevalent in the ASGM sector such as child labor and sex trafficking might not be resolved by adopting mercury-free mining practices.[58] Though expanding mercury phaseout efforts could catalyze protections for workforce and community safety, other labor rights issues should continue to be analyzed in future research.

B. Environmental Impacts

Beyond human health impacts, mercury-based ASGM generates a host of other negative environmental impacts. As previously discussed, the burning of mercury from amalgam during mining processes generates toxic emissions that can harm not only humans but also wildlife.[59] While mercury is a naturally occurring metal, high concentrations of mercury can disrupt ecosystems abutting mining operations.[60] Such ecosystem harms do not exist in a vacuum but instead trickle down to humans through the food chain.[61] Additionally, as a heavy metal, mercury does not degrade over time, meaning that it can accumulate to dangerous levels within soils and waters, disrupting ecosystem balances and increasing health risks to surrounding humans and wildlife.[62] To restore ecosystems to healthy mercury levels, scientists must employ soil and water remediation strategies like adsorption, desorption, oxidation, and reduction.[63]

Additionally, the illegal and informal ASGM sector contributes to forest degradation in key biodiversity reservoirs, such as the Amazon Rainforest. This is because terrestrial and aquatic exposure to mercury creates chemical pollution that disrupts the homeostasis of healthy soils and water systems.[64] Mercury degradation of soil and biota can, in turn, degrade forests whose roots rely on healthy soils.[65] Mining processes can lead to intentional forest clearing by miners as well, especially when such mining operations are outside regulatory purview.[66]

This environmental degradation can spiral into a negative feedback loop. Forests serve as mercury sinks, mitigating mercury pollution in the air.[67] Thus, deforestation for mining purposes not only releases more mercury into the ecosystem but also degrades natural mercury sinks.[68] Such chemical pollution of the soil also ripples through the ecosystem to threaten regional biodiversity more broadly, further amplifying the problem.[69] Consequently, mercury-caused forest impacts increase overall mercury concentrations within the ecosystem over time.[70] Additionally, as previously discussed, mercury pollution in waterways can cause an accumulation of the toxin in fish, carrying pollution from the mining source to the drinking and eating grounds of nearby communities.[71]

Collectively, the use of mercury within ASGM regions creates runoff contamination that threatens ecosystem sustainability. Better legal frameworks could help regulate the ASGM sector to mitigate such environmental impacts and preserve ecosystem health for future generations.

II. Legal Efforts to Improve Small-Scale and Artisanal Gold Mining Sustainability

At the national and international level, legal actions have been taken to mitigate the harm caused by the gold mining industry. Yet, more than a decade after implementing a foundational international treaty—the Minamata Convention on Mercury—and enforceable legal structures, the ASGM subsector, specifically, remains resistant to change. This Section explores the history of such legal mechanisms and begins to discuss why these reforms fail to generate their intended impact.

A. A Case Study: Colombia

Colombia serves as a stimulating case study of legal efforts and challenges experienced from a national perspective. Though the overall number of ASGM miners in Colombia is uncertain, planetGOLD estimates there are approximately 350,000 miners in Colombia directly engaging in ASGM, while other sources suggest as many as two million may be employed in the sector.[72] As explained below, the Colombian government has taken robust legal action to address gold mining concerns through legislation and through the delegation of regulatory authority to administrative agencies. Yet, like many other nations facing similar gold mining issues,[73] Colombia’s modern efforts to improve gold mining sustainability realize negligible impacts in practice.

1.   Distinctive Characteristics

The political history and geographic context of gold mining in Colombia offer interesting perspectives for considering regulatory challenges. Colombia is uniquely situated to exemplify the multifaceted issues pertaining to ASGM. Yet, Colombia is also generalizable enough to serve as a productive study for prospective ASGM legal improvements in other nations too.[74]

At baseline, this Note uses Colombia as a case study because the government appeared, and continues to appear, willing to cooperate on addressing ASGM issues. Admittedly, the Colombian government maintains some perverse incentives against strictly regulating or eliminating the ASGM industry, due to its major contributions to the country’s GDP through economic exports.[75] Colombia’s legal actions involving ASGM likewise come under scrutiny for being relatively ineffective in practice.[76] Nevertheless, national government acknowledgement of ASGM issues, and cooperation in tackling such issues, is foundational for progress of any kind.

Geographic context also makes Colombia an appealing example for studying ASGM. To begin, Colombia’s geography is particularly vulnerable to ASGM harms. The Amazon Rainforest, a tropical habitat and important carbon sink with rich biodiversity, accounts for 35 percent of Colombia’s surface area.[77] Colombia also lies proximal to other segments of the Amazon Rainforest.[78] Collectively, this contiguity with the Amazon ecosystem places the Colombian government in a critical position for upholding environmental stewardship. ASGM practices, without formal regulatory intervention, undermine the health of the Amazon Rainforest through the soil, water, forest, and biodiversity harms previously discussed.[79] Mercury use in ASGM has particularly disruptive effects on water quality and tree root strength that threaten the Amazon biome.[80]

And while vulnerable to ASGM harms, Colombia could see advantages by tackling mercury pollution issues because Colombia cannot mine for mercury domestically.[81] Colombia contains no naturally occurring cinnabar deposits, from which mercury ore is derived, which means that all mercury cycling into the country is a product of international trade.[82] ASGM solutions focusing on eliminating mercury use could simplify the country’s regulatory strategy.

Colombia is also a compelling case study because it sits adjacent to other ASGM hotspots such as those found in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Brazil.[83] These nations have a common ecological interest in the Amazon Rainforest and many cultural and geographic parallels that could make cooperation on ASGM issues worthwhile.[84] So, if national strategies are successful in Colombia, there is a potential opportunity to knowledge-share with surrounding countries that face similar ASGM challenges. Moreover, because both the gold and mercury supply chains traverse national boundaries, this region of South America poses interesting questions about whether and how to regulate cross-border trade networks on land.[85]

Colombia itself also has a political history that provokes questions on how to better enforce legal compliance with ASGM standards. The illegal ASGM subsector in Colombia shares ties to organized criminal syndicates that often conduct other illicit activities such as drug trafficking and money laundering.[86] These illicit networks share historical ties with armed guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and their associated drug cartel activity.[87] Even before the 2016 peace accords between FARC and the Colombian government, organized rebel groups like FARC began capitalizing on illicit ASGM for revenue as an alternative to the illegal drug trade.[88] Compared to dealing drugs like cocaine, illicitly mining gold proved to be lower risk and more profitable. This trend toward illegal ASGM became more pronounced in recent years as the government cracked down on enforcement against drug trafficking.[89]

By their nature, organized crime networks in Colombia prove resistant to legal regulation and have heightened incentive to avoid government monitoring through mine licensing programs.[90] By evading regulatory oversight, organized criminal networks can benefit from cutting costs associated with registration fees, workers’ safety, and the like (sometimes through coercion, extortion, or bribery) while also generating a discrete source of money that can fund other illegal activities or even terrorism.[91] Particularly when licensing compliance is poorly enforced with low chance of punishment, these organized crime groups have little to gain and much to lose from ASGM formalization.[92] This history of illegal trade and rebel guerrilla threats is not entirely unique to Colombia and can also serve as a lens for considering other illicit forces that oppose ASGM formalization efforts in nations worldwide.[93]

2.   History of Gold Mining

Gold mining is not new to Colombia, but formal environmental and safety regulation of the industry is a relatively recent development. Prior to colonial occupation, Indigenous communities long engaged in artisanal gold mining in alignment with local traditions and values.[94] Then in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spanish colonization and the introduction of the African slave trade into Colombia led to a significant expansion of the gold mining industry.[95] Colonial oversight of the industry focused on efficient and scalable resource extraction for the colonists’ economic gain.[96] Gold mining proved so profitable for the economy that, even after Colombia claimed independence in 1819, the trade persisted as a main source of income in gold production hubs like Antioquia.[97] Even after the colonial era, economic benefits reaped from gold mining often went to foreign investors and came at the cost of Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities who labored in mines.[98] Communities coerced into the industry became subsequently dependent on gold mining for their livelihoods.[99]

The supremacy of the gold market eventually ebbed in key mining regions as other resource production, such as coffee bean harvesting, took the helm.[100] But gold mining continued at a reduced scale. Eventually, a reinvigoration in gold production occurred circa the 1970s, shortly after Law 20 of 1969 established state ownership of mines in Colombia.[101] The government would later repeal Law 20 in favor of Decree 2655 in 1988, which changed mining structures to merely allow the state to partake in mining through public or mixed companies and no longer require mining operations to be exclusively run by the government.[102] While short-lived, Decree 2655 began to open opportunities for private sector participation and perhaps further fueled the sector’s economic growth.[103]

3.   Modern Gold Mining Regulation

As gold mining made a modern resurgence in regions like Antioquia and Southern Córdoba, the Colombian government aimed to better regulate the industry in the 1990s and early 2000s.[104] Through the adoption of laws, like Colombia’s 1991 Constitution, and the creation of the mining codes, the government recognized the potential to grow the mining industry for economic development.[105] Simultaneously, government action appeared reactionary to the multi-ethnic social mobilization across the nation, which occurred in the 1980s.[106]

New laws also created new rights-based relationships between private citizens and the State. Article 88 of the Constitution established all Colombian subsoils and nonrenewable resources as state property but gave Congress the authority to legislate conditions for the scope of resource handling and rights over resources for territorial entities (i.e., regional governments in Colombia).[107] At the same time, the Constitution also declared public health and environmental protection to be collective rights of its citizens.[108] Meanwhile, Law 685 of 2001—the Mining Code—created a legal relationship between the government and individual property-rights holders for the various stages of mining, including exploration, construction and assembly, exploitation, processing, transport, and mineral marketing.[109]

Colombia further developed government regulation of the mining sector by delegating authority to federal agencies. Decree 4134 of 2011 established the National Mining Agency (ANM), which manages the title and registration process for mining formalization, including monitoring.[110] Other agencies involved in gold mining oversight include the Ministry of Mines and Energy, an executive agency that develops government regulations and policy implementation plans for mining management.[111] Affiliated with the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Mining-Energetic Planning Unit (UPME) supports other agency efforts by managing and planning for the sustainable development of Colombia’s mining and energy industries.[112] For example, UPME assists in creating and implementing public policy for mining.[113] UPME also drafts and updates the National Mining Development Plan in collaboration with other relevant agencies.[114]

These agencies and the legislature have also sought to regulate mercury use in ASGM. Colombia instituted Law 1658 in 2013 to phase out mercury trade and industrial use, which extends to the gold mining industry.[115] Moreover, interministerial collaboration on the Single National Mercury Plan improved coordination toward the goal of eradicating mercury use.[116]

In 2012, the Ministry of Mines and Energy developed a registry system for miners to formally license their operations under Decree 2637. The system, known as the Single Registry of Mineral Traders (RUCOM), legally recognizes mining operations and, in theory, works to ensure worker safety and general sustainability for gold extraction by monitoring registered mining operations.[117] However, as the next Section will illustrate, enforcement of these protections through RUCOM has proved elusive.

4.   Challenges to Regulating

Despite progressive laws and regulations, Colombia’s gold mining industry continues to endanger human health and the environment.[118] Particularly within ASGM, few mines pursue registration through RUCOM.[119] Numerous factors appear to contribute to the continuance of these informal—now illegal—ASGM operations in Colombia a decade after regulatory rollout, including the overly complex nature of RUCOM registration, lack of effective enforcement, the ability of organized crime networks to avoid accountability, and the policies and lack of enforcement in neighboring countries.[120]

First, critics contend that RUCOM registration is overly complex, which deters many small-scale mines with limited resources and knowledge from registering.[121] Adding to RUCOM challenges, ASGM operations are often dispersed and come in varying forms.[122] Therefore, characteristics that legally define small-scale mining and miners falling under RUCOM and ANM authority may fail to describe certain mining operations.[123] Narrow or poorly characterized legal definitions for ASGM can also lead mine owners to circumvent formalization requirements that protect human safety and environmental health.[124] Thus, existing laws pertaining to mining create certain legal ambiguities and have dysfunctional agency implementation in Colombia.[125]

Second, Colombia faces issues with enforcement. Like many other nations seeking to regulate the ASGM subsector, Colombia struggles to allocate adequate resources to monitor illegal gold mining, which often occurs in rural areas that are difficult to access.[126] Critics suggest that Colombia needs to improve coordination between various environmental and mining agencies, as they are newly established and lack clear role delineation.[127] Moreover, the government appears to lack effective communication channels with, and in consideration of, Indigenous community interests.[128] When a significant amount of ASGM malpractices disproportionately harm Indigenous people,[129] overlooking communication and collaboration with this demographic could itself hinder effective mining enforcement strategies.

Organized crime itself also proves difficult to dismantle through enforcement mechanisms, and ASGM management often has organized-crime connections.[130] Within Colombia, the connection between gold mining and organized crime networks, often associated with drug trafficking and historical rebel guerilla groups, complicates efforts toward legal compliance.[131] Moreover, environmental defenders who try to speak out or litigate against environmental injustices related to unsustainable ASGM practices often face violent repercussions, as discussed further in Part II.B.3.[132]

For example, in 2016, Colombia established a five-hundred-person militarized unit to stop illegal mining by arresting mine workers and destroying their equipment.[133] However, a local think tank alleged that this unit has been ineffective at stopping illegal mining operations because the leaders of organized crime groups often evade arrest and groups can easily replace equipment within weeks.[134] Additionally, the Colombian military’s public marketing of ASGM enforcement tactics faced criticism on the ground from traditional miners.[135] Despite local communities’ sentiments, Colombia continues to consider these enforcement acts as successful and even publicizes its explosions of illegal gold mining equipment.[136]

This is not a struggle confined to Colombia either: Numerous surrounding countries in the Amazonian biome serving as illegal gold mining hotspots also struggle with ineffective regulatory frameworks and enforcement strategies. Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru—among others—recognize the significant damage attributed to their ASGM operations.[137] The prevalence of similar ASGM issues amongst neighbors also creates challenges for Colombia to regulate its own gold mining industry. For example, governments are often wary that overregulation or harsh enforcement across the mining industry could push out business into nations with less legal oversight.[138]

Additionally, eliminating mercury use within Colombian borders becomes complicated when surrounding nations continue illicit trade in mercury.[139] As previously discussed, Colombia does not maintain viable cinnabar deposits to extract mercury domestically, so mercury importation is critical for many illegal ASGM operations.[140] But surrounding nations do mine cinnabar to create mercury, and some of them—like Peru—act as a smuggling gateway for mercury to enter Colombia.[141] When neighboring countries continue to transfer illicitly-sourced mercury into Colombia through illegal pathways, this complicates Colombia’s regulatory approach to enforcing laws like Law 1658.[142]

The Colombian government also maintains certain perverse incentives to neglect ASGM regulation. As the country’s fifth largest export, gold is a major source of revenue for the country.[143] The ASGM sector is a significant contributor to such revenue, accounting for approximately 60 percent of gold extraction in Colombia.[144] In the absence of any incentives to switch to economical alternatives to mercury, more stringent regulatory restrictions on mining could hinder ASGM operations , thereby negatively affecting the national economy.[145]

Colombia’s current enforcement strategies against illegal ASGM raise questions over the country’s ability to generate sector-wide change. To address ASGM challenges, Colombia must also keep the policies and trade networks of neighboring countries in mind. Amazonian countries lack cross-border coordinating or parallel implementation of sustainable mining regulations at present, undermining progress on this issue. Without a pivot in strategy or capacity support, Colombia may be grasping at straws in its effort to enforce its mining laws.

B. International Actions

Beyond national laws and regulations, some international agreements have the potential to support supply chain sustainability within the gold industry, particularly in the phaseout of mercury in ASGM. Likewise, market-based mechanisms, like gold certification schemes, have aimed to improve gold supply chain transparency and accountability. However, to date, neither these intergovernmental efforts nor these certification schemes have lived up to their promise. The below Sections analyze the aims and mechanisms relevant to ASGM in these international agreements and market mechanisms, as well as their potential weaknesses.

1.   The Minamata Convention on Mercury

In 2013, the United Nations and other stakeholders developed the Minamata Convention on Mercury (Minamata Convention).[146] This legally binding international treaty intends to protect human health and the environment from the adverse effects of exposure to mercury and mercury compounds.[147] The Minamata Convention focuses on many industries and strategies to phase out the global mercury trade and anthropogenic mercury release.[148] For example, the agreement aims to mitigate the use of mercury in manufactured products, including fluorescent lamps, dry cells, dental amalgam, skin cosmetics, and thermometers.[149] The Minamata Convention also supports remediation of mercury-contaminated areas and helps establish safe mercury storage and disposal processes.[150]

Article 7 of the Minamata Convention specifically pertains to mercury use in ASGM.[151] Given the pervasive, international concerns surrounding mercury use, Article 7 requires parties that ratify the Minamata Convention to reduce or eliminate mercury from ASGM where feasible.[152] Parties to the Convention that self-identify as having “more than insignificant” ASGM activities must report this finding to the Minamata Convention Secretariat.[153] After reporting, Parties can develop and implement a National Action Plan (NAP).[154] As of May 2025, thirty-seven countries have submitted NAPs.[155]

For countries with notable ASGM presence, NAPs are comprehensive launching points for identifying issues and drafting actionable solutions. Each NAP must describe national objectives and reduction targets related to reducing mercury use in ASGM.[156] NAPs also need to contain quantified estimates for mercury used and qualitative information on mining tactics employed within a specific country.[157] Additionally, NAPs outline strategies to support legal formalization in the ASGM sector, mitigate mercury trade in ASGM, engage with stakeholders, protect public health, and reduce mercury exposure among vulnerable populations.[158] Finally, NAPs require an implementation schedule to plan the rollout of Article 7 efforts over time.[159] The Global Environment Facility (GEF) provides funding support to countries in need of developing NAPs.[160]

Developing countries and countries with transitioning economies can also develop a Minamata Convention Initial Assessment (MIA) prior to ratifying or creating NAPs.[161] MIAs allow countries to access GEF funding to explore implementation planning and undertake a mercury inventory prior to Minamata Convention ratification or approval.[162] After ratification, select countries can access additional funding for research and capacity building that supports active NAP implementation, most notably through the planetGOLD program.[163] planetGOLD collaborates on the ground with ASGM communities, governments, and the private sector to work toward making ASGM safer, cleaner, and more profitable.[164] planetGOLD projects can include pilot projects for mercury-free gold mining technology, supportive efforts to incentivize mining formalization, educational campaigns, and mechanisms to improve access to finance for miners.[165]

Despite the focused strategies related to ASGM outlined in the Minamata Convention, mercury use persists within the ASGM sector even over a decade after the treaty’s creation.[166] Slow adoption of the treaty by various nations, as well as delayed NAP development and implementation timelines, is partially to blame.[167] Likewise, government buy-in for legal reform is logistically challenging and time consuming for many countries.[168] Despite GEF support, some research also suggests that financial constraints contributed to implementation delays, as many countries with ASGM issues need more long-term capacity-building assistance to realize widespread progress.[169]

Minamata Convention projects typically encourage legal compliance by creating positive incentives, rather than focusing on enforcement mechanisms. For example, most planetGOLD programs facilitate capacity-building projects. These capacity-building projects create a pathway for compliance by supporting mercury-free technology adoption and educating localities on gold mining best practices.[170]

The Minamata Convention, however, does not establish negative consequences for noncompliance. The Minamata Convention maintains requirements for ratifying nations to act according to the international agreement but does not provide any penalties for countries in violation.[171] Sanctions could be imposed on those who violate the treaty, but other political factors and the niche scope of mercury usage are likely to sway decision-makers away from imposing sanctions.[172]

Such enforcement challenges are common in the international realm. Under international law, nations are sovereign equals, and international agreements cannot overstep national sovereignty without the sovereign’s consent.[173] Since enforcement is not typically within the purview of international treaties, treaties like the Minamata Convention often allow issues of enforcement to fall to the wayside.[174] Even when enforcement mechanisms are encouraged by international treaties, international funders like the United Nations may be hesitant to finance government enforcement initiatives due to the political risk involved.[175]

Although the Minamata Convention pushes for greater enforcement against ASGM violators, Colombia’s lack of progress under the Convention belies the treaty’s effectiveness. Colombia signed the Minamata Convention in 2013 but did not officially ratify it until 2019.[176] The country’s current NAP, published in 2023, identifies key weaknesses and objectives for sustainable ASGM management.[177] For example, it cites RUCOM licensing data to demonstrate the high level of informal participation in Colombia’s gold mining sector.[178] It then proposes that RUCOM update and consolidate its database of mineral gold processing and industrial plants already registered in RUCOM as an initial remedial step.[179] Colombia’s NAP also details a strategy against illicit exploitation. This strategy includes efforts to dismantle organized crime groups and disrupt “financial circles” as “part of the strategy against environmental crime” in line with the National Criminal Policy Plan.[180] The NAP’s promising language recognizes regional mercury use in ASGM as an environmental crime.[181] However, current GEF and third-party funding initiatives focused on ASGM in Colombia still fail to touch upon enforcement and instead try to incentivize formalization with carrots instead of sticks.[182]

Considering these Minamata Convention failures, Part IV below proposes potential policy recommendations to address these enforcement gaps.

2.   Gold Certification Schemes and Supply Chain Oversight

International cooperation against ASGM injustices also takes the form of supply chain sustainability certifications and related market-based mechanisms. This form of voluntary supply chain due diligence requires verification of gold or gold-related businesses at different stages of gold development.[183] Thus, in theory, the chain of title for gold can be traced to ensure sustainable extraction and refinement practices.[184] Investors or gold end-markets may choose to prioritize or selectively use certified gold instead of uncertified gold that is likely associated with human rights issues or environmental degradation in the upstream supply chain.[185]

Many critics contend that market-based mechanisms are often ineffective in practice.[186] Such market-based mechanisms, like the Fairmined certification and the Swiss Cooperation’s Better Gold Initiative, seek to establish human rights and environmental standards for gold supply chains.[187] Yet, these certification schemes usually govern downstream to upstream, meaning certification bodies have little presence on the ground in areas where informal ASGM operates.[188] For example, the Better Gold Initiative is an industry association that brings together refiners, jewelers, watchmakers, and financial institutions (downstream gold supply chain actors) to commit to sustainable gold sourcing upstream in the mining process.[189] And unlike drug trafficking or other illegal trade pathways, gold is not inherently illegal. In fact, mercury-produced ASGM gold is difficult to distinguish from legally mined gold.[190] Consequently, there are many viable pathways to smuggle informal or illegal gold into formal markets while evading certification-scheme monitoring activities.[191]

For example, in Colombia, illegally mined gold is often laundered through medium- or large-scale mines with legal licenses.[192] Intermediate gold aggregators may likewise forge documents and use shell companies to circumnavigate government reach.[193] Weaknesses within the mining registration system also make it easy to produce fraudulent miner registries and use the registries to misrepresent gold quality to bring illicit gold into formal markets.[194] Monitoring gold pathways for such fraudulent activities would be resource-intensive and impractical for mining certification schemes that have limited on-the-ground oversight.

Another recent example of challenges with market-based mechanisms comes from the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA). LBMA manages one of the world’s largest wholesale over-the-counter markets for trading gold and maintains baseline requirements for gold sourcing standards.[195] Between 2021 and 2024, the LBMA came under scrutiny by various human rights and sustainability groups for greenwashing and inadequate efforts to ensure compliance with its responsible-sourcing standards.[196] LBMA also granted responsible-sourcing approval to gold refiners that were later found to be connected to illegal gold networks.[197] On top of this, LBMA is currently in litigation for wrongly certifying gold derived from a Tanzanian mine inflicting human rights abuses.[198]

To address such issues, LBMA—in collaboration with the World Gold Council—is rolling out the Gold Bar Integrity (GBI) Project to digitally trace gold moving through the global supply chain that ends up on the London Bullion Market.[199] The initiative shows promise to improve monitoring for irregularities or discrepancies in the gold supply chain.[200]

3.   Other International Agreements

Other international agreements established in recent years have potential to indirectly support progress on ASGM sustainability. Aspirational plans under the Escazú Agreement and Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework could be leveraged with the Minamata Convention’s goal of mercury mitigation in ASGM to facilitate co-benefits. These emerging agreements also indicate that the Minamata Convention could experience renewed relevance with a more significant impact in the coming decade.

a. The Escazú Agreement

Adopted in 2018, the Escazú Agreement is a regional treaty between twenty-four Latin American and Caribbean countries that strengthens the connection between human rights and environmental protection.[201] Among its central pillars, the treaty delineates rights to public access of environmental information and participation in environmental decision-making.[202] The Escazú Agreement also establishes a right to engage in administrative or judicial institutional procedures, such as an adjudicatory appeals process for an environmental decision under a competent government agency.[203]

Most notably, the Escazú Agreement is the first international treaty to establish protections for environmental defenders.[204] The United Nations defines environmental defenders as “individuals and groups who, in their personal or professional capacity and in a peaceful manner, strive to protect and promote human rights relating to the environment, including water, air, land, flora and fauna.”[205] Environmental defenders, especially in regions like Latin America and the Caribbean, are often vulnerable to reactionary violence and harassment that can be life threatening.[206]

The impact of the Escazú Agreement is yet to be seen. Among signatory countries, the ratification process has been slow. Eight signatory countries have not yet ratified it, including Brazil and Peru.[207] Colombia only recently ratified the treaty in 2024, a six-year delay.[208] There, Colombia’s Constitutional Court had to determine whether the Escazú Agreement was constitutional prior to ratification.[209] Colombia’s lengthy legal review helps explain why some signatory countries may delay ratification even when they support the cause.[210]

While not directly calling out ASGM, the Escazú Agreement presents opportunities for addressing ASGM’s environmental issues. The treaty sets forth guidelines for protecting environmental defenders and also encourages environmental defenders to participate in the treaty implementation process to better address their needs.[211] The treaty has spurred collaboration between civil society and government institutions that has the potential to impact national safeguards at a constitutional level and generate helpful jurisprudence.[212] The new individual rights for accessing environmental information and judicial review could likewise be significant from a human rights perspective.[213] The agreement could benefit nations like Colombia, which has one of the worst records for violence against environmental defenders worldwide.[214] Without these safeguards, prospective environmental defenders may be deterred from speaking out against the ecosystem and human health impacts caused by illegal gold mining.[215]

Implementing Escazú Agreement improvements and ensuring countries meet their treaty obligations may take time. But given that sixteen countries have ratified the Escazú Agreement, the treaty could be a useful tool for bolstering environmental protection through legal institutions and protecting those who speak out against environmental injustices.[216]

b. Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework is an international agreement established in 2022 that aspires to mitigate anthropogenic biodiversity loss.[217] Informally dubbed the “Paris Agreement for Nature,” this framework establishes targets for 2030 and 2050 to preserve native species, mitigate human-caused extinction, reverse biodiversity loss, and retain resilient ecosystems.[218]

Although the framework is not a legally binding treaty with mandatory obligations, the World Economic Forum suggests that the framework could lead to tremendous change to businesses worldwide and encourage a suite of new domestic regulations.[219] Nations that adopt the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework are expected to work toward the goals and targets established by the agreement.[220] These obligations include submitting documentation demonstrating national progress toward the biodiversity goals listed in National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans.[221] Financial mechanisms in the framework can also provide implementation support to island nations, so-called developing countries, and countries in periods of economic transition.[222] This implementation funding would target capacity building, technology transfer and knowledge sharing, and scientific programs.[223] Related biodiversity financing plans can also help countries access private funding to meet their goals and targets.[224]

The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework provides a promising avenue to support monitoring of biodiversity impacts related to mercury contamination in the ASGM sector. Biodiversity loss in the form of forest degradation and aquatic ecosystem contamination is one of the primary concerns associated with illegal gold mining.[225] This is especially true for countries like Colombia, whose ASGM operations risk irreversible damage to the biodiverse Amazon Rainforest.[226]

III. The Way Forward: Continuing to Prioritize Mercury Elimination

Generally, mercury contamination from mining generates significant harm to human health and the environment in vulnerable communities, relative to other abuses within the sector.[227] As previously discussed, human rights concerns attributed to ASGM practices are not confined to mercury use in ASGM. Child labor within mines, sex trafficking connected to mining management, and inadequate safety protections could persist in ASGM even if the sector globally phases out mercury.[228] But of the ASGM malpractices, mercury exposure may pose the highest degree of risk because of its pervasiveness in the sector and ability to spread to nearby ecosystems and communities.[229]

Because the low cost of mercury enables informal gold mining, addressing the illicit mercury trade could hamper other gold mining malpractices—although little research is available to consider these downstream impacts.[230] Mercury regulation, rather than direct gold regulation, is likely more palatable for politicians in countries like Colombia. The public is more likely to be critical of direct gold regulation because gold exports contribute significantly to the national economy.[231]

While various national laws and international agreements attempt to mitigate the health and environmental harm from mercury, progress has been negligible after decades of work.[232] In particular, efforts to eliminate mercury from ASGM under the international Minamata Convention have yielded unsatisfactory results twelve years after the treaty’s adoption.[233] This raises questions for future stakeholders on how to account for past failures and accelerate future progress.

Despite this lackluster progress, stakeholders worldwide should continue to prioritize mercury-focused strategies aligned with the Minamata Convention for several reasons. First, supply-side and demand-side interventions are becoming more feasible as mercury monitoring becomes easier to administer and mercury use becomes easier to remove from the mining process. Second, both mercury trade regulation and substitute implementation might avoid some of the pitfalls associated with direct gold trade regulation. The Sections below demonstrate these phenomena within Colombia and suggest actions that could help accelerate progress on ASGM sustainability through mercury-focused strategies.

A. Mercury Trade Monitoring

Colombia serves as a promising test case for strengthening mercury trade regulation because the country has no viable cinnabar deposits that enable domestic mercury mining.[234] Colombia has also banned mercury imports for the gold mining industry, so all mercury entering the ASGM sector is illegal.[235] But Colombia lacks sufficient shipping records and border control measures to pinpoint illicit smuggling pathways.[236] Mercury continues to enter through illegal trade networks.[237] Better regulation of trade at national borders could thus generate tremendous impact.

Thankfully, Colombia is moving to address the issue of mercury smuggling. Colombia’s NAP for the Minamata Convention identifies management of illegal trade and smuggling of mercury as an implementation strategy.[238] Specifically, the NAP involves using GEF funding to create a cross-border cooperation project with other Amazonian nations to address mercury trade, as well as promoting other binational agreements for mercury border control.[239] The strategy also involves strengthening domestic processes for mercury mapping, customs and port control, and technological surveillance by authorities.[240]

As Colombia’s NAP referenced, GEF is beginning to roll out a funding initiative to research and control mercury trade across key Latin American countries.[241] After some delay, GEF approved the initiative in 2024 for implementation, and the Andean Observatory pledged ongoing support to ensure continued mercury monitoring and the longevity of the initiative after GEF’s implementation window closes.[242] The GEF initiative aims to generate legal reforms to border control, build capacity, and facilitate collaboration between select South American countries to stop transnational mercury smuggling.[243] The initiative holds promise; it underwent updates between 2022 and 2024 to incorporate teachings from other mineral control and diamond trade policies.[244]

More stakeholders and philanthropy may prove helpful to ensure long-term success of such an ambitious project. Nongovernmental organizations independent of the Andean Observatory could conduct their own border and mercury monitoring efforts. Nongovernmental reporting could pressure government accountability for ASGM management. Third-party research could also help the government target the borders or checkpoints that see the biggest influx of smuggled mercury.

B. Mercury Substitutes for Gold Mining Processes

Stakeholders worldwide also should continue to champion mercury-focused strategies because recent advances make mercury use easier to replace within the mining process. As previously discussed, two of the foremost barriers to safe gold extraction are the prohibitive cost and scarcity of mercury substitutes. ASGM often employs mercury extraction methods because it is cheaper than investing substantial upfront capital to implement more complex and safer mining methods.[245] Unlike larger mines, ASGM cannot rely upon economies of scale to minimize extraction costs and ensure steady profit margins.[246] Mercury is also effective and efficient for dispersed gold extraction.[247]

Technological improvements could soon accelerate the adoption of mercury substitutes. To date, a substantial amount of research affiliated with the Minamata Convention has focused on innovating and practically improving mercury substitutes.[248] This focus on developing mercury-free best practices could help explain why countries have not yet realized significant progress toward Minamata Convention goals. Technological improvements often take time to research and develop, then proliferate in a manner that is economically practical.[249] Thus, technological progress on Minamata Convention goals may be slow, causing delayed impact in the coming years.

Nonetheless, sustained investment in mercury-substitute programs suggests that technological improvements may soon become viable to implement on a broader scale. For example, mercury-substitute pilot programs aligned with the Minamata Convention include efforts by planetGOLD and the Artisanal Mining Grand Challenge.[250] planetGOLD programs generally aim to bolster adoption of low-cost technological alternatives to mercury use by financing technology transfers, conducting new technology training, and sharing information on best practices.[251] Meanwhile, the Grand Challenge functions as an incubator competition to encourage the development of innovative and sustainable ASGM process solutions.[252]

Research conducted during the first decade of Minamata Convention implementation now shows that inexpensive and effective substitutes for mercury exist but must be proactively disseminated to incentivize small-scale gold mining industry changes.[253] For example, miners could leverage gravity to separate gold particles from ore via centrifuges or shaking tables. Similarly, miners could use borax to lower the melting point for gold.[254] These solutions generally require mining operations to use different processes and equipment than mercury-based mining, so adopting these changes still requires buy-in and potentially financial support to persuade mine managers.[255]

For this reason, ASGM sustainability efforts should continue to focus on mercury mitigation through demand-side considerations, including technological replacements.[256] Support for technological substitutes helps balance the supply-side mercury trade monitoring strategies mentioned above. Offering economic assistance would incentivize miners to transition to safer practices and come into alignment with legal regulations. In an industry where many miners rely on ASGM wages for their basic needs, adoption of sustainable technologies must be economical for the businesses involved.[257] Laws forcing adoption of new technology may backfire and destabilize the job security of miners if such technology is not financially viable for businesses to implement. Continued philanthropic and nongovernmental support could be beneficial to ensure long-term and widespread adoption of mercury alternatives in ASGM, particularly at the grassroots level.

IV. Policy Recommendations for a Mercury-Focused ASGM Sustainability Strategy

Even with well-written laws and regulatory designs, progress in the ASGM sector will not occur unless people comply with the law. Much of the existing research analyzing the implementation of the Minamata Convention and federal ASGM formalization across countries suggests that new government regulation struggles to rival the social legitimacy of existing customs (also referred to as “tacit rules”).[258] To overcome the preference for informal customs in ASGM practices, many argue that legal regulation needs to be supported by improvements in miner training programs, inexpensive alternatives to unsafe mining practices, and more comprehensive mercury monitoring.[259] As Part III argues, mercury-focused solutions aligned with such mechanisms can incentivize formalization and reduce barriers to legal compliance.[260]

In furtherance of these goals, Part IV recommends policies to catalyze a sector-wide shift toward sustainable ASGM management. First, in countries like Colombia, policymakers should further improve the efficiency of litigation and adjudication pathways for mining law violations, with an emphasis on empowering Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities and protecting environmental defenders. Second, instead of adopting strategies that trace the origins of gold or regulate gold trade through certification, industry regulation should focus on identifying mercury pollution as an indicator of gold supply chain discrepancies. Such mercury-based policy improvements would reduce harm to communities most vulnerable to ASGM’s harm by centering their voices.

A. Improving Litigation and Adjudication Pathways

Litigation and administrative adjudication provide avenues for those harmed by ASGM malpractices to seek justice. These avenues also allow the public to push for legal and regulatory reform through the courts, functioning as a check on government power.[261] Litigation could be particularly helpful to mobilize change when a government agency displays weaknesses in enforcing the law or when there is corruption within the ranks of government officials.[262] For Colombia, mercury-related ASGM liabilities are unlikely to see successful adjudication or litigation without better legal protections for Indigenous communities, Afro-descendant communities, and environmental defenders.

1.   Empower Indigenous and Afro-descendant Communities to Litigate

Research suggests that law enforcement within Colombia may overlook or undermonitor the rights of Indigenous communities or Afro-descendant individuals,[263] necessitating litigation pathways for individuals to petition for protection of their own rights. In Colombia, Indigenous communities have a right of first refusal for commercial mining on their lands, which is a strong legal protection compared to many surrounding countries in the Amazon biome.[264] Afro-descendant communities in Colombia similarly have rights enshrined in Law 70 and through constitutional law. Law 70 recognizes Afro-descendant community rights to collective land ownership in areas that these communities have historically occupied, as well as the right to free, prior, and informed consent and consultation with the government before mining project implementation.[265] Likewise, the Colombian Constitutional Court has upheld Afro-descendant communities’ rights to consultation and ruled that forced displacement of such Afro-descendant communities is unconstitutional.[266] Nevertheless, existing laws in Colombia lack adequate implementation and enforcement, leaving many Indigenous communities vulnerable to mining exploitation.[267] To eliminate the use of mercury from ASGM and make the gold supply chain sustainable, these communities are an important focus.

Often under-resourced, Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities in Colombia need educational and advocacy support to challenge ASGM injustices in court. But understanding Indigenous and Afro-descendant community needs is locality-specific and should not be overgeneralized. For example, some Indigenous communities live relatively isolated from other communities, while others are ingrained in mining communities and dependent upon the gold mining industry. Strategies for aiding isolated Indigenous communities may prioritize monitoring for environmental health harms and protecting against physical contact with mercury.[268] Meanwhile, other Indigenous or Afro-descendant communities may be involved in ASGM mining directly, and rely on it for their livelihood, but also suffer substantial harm from prevailing mining practices. These communities may benefit from educational knowledge-sharing on ASGM health impacts and their legal rights. More specifically, strategies that empower such communities to litigate may prioritize labor safety training or labor rights education to protect miners at immediate risk of harm.

With support from nongovernmental organizations, these communities can litigate against industry malpractices. Capacity-building programs should collaborate with Colombia’s Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities on monitoring mercury contamination of soils, groundwater, and surface waterways. Prioritizing projects that give such communities more agency and decision-making power can help them advocate on their own behalf, instead of developing dependency on philanthropic groups.

In addition to providing information to support litigation, placing mercury monitoring authority in the hands of such communities in Colombia and other ASGM hotspots empowers these communities with the data and authority to directly contribute to ASGM sector-wide progress in other ways. The information could also be useful evidence for compliance efforts under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework.[269] Moreover, such communities could be motivated to report down the gold supply chain to LBMA or gold refiners when mercury exposure levels are high.[270] Unlike monitoring efforts by the government, which may suffer from conflicting incentives,[271] here the incentives of these communities and the goals of LBMA to accurately monitor and seek mercury contamination reductions may be more aligned.

Advocacy efforts focused on reforming laws could also support prospective litigatory efforts. For instance, in Colombia, nongovernmental organizations could push for property law revisions that clarify rights, protections, and practical enforcement processes for Indigenous and Afro-descendant landholders.[272] Additionally, advocacy efforts could focus on expanding recognized Indigenous and Afro-descendant people’s rights more broadly. Some research claims, for example, that an increase in nationally recognized and enforced Indigenous rights, in alignment with preexisting treaties, could be beneficial in mitigating the illegal gold mining industry and mercury trade.[273]

2.   Protect Environmental Defenders

Additionally, in Colombia, litigatory justice for ASGM abuses may not be possible because people fear for their safety if they speak out. Harassment and violence against environmental defenders are well documented. In fact, research suggests that Colombia is the deadliest country for environmental defenders worldwide as of 2023.[274] Over the past decade, 461 environmental defenders have been murdered in the country.[275]

Given the ASGM sector’s associations with organized criminal syndicates in Colombia,[276] prosecution of syndicate leaders is critical for dismantling illicit schemes. Yet, some evidence suggests that Colombian government officials have been complicit in undermining mining laws due to the influence of bribes and conflicts of interest.[277] Such internal corruption and organized crime intimidation hinder progress and make the threat of harm to environmental defenders especially pronounced.[278] By silencing environmental defenders in public spaces, including in court, and failing to prosecute the organized crime groups that are often responsible for killing environmental defenders, enforcement against ASGM abuses will continue to fall short.

To mitigate these injustices, advocates can leverage Colombia’s international treaty obligations under the Escazú Agreement to push the government to better protect environmental defenders.[279] Non-profit organizations and other stakeholders can also help fund and facilitate more direct engagement with Indigenous communities who often also serve as environmental defenders.[280] USAID and the American Bar Association already spearheaded initiatives in this realm, but given the gravity of the issue and the recent dismantling of USAID, additional on-the-ground engagement with Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities around ASGM hotspots could be critical for progress.[281]

Nongovernmental organizations could also provide expertise on environmental-defender protection strategies to federal or local governments. Such government interactions could include technical consultation or advocacy for legal reforms that provide environmental defenders with certain rights or resources to shield them from retaliation. For example, Amnesty International and Oxfam International provide platforms for at-risk female environmental defenders to tell their stories and amplify their demands to Latin American governments.[282] Oxfam International solicited a public petition pressuring the Colombian President Iván Duque to “implement preventive and protective measures for these environmental and territorial defenders, these indigenous, rural and Afro-descendent women.”[283] Support from nongovernmental organizations generates power in numbers, further legitimizing the pleas for progress from environmental defenders.

Arguably, even facilitating dialogue and educating stakeholders on the needs of environmental defenders and the Escazú Agreement could help move the needle.[284] Improved protections for environmental defenders worldwide will not only ensure their safety but also enable them to continue their advocacy for human health and environmental protections.[285]

B. Integrating Mercury into Gold Supply Chain Diligence

As discussed in Part II.B.2, certification schemes and other due diligence practices along the gold supply chain face monitoring and verification difficulties.[286] Gold proves easy to smuggle and its extraction techniques leave no physical evidence.[287] But with emerging systems for controlling the flow of mercury into ASGM operations, renewed opportunities for downstream supply chain diligence could reinforce system sustainability. In other words, gold refineries and end-markets could collaborate with nongovernmental organizations conducting mercury monitoring like the Andean Observatory to ensure that countries with ASGM operations uphold their commitments to mercury control at national borders.

This policy solution would refocus gold supply chain diligence and certification monitoring to center on mercury, rather than gold. Updating gold responsible-certification and due-diligence standards to emphasize mercury risk is likely a better use of resources than monitoring gold chain-of-title, because a mercury focus could circumnavigate the monitoring and verification difficulties discussed in Part II.B.2.[288] Mercury use in gold mining is illegal or being phased out in nations that ratified the Minamata Convention, and its presence is scientifically traceable in the environment, unlike chain-of-title tracing.[289] As regions expand mercury emission monitoring and border control measures through Minamata Convention implementation projects, banks, investors, and certification schemes should leverage these resources for their due diligence processes to validate sustainable gold sourcing. These gold diligence schemes could focus on the geography of origin and flag strands of gold as high risk when they trace back to regions with high levels of environmental mercury contamination. While this approach could be overinclusive and capture mining operations that are coincidentally proximal to unrelated mercury pollution, this overinclusivity is arguably preferable to current schemes that are underinclusive.

Policy experimentation of this type is particularly timely for major end-use gold markets like the London Bullion Market.[290] Given the renewed efforts by LBMA to improve responsible gold sourcing oversight in the London Bullion Market,[291] the moment may be ripe for LBMA to collaborate with organizations involved with mercury monitoring and control. For example, the Andean Observatory could communicate sustainability risks with LBMA if partner countries fail to uphold mercury border control practices. Or LBMA could collaborate with regional water monitoring programs aimed at assessing potential mercury contamination near alleged ASGM hotspots. Additionally, advocacy groups and nongovernmental organizations could facilitate dialogue between such stakeholders. Not only would this cross-sectional collaboration support the monitoring of legitimately responsible gold flows, but such collaboration could also serve as a check against government corruption or lackluster government enforcement of mercury elimination.[292]

Conclusion

Building a sustainable gold supply chain from top to bottom is complex. While many governmental regulatory efforts and nongovernmental capacity-building programs are underway to address human rights and environmental abuses within the gold supply chain, such efforts have generated negligible progress to date. To accelerate progress on this issue, multidimensional, coordinated actions are needed across a global landscape.

Arguably, a focus on tracking and eliminating mercury use within the ASGM sector serves as a linchpin for protecting human health and the environment. The Minamata Convention on Mercury is a significant step forward on this issue. But slow ratification processes and selective implementation actions by member countries stall progress. Still, more targeted efforts focused on mercury elimination could help catalyze impacts, particularly in Amazonian countries like Colombia.

Ultimately, mercury-focused strategies should continue to be prioritized. Such strategies prove the most effective at mitigating the environmental and human health toll posed by ASGM, in comparison to gold supply chain-focused interventions. Alternatives to mercury use in ASGM may also become more technologically and economically viable in the near future, making this strategy more promising.

From a policy perspective, regions like Colombia could mitigate the harmful effects of mercury by improving relevant litigation and adjudication pathways as well as integrating mercury monitoring into gold certification schemes. To encourage litigation and enforcement against ASGM law violators, stakeholders could hold organized crime syndicates responsible and expand legal protections for environmental defenders. Existing gold supply chain diligence frameworks could also better integrate mercury monitoring programs to serve as a check on the reliability of their tracing data and gain a more holistic understanding of sustainability risks. Finally, the consideration, participation, and empowerment of Indigenous, Afro-descendant, and other vulnerable communities is crucial to properly addressing injustices within the global artisanal and small-scale gold mining supply chain.

Copyright © 2026 Megan Conner, Attorney and Alumna of University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Many thanks to the California Law Review and Berkeley Law’s Note Publishing Workshop, including Professors Diana Reddy and Daniel Farber, for your support refining this piece. I also owe a special gratitude to my former colleagues at the World Resources Institute who introduced me to the landscape of gold mining injustices. All views expressed in this Note are my own and not that of my employer.

[1]. Of all the elements on the periodic table, gold scientifically proves advantageous as a form of currency for many reasons, including that it is easy to smelt, durable at room temperature, and “scarce but not impossibly rare.” Justin Rowlatt, Why Do We Value Gold?, BBC (Dec. 8, 2013), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25255957 [https://perma.cc/8AXX-PP3M]. Gold’s popularity in jewelry is derived in part from its association with currency and wealth. See generally Erica Schoenberger, Why is Gold Valuable? Nature, Social Power and the Value of Things, 18 Cultural Geographies 3 (2011) (exploring how gold’s value has been historically produced and sustained as an expression of class and social power).

[2]. SeeGold Demand Sectors, World Gold Council, https://www.gold.org/about-gold/gold-demand/by-sector [https://perma.cc/7CU6-945Y].

[3]. See, e.g., Hsueh-Hsiao Wang, Cheng-Huang Su, Yih-Jer Wu, Cheng-An J. Lin, Chih-Hsien Lee, Ji-Lin Shen, Wen-Hsiung Chan, Walter H. Chang & Hung-I. Yeh, Application of Gold in Biomedicine: Past, Present and Future, 6 Int’l J. Gerontology 1, 1 (2012); NASA, Spinoff 97, at 50–51 (1997), https://spinoff.nasa.gov/spinoff1997/spin97.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK6D-ABLY]; Catherine Harte, The Untapped Gold Mine Hidden in Our Used Cars, Ecologist (Mar. 14, 2018), https://theecologist.org/2018/mar/14/untapped-gold-mine-hidden-our-used-cars [https://perma.cc/D4AH-V94A].

       [4]. If anything, evidence suggests that the price of gold may go up in the near term. Gold Price Prediction: Gold Rate May Go Up Once Again, Claim Experts, Econ. Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/gold-price-prediction-gold-rate-may-go-up-once-again-claim-experts/articleshow/121536387.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst [https://perma.cc/7PXW-VD69]; Will Gold Prices Hit Another All-Time High in 2025?, J.P. Morgan (Feb. 19, 2025), https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/commodities/gold-prices [https://perma.cc/B7TU-X3QP]; see alsoGold’s Contribution to Society, World Gold Council, https://www.gold.org/esg/golds-contribution-to-society [https://perma.cc/E5MG-VMHL] (discussing gold’s growing and widespread use in electronics, diagnostic tests, and innovative technologies).

       [5]. Here, sustainability does not refer to truly sustaining and replenishing a natural resource, as gold is a non-renewable resource that mining inevitably depletes from ecosystems. Rather, sustainability in gold mining focuses on minimizing associated environmental harms, providing fair labor practices for miners, safeguarding local community wellbeing near mining operations, and other ethical sourcing considerations. More broadly, sustainability in the gold mining context aims to advance United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. See World Bank, Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) 5 nn. 2–3, https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/3350d1c18d832fecc58fdce4743f7f82-0400052024/original/ASM.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TTX-AYGM]; see also Gold Mining and ESG, World Gold Council, https://www.gold.org/gold-and-esg [https://perma.cc/WPM2-FUU3]. Additionally, in the respective canon of academic literature, the initialism ASGM appears most frequently; however, some literature occasionally uses other synonymous initialisms like ASSM or ASM. The terms illegal or informal gold mining (IIGM) and galamsey (specific to Ghana) also appear under the same umbrella definition. See, e.g., Darci Stanger, Galamsey: Environmental Impact of Illegal Gold Mining in Ghana, Geo. Int’l Env’t L. Rev. Online (Feb. 13, 2015), https://gielr.wordpress.com/2015/02/13/galamsey-environmental-impact-of-illegal-gold-mining-in-ghana/ [https://perma.cc/SR97-FCVA]; Sebastián Rubiano Galvis, World Wildlife Found. & Gaia Amazonas, The Amazon Biome in the Face of Mercury Contamination: An Overview of Mercury Trade, Science, and Policy in the Amazonian Countries 120 (2019), https://wwfint.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/reporte_eng_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YWL-GSHD].

       [6]. An Introduction to ASGM: Primer on Mercury Use in Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining, planetGOLD, https://www.planetgold.org/introduction-asgm [https://perma.cc/6JES-SV4H].

       [7]. Artisanal Gold Council, Chemical Hazards in the Artisanal Gold Sector 1 (2020), https://www.planetgold.org/sites/default/files/Chemical-hazards-in-ASGM.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAC7-RF33]; Mercury, World Health Org. (Oct. 24, 2024), https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/mercury-and-health [https://perma.cc/2LBW-S2YP].

[8]. Infra Part II.B.

       [9]. While mercury use in ASGM provides an economically lucrative means to efficiently extract gold from waterways and other reservoirs, the practice places both miners and nearby communities at risk of devastating health externalities. Mercury exposure, even in small quantities, can lead to serious neurological impairments, nerve damage, and other bodily harms. Mercury use in ASGM also contributes to environmental damage for the surrounding ecosystem, such as forest degradation and water contamination. Infra Parts II.A–B.

[10]. Artisanal Small Scale Gold Mining (ASGM), Zero Mercury, https://www.zeromercury.org/about-mercury/mercury-in-processes/artisanal-and-small-scale-gold-mining-asgm [https://perma.cc/2K99-RJCZ].

[11]. Id.; Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining Without Mercury, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/artisanal-and-small-scale-gold-mining-without-mercury [https://perma.cc/6PFZ-VKGL]; Kevin Telmer & Daniel Stapper, United Nations Env’t Programme, A Practical Guide: Reducing Mercury Use in Artisanal and Small-scale Gold Mining 10–13 (2012), https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/files/2017-11/ASGM_English%20%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YUP-E468].

[12]. Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining Without Mercury, supra note 11; Telmer & Stapper, supra note 11, at 10–13.

[13]. Infra Part II.A.1.

     [14]. Telmer & Stapper, supra note 11, at 10.

     [15]. Large-scale gold mining is considered formalized and must comply with due diligence requirements outlined in the United States’ Dodd-Frank Act, as well as the European Union’s Conflict Minerals Regulation, in order to participate in global markets. See Ludovic Bernaudat, The planetGOLD Programme and the Large-scale Gold Mining Sector, planetGOLD (Mar. 28, 2022), https://www.planetgold.org/planetgold-programme-and-large-scale-gold-mining-sector [https://perma.cc/X6GF-ZQPR]; World Gold Council, Lessons Learned on Managing the Interface Between Large-scale and Artisanal and Small-scale Gold Mining 73 (2022). Mining of gold and other nonrenewable resources inherently depletes ecosystems and requires large upfront capital investments with long development and payback timeframes. These factors drive most jurisdictions to institute licensing regimes for large-scale mining, usually separate from other health and safety regulation. Inv. Climate Advisory Servs., World Bank Group,Sector Licensing Studies: Mining Sectorviii (2011) https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/867071468155129330/pdf/587890WP0Secto1BOX353819B001PUBLIC1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3ZR-5DCU].

     [16]. World Gold Council, supra note 15, at 74. Few ASGM operations have licenses, in some cases because they evade applicable licensing regimes and in other cases because they are too small or informal to qualify under the definitions of a licensing regime. See,e.g., Doris Buss, The Case of the Impossible Mining License: Legal Rituals and “Responsible Mining,” 28 L. Text Culture 139, 141, 153–54, 157 (2024).

     [17]. Existing research suggests that individuals involved in the ASGM sector typically generate slimmer profit margins compared to larger mining businesses, making such individuals more resistant to costly mining license and registration processes. See, e.g.,Tshia Malehase, Adegbenro P. Daso & Jonathan O. Okonkwo, Initiatives to Combat Mercury Use in Artisanal Small-Scale Gold Mining: A Review on Issues and Challenges, 25 Env’t Revs. 218, 222 (2017); Galvis, supra note 5, at 117. Yolanda Borquaye, Note, Co-Management of Ghana’s Gold: Proposals for a Policy and Legislative Framework to Address the Issue of Galamsey, 28 N.Y.U. Env’t L.J. 361, 384–85 (2020). Notably, at least one critic argues that formalization of the ASGM sector would not guaranteeenvironmental and human health improvements. See, e.g., Maria Eugenia Robles, Boris Verbrugge & Sara Geenen, Does Formalization Make a Difference in Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM)? Insights from the Philippines, Extractive Indus. & Soc’y, June 2022, at 1, 10.

     [18]. World Gold Council, supra note 15, at 53; Malehase, Adegbenro & Okonkwo, supra note 17, at 220–21.

     [19]. Malehase, Adegbenro & Okonkwo, supra note 17, at 223; Galvis, supra note 5, at 120.

[20]. Formalization, planetGOLD, https://www.planetgold.org/formalization [https://perma.cc/4EDX-7T3Y].

[21]. See Charlie Espinosa & Kelsey Beyeler, Amazon Aid Found., Tracking Amazon Gold 15–18 (2021); Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res. of the Phil., Philippine Minamata Initial Assessment 96 (2019), https://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/documents/minamata_initial_assessment/Philippines-MIA-2019-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP7A-SSAZ]; Michael Eduful, Kamal Alsharif, Alexander Eduful, Michael Acheampong, Joyce Eduful & Lubana Mazumder, The Illegal Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (Galamsey) ‘Menace’ in Ghana: Is Military-Style Approach the Answer?, Res. Pol’y, Oct. 2020, at 1, 1.

[22]. See Espinosa & Beyeler, supra note 21, at 35; Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res. of the Phil., supra note 21, 109–11; Eduful et al., supra note 21, at 10.

     [23]. Jennifer Allan, The Incremental Approach to Governing Mercury, Int’l Inst. Sustainable Dev. (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.iisd.org/articles/governing-mercury [https://perma.cc/8FDW-UEX8]; Michael S. Bank, The Mercury Science-Policy Interface: History, Evolution and Progress of the Minamata Convention, Sci. Total Env’t, June 20, 2020, at 1, 2.

[24]. See infra Part II.B.1.

[25]. See infra Part II.B.1.

     [26]. Fabian Federl & Jack Nicas, Gold’s Deadly Truth: Much Is Mined with Mercury, N.Y. Times (Sept. 22, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/22/world/americas/gold-mercury-mining-poison.html?auth=login-google1tap&login=google1tap [https://perma.cc/4D5Z-885T].

[27]. See infra Part II.B.1.

     [28]. Colombia is a unique example of ASGM issues for a variety of reasons detailed in Part II.A.1. At the same time, ASGM in Colombia appears generalizable enough to serve as a productive study for prospective ASGM legal improvements in other mining hotspots. See infra Part II.A.1.

[29]. Mercury, supra note 7.

[30]. Artisanal Small Scale Gold mining (ASGM), supra note 10.

     [31]. Gobierno del Cambio, Plan de Acción Nacional: Sobre Mercurio en la Minería Artesanal y de Pequeña Escala en Colombia [National Action Plan: On Mercury in Artisanal and Small-Scale Mininng in Colombia] 27–28 (2023), https://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/documents/national_action_plan/Colombia-ASGM-NAP-2024-SP.pdf [https://perma.cc/EW7X-9Q57].

[32]. Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining Without Mercury, supra note 11; Basic Information About Mercury,EPA, https://www.epa.gov/mercury/basic-information-about-mercury [https://perma.cc/TT57-RG8V].

[33]. Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining Without Mercury, supra note 11; Telmer & Stapper, supra note 11, at 10–13.

     [34]. Bank, supra note 23, at 5.

[35]. See, e.g., Patricia Quijano Vallejos, Peter G. Veit, Pedro Tipula & Katie Reytar, World Res. Inst., Undermining Rights: Indigenous Lands and Mining in the Amazon 3 (2020); Aneesah Babatunde, Jacqueline Cardona, Melissa Colliander, Bianca Godinez, Miah Moore-Alexander, Amy Salazar-Molina, Amina Thomas, Kayla Trujillo, Lindsey Villarreal & Miranda Ruiz-Vazquez, The Price of Gold: The Impacts of Illegal Mining on Indigenous Communities in Venezuela and Brazil, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud., https://features.csis.org/the-price-of-gold/index.html [https://perma.cc/HWL7-LH2T]; Espinosa & Beyeler, supra note 21, at 9; Juan Sebastián Lara-Rodríguez, All that Glitters Is Not Gold or Platinum: Institutions and the Use of Mercury in Mining in Chocó, Colombia, 5 Extractive Indus. & Soc’y 308, 309 (2018); Jill K. Cariño, Debates Indígenas, Philippines: Gold Mining and Indigenous Peoples in the Cordillera (2023), https://www.iwgia.org/en/news/5255-philippines-gold-mining-and-indigenous-peoples-in-the-cordillera.html [https://perma.cc/PN29-6B2D]. At least sixteen million people depend on ASGM for their livelihood while another eighty million people indirectly depend on ASGM due to the economic spillover effects in nearby communities. Gold Mining, Pact, https://www.pactworld.org/our-expertise/gold-mining [https://perma.cc/8KA2-EHDF].

     [36]. See, e.g., Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 309, 313, 316. ASGM research about Colombia often focuses on adverse impacts to both Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities, which are a defined demographic group specific to Colombia. SeeAfro-Colombians in Colombia: Historical Context, Minority Rts. Grp. (June 2023), https://minorityrights.org/communities/afro-colombians/ [https://perma.cc/4G9Q-3DLR]. Nevertheless, with some research only focusing on Indigenous communities in Colombia, there is less research available on Afro-descendent communities, which is why Indigenous and Afro-descendent communities are not always discussed in tandem in this Note.

[37]. Formalization, supra note 20; Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 312–14.

[38]. Mercury, supra note 7.

[39]. See generally Vasco Branco, Michael Aschner & Cristina Carvalho, Neurotoxicity of Mercury: An Old Issue with Contemporary Significance, 5 Adv. Neurotoxicol. 239 (2021).

[40]. Id. at 244–45.

[41]. E.g., Hana Pohl & Joan Colman, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Interaction Profile for: Chlorpyrifos, Lead, Mercury, and Methylmercury app. C at 81 (2006).

     [42]. Jung-Duck Park & Wei Zheng, Human Exposure and Health Effects of Inorganic and Elemental Mercury, 45 J. Preventative Med. & Pub. Health 344, 344 (2012); Health Effects of Exposures to Mercury, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/mercury/health-effects-exposures-mercury [https://perma.cc/937L-57D6].

[43]. Health Effects of Exposures to Mercury, supra note 42; Mercury, supra note 7. Methylmercury is an organic form of mercury created by bacteria when mercury is deposited in water or soils. Pohl & Colman, supra note 41, at 81. Methylmercury is commonly found in soils and waters around ASGM operations. See generally John E. Gray, Victor F. Labson, Jean N. Weaver & David P. Krabbenhoft, Mercury and Methylmercury Contamination Related to Artisanal Gold Mining, Suriname, 29 Geophysical Rsch. Letters 20-1 (2002).

     [44]. Shawn L. Posin, Erwin L. Kong & Sandeep Sharma, Mercury Toxicity, in StatPearls (2025) (ebook), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK499935 [https://perma.cc/N9PR-RWZX]; Mercury Poisoning, Fla. Health, https://www.floridahealth.gov/environmental-health/mercury-spills/mercury-poisoning/index.html [https://perma.cc/FF6E-J8GU].

     [45]. Telmer & Stapper, supra note 11, at 8; Mercury, supra note 7.

[46]. See Artisanal Gold Council, supra note 7, at 1; United Nations Env’t Programme, Mercury Use in Small-Scale Gold Mining 2, https://cdn.serc.carleton.edu/files/integrate/teaching_materials/mineral_resources/activities/summary_unep_mercury_use.v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PG3-957G]; Kira Taux, Thomas Kraus & Andrea Kaifie, Mercury Exposure and Its Health Effects in Workers in the Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) Sector—A Systematic Review, Int’l J. Env’t Rsch. & Pub. Health, Feb. 13, 2022, at 1, 2.

     [47]. Juliane Kippenberg, Margaret Wurth & Carlos Conde, “What . . . if Something Went Wrong?”: Hazardous Child Labor in Small-Scale Gold Mining in the Philippines, Hum. Rts. Watch (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/30/what-if-something-went-wrong/hazardous-child-labor-small-scale-gold-mining [https://perma.cc/UYT5-D423].

[48]. Health Effects of Exposures to Mercury, supra note 42.

[49]. See Mercury,United Nations Off. for Disaster Risk Reduction (2025), https://www.undrr.org/understanding-disaster-risk/terminology/hips/ch0104 [https://perma.cc/L4ZY-9SMS].

[50]. Id.; Mercury, supra note 7.

[51]. How the Minamata Convention is Aiming to End Mercury’s Millennia-Long Toxic Run, United Nations Env’t Programme (Oct. 6, 2023), https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/how-minamata-convention-aiming-end-mercurys-millennia-long-toxic-run [https://perma.cc/ZQW5-2N53]; Allan, supra note 23.

[52]. See A Message from Minamata Bay, Minamata Convention on Mercury (Aug. 15, 2020), https://minamataconvention.org/en/news/message-minamata-bay [https://perma.cc/X9M2-SS25].

     [53]. Compressor gold mining is prevalent in the Philippines, with safety risks often compounded by child labor. Larry C. Price, The Philippines: Dangerous and Illegal Compressor Mining, Pulitzer Ctr. (Nov. 16, 2012), https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/philippines-dangerous-and-illegal-compressor-mining [https://perma.cc/5G3C-6Z3Z].

     [54]. Kippenberg, Wurth & Conde, supra note 47.

[55]. Id.

[56]. See id.

[57]. See infra Part IV.

[58]. See, e.g., Price, supra note 53; Kippenberg, Wurth & Conde, supra note 47; Livia Wagner, Glob. Initiative Against Transnat’l Organized Crime, Organized Crime and Illegally Mined Gold in Latin America 27–36 (2016); Sam Jones, Illegal Gold Mining Drives Human Rights Abuses in Latin America, Claims Study, Guardian(Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/apr/07/illegal-gold-mining-drives-human-rights-abuses-in-latin-america-claims-giatoc-study [https://perma.cc/BX3H-JRFH].

     [59]. Luiwei Wang, Deyi Houa, Yining Caoa, Yong Sik Okb, Filip M.G. Tackc, Jörg Rinklebed & David O’Connora, Remediation of Mercury Contaminated Soil, Water, and Air: A Review of Emerging Materials and Innovative Technologies, Env’t Int’l, Jan. 2020, at 1, 1.

     [60]. Galvis, supra note 5, at 3. Jones, supra note 58.

     [61]. Galvis, supra note 5, at 3; Bank, supra note 23, at 1.

     [62]. Wanget al., supra note 59, at 1; Galvis, supra note 5, at 74; Lily Lisa Yevugah, Godfred Darko & Jesper Bak, Does Mercury Emission from Small-Scale Gold Mining Cause Widespread Soil Pollution in Ghana?, Env’t Pollution, Sept. 1, 2021, at 1, 1–2.

     [63]. Wanget al., supra note 59, at 2.

[64]. Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining and Biodiversity, United Nations Env’t Programme: Glob. Mercury P’ship, https://www.unep.org/globalmercurypartnership/what-we-do/artisanal-and-small-scale-gold-mining-asgm/ASGM-and-biodiversity [https://perma.cc/GMR7-QZ2E].

[65]. See id.; Cristen Hemingway Jaynes, Brazil and Colombia Destroy Illegal Gold Mines in Amazon Rainforest, Ecowatch (Dec. 7, 2023), https://www.ecowatch.com/brazil-colombia-illegal-gold-mines-amazon-rainforest.html [https://perma.cc/G4EW-2GCB].

[66]. Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining and Biodiversity, supra note 64.

     [67]. Aryeh Feinberg, Martin Jiskra, Pasquale Borrelli, Jagannath Biswakarma & Noelle E. Selin, Deforestation as an Anthropogenic Driver of Mercury Pollution, 58 Env’t Sci. & Tech. 3246, 3246 (2024).

     [68]. Id.

     [69]. For example, this soil degradation harms plants by weakening their root structures. Plant declines can disrupt animals reliant on such plants for their sustenance and habitats. Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining and Biodiversity, supra note 64.

[70]. Id.

     [71]. Bank, supra note 23, at 1.

[72]. Colombia, planetGOLD, https://www.planetgold.org/colombia [https://perma.cc/R75D-6ZHX]; Colombia, ASM Database, https://artisanalmining.org/InventoryData/doku.php/country:colombia [https://perma.cc/TN6R-YNL7].

     [73]. Besides Colombia, recognized hotspots for ASGM include various countries in South America (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Nicaragua, and Suriname), Africa (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, the Kingdom of Eswatini, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), and Asia (Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic). See Mercury and Gold Mining (ASGM),Int’l Pollutants Elimination Network,https://ipen.org/documents/mercury-and-gold-mining-asgm [https://perma.cc/3RLC-LK76]; National Action Plans, Minamata Convention on Mercury, https://minamataconvention.org/en/parties/national-action-plans [https://perma.cc/P9U5-DYLE]; Development of National Action Plan for the Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining Sector in Cambodia, Glob. Env’t Facility, https://www.thegef.org/projects-operations/projects/10922 [https://perma.cc/R3AT-596P].

     [74]. Like Colombia, other countries worldwide face similar trends in grappling with ASGM issues, albeit with unique geographic, cultural, and political circumstances. See, e.g., Andrew A. Irvine, Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in Ecuador: Building and Implementing an Effective Legal Framework, in Int’l Mining & Oil & Gas L. Dev. & Inv., at 20A-1 (Rocky Mountain Min. L. Found. Special Inst., No. 2 RMMLF-INST 20A, 2017); Aneesah Babatunde et al., supra note 35; Geri-Geronimo R. Sañez, Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res. of the Phil., National Strategic Plan for the Phase-out of Mercury in Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining in the Philippines (2010); Borquaye, supra note 17.

     [75]. Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 309. Estimates suggest that gold is Colombia’s fifth largest export product, with the Colombian ASGM sector accounting for approximately 60 percent of gold extraction. Alejandro Vera, Buscando Oro: How Colombia’s ASGM are Fighting for Gender Equality and Working to Create a Sustainable Economy, Bos. Pol. Rev. (Oct. 10, 2024), https://www.bostonpoliticalreview.org/post/buscando-oro-how-colombia-s-asgm-are-fighting-for-gender-equality-and-working-to-create-a-sustainab [https://perma.cc/7543-28T4].

[76]. See, e.g., Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 308.

     [77]. Cesar Augusto Murad & Jillian Pearse, Landsat Study of Deforestation in the Amazon Region of Colombia: Departments of Caquetá and Putumayo, 11 Remote Sensing Applications 161, 161 (2018).

[78]. Id.

[79]. See supra Part I.2.

[80]. See supra Part I.2.

[81]. See Galvis, supra note 5, at 25, 43.Vinicius Madureira, Report: Mercury from Bolivia Supplying Illegal Mining in Peru, Organized Crime & Corruption Reporting Project (Dec. 1, 2022), https://www.occrp.org/en/news/report-mercury-from-bolivia-supplying-illegal-mining-in-peru [https://perma.cc/478D-64CX]; David J.X. Gonzalez, Treaty Does Not Stop Illicit Mercury Trade in South America, YaleGlobal Online (Feb. 13, 2018), https://archive-yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/treaty-does-not-stop-illicit-mercury-trade-south-america. [https://perma.cc/5AM3-V3ZV].

     [82]. Galvis, supra note 5, at 25, 43; Gonzalez, supra note 81.

[83]. See generally Lenin Valencia, Las Rutas del Oro Ilegal: Estudios de Caso en Cinco Países Amazónicos [The Routes of Illegal Gold: Case Studies in Five Amazonian Countries] (2015).

[84]. See id.

[85]. See generally Wagner, supra note 58.

[86]. See id. In Colombia, gold now outpaces cocaine as the preeminent illegal export, contextualizing the scale of the illegal ASGM issue. Jones, supra note 58.

[87]. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 58, at 10; Jones, supra note 58.

[88]. See Jeremy McDermott, Gold Overtakes Drugs as Source of Colombia Rebel Funds, BBC (June 17, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-18396920 [https://perma.cc/E27T-J6R5].

[89]. Id.

[90]. Id.

[91]. SeeIllegal Mining, Nature Crime All., https://naturecrimealliance.org/nature-crimes/illegal-mining/ [https://perma.cc/Q6NT-DUC8]; Buse Egin, Illicit Financial Flows and Illegal Gold Mining – New Developments in Colombia, Glob. Fin. Integrity (June 13, 2023), https://gfintegrity.org/illicit-financial-flows-and-illegal-gold-mining-new-developments-in-colombia/ [https://perma.cc/WX3M-2FMR].

[92]. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 58, at 33; see also Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 308.

[93]. See Jones, supra note 58(noting that illegal miners are exploiting members of the Indigenous Yanomami tribe in Venezuela and child laborers in Bolivia).

     [94]. Frédéric Massé & Juan Munevar, OECD, Due Diligence in Colombia’s Gold Supply Chain: Gold Mining in Antioquia 4–5 (2016), https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/Antioquia-Colombia-Gold-Baseline-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AAT-UKZH].

[95]. Id. at 4.

[96]. See id.

[97]. Id.

[98]. See id.; see also Ana Bilbao, Mining Colombian Contemporary Art: Histories, Scales and Techniques of Gold Extraction, Burlington Contemp. (May 2019), https://contemporary.burlington.org.uk/journal/journal/mining-colombian-contemporary-art-histories-scales-and-techniques-of-gold-extraction [https://perma.cc/2FT9-AW2Z].

     [99]. Massé & Munevar, supra note 94, at 6; Jenni Perdomo & Kathryn Furlong, Producing Mining Territories: The Centrality of Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining in Colombia from Colonization to the Present, 137 Geoforum 22, 23 (2022).

   [100]. Massé & Munevar, supra note 94, at 4.

   [101]. Javier Lautaro Medina Bernal, Tatiana Cuenca Castelblanco, Catalina Serrano Pérez & Lorena Carrillo González, ALBOAN Found. & Conflict Free Tech., Gold Mining and Local Communities in Southern Córdoba in Colombia, the Case of El Alacrán Mine 8 (2019), https://www.tecnologialibredeconflicto.org/wp-content/uploads/documentos/ALBOAN-MineriaColombia-en.pdf [perma.cc/WQ4W-KYD9]; Gobierno del Cambio, supra note 31, at 31.

   [102]. Gobierno del Cambio, supra note 31, at 8.

[103]. Id.

[104]. Id.

[105]. See id. at 2, 8.

   [106]. See, e.g., Farid Samir Benavides Vanegas, Indigenous People’s Mobilization and Their Struggle for Rights in Colombia 7–8 (Int’l Catalan Inst. for Peace, Working Paper 2009/8, 2009) https://www.icip.cat/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/wp8_ang.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF3D-WG4V] (discussing the emergence of a new kind of social mobilization led by Indigenous communities in the 1980s).

   [107]. Under these laws, “resource handling” encompasses how gold can be extracted and used. Id. at 8; José Vicente Zapata, Denial Fajardo & María Alejandra Cabrera, Colombia, in The Mining Law Review 60, 61 (Erik Richer La Flèche ed., 6th ed. 2017).

   [108]. Zapata, Fajardo & Cabrera, supra note 107, at 64; Héctor Herrera, Legal Ways to Protect the Environment in Colombia, AIDA (Apr. 24, 2018), https://aida-americas.org/en/blog/legal-ways-protect-environment-colombia [https://perma.cc/E3FR-CYF8].

   [109]. Zapata, Fajardo & Cabrera, supra note 107, at 61.

   [110]. Decree 4134, noviembre 2, 2011, Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.).

   [111]. As the name suggests, the Ministry of Mines and Energy also regulates the energy sector. Ministerio de Minas y Energía [Ministry of Mines and Energy], https://www.minenergia.gov.co/ [https://perma.cc/ABF4-EX2P].

   [112]. Decree 255, enero 28, 2004, Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.).

[113]. Id.

[114]. Id.

   [115]. Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, 309–12.

   [116]. Gobierno del Cambio, supra note 31, at 8–9.

   [117]. Decree 2637, diciembre 17, 2012, Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.).

   [118]. Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 309.

[119]. Id. at 312, 316 (stating that small-scale, artisanal mining operations are less likely to register through RUCOM due to the little information given to them and the lack of education in Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities).

[120]. See id. at 308, 316.

   [121]. Ryan C. Berg, Henry Ziemer & Arianna Kohan, A Closer Look at Colombia’s Illegal, Artisanal, and Small-Scale Mining, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Dec. 20, 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/closer-look-colombias-illegal-artisanal-and-small-scale-mining [https://perma.cc/FJM7-D8BA].

[122]. See Jordan de Haan & Brandon Turner, United Nations Inst. for Training & Rsch. & United Nations Env’t, Handbook for Developing National ASGM Formalization Strategies within National Action Plans 16 (2018), https://unitar.org/sites/default/files/media/publication/doc/formalization_handbook_e_web_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PCU-AT6G].

[123]. See Camilo Pardo-Herrera, Terrorism, Transnat’l Crime & Corruption Ctr., Illegal Trade in Gold from Peru and Colombia: Understanding the Dynamics, Routes, and U.S. Linkages 10 (2022).

[124]. See id. at 9.

   [125]. Berg, Ziemer & Kohan, supra note 121; see Pardo-Herrera, supra note 123, at 10.

[126]. SeeIllicit Mining: Threats to U.S. National Security and International Human Rights, Hearing before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere, Transnat’l Crime, Civilian Sec., Democracy, Hum. Rts., & Glob. Women’s Issues, 116th Cong. 12–13 (2019) (statement of Richard H. Glenn, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Int’l Narcotics & Law Enf’t Affs., U.S. Dep’t of State).

   [127]. Galvis, supra note 5, at 10, 31.

   [128]. Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 316.

[129]. See id. at 309, 312;Jasmine Plummer, The Yanomami: Illegal Mining, Law, and Indigenous Rights in the Brazilian Amazon, 27 Geo. Int’l Env’t L. Rev. 479, 492–94 (2015); Vallejos, Veit, Tipula & Reytar, supra note 35, at 6–7, 23–24.

[130]. Supra Part II.A.1.

   [131]. Vallejos, Veit, Tipula & Reytar, supra note 35, at 37; Espinosa & Beyeler, supra note 21, at 8, 24; Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 312; Luis Jaime Acosta, Colombia, Brazil Destroy Illegal Gold Dredges in Amazon Rainforest, Reuters (Dec. 6, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-brazil-destroy-illegal-gold-dredges-amazon-rainforest-2023-12-06/ [https://perma.cc/84DM-4WCY].

[132]. See infra Part II.B.3.

   [133]. Colin Arsenault, Note, Suction Dredging in the United States: Current Regulations and Potential Paths Forward, 25 Hastings Env’t L.J. 161, 178–80 (2019).

[134]. Id.

   [135]. Id.; Bram Ebus, Illegal Gold Mining in Colombia Is Destroying the Rainforest, Newsweek (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.newsweek.com/2016/11/25/colombia-illegal-gold-mining-521717.html [perma.cc/6J78-4UMF] (detailing how the crackdown on illegal mining hurt many more local, traditional miners than armed, organized crime groups, thus leaving local communities with an aversion to the enforcement tactics).

[136]. See, e.g., Mine Explosion: Colombian Authorities Blow Up Illegal Sites, BBC (Dec. 6, 2023), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-latin-america-67644336 [https://perma.cc/MSB4-YVV6]; Acosta, supra note 131; Cristen Hemingway Jaynes, Brazil and Colombia Destroy Illegal Gold Mines in Amazon Rainforest, Ecowatch (Dec. 7, 2023), https://www.ecowatch.com/brazil-colombia-illegal-gold-mines-amazon-rainforest.html. [https://perma.cc/G4EW-2GCB].

[137]. See, e.g., Espinosa & Beyeler, supra note 21, at 12; Galvis, supra note 5, at 8–10.

   [138]. Sukrishnalall Pasha, Mark D. Wenner, Dillon Clarke, Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Toward the Greening of the Gold Mining Sector of Guyana 4–5 (2017), https://www.ceintelligence.com/files/documents/Toward-the-Greening-of-the-Gold-Mining-Sector-of-Guyana-Transition-Issues-and-Challenges.PDF [https://perma.cc/2AR3-6W8T]. See generally, e.g., Kristina Söderholm, Patrik Söderholm, Heidi Helenius, Maria Pettersson, Roine Viklund, Vladimir Masloboev, Tatiana Mingaleva & Viktor Petrov, Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness in the Mining Industry: Permitting Processes with Special Focus on Finland, Sweden and Russia, 43 Res. Pol’y 130 (2015).

   [139]. As expanded upon in Part II.B.1, many countries have ratified or are in the process of ratifying the Minamata Convention of 2013, which requires participating nations to commit to closing all domestic mercury mines within fifteen years, banning any new mercury mines, and prohibiting mercury exportation in absence of written consent by the respective importer. Trading Mercury, United Nations Env’t Programme, https://www.unep.org/interactive/trading-mercury-health-effects/ [https://perma.cc/2635-THQX]; see supra Part II.B.1.

   [140]. Extraction of cinnabar ore produces liquid mercury. See Galvis, supra note 5, at 40–44; Madureira, supra note 81; Gonzalez, supra note 81.

   [141]. Galvis, supra note 5, at 40–44; Gonzalez, supra note 81; see Madureira, supra note 81.

   [142]. Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 311, 316; see Galvis, supra note 5, at 40-44; Gonzalez, supra note 81; Madureira, supra note 81.

   [143]. Vera, supra note 75.

[144]. Id.

[145]. See generally Villar D, Perez-Montes JE & Schaeffer DJ, Mining as the “Locomotive” of the Colombian Economy: It’s Real Cost, 5 J. Pollution Effects & Control, no. 3, 2017, at 1, 6.

   [146]. Minamata Convention on Mercury, https://minamataconvention.org/en [https://perma.cc/5WSM-V7YR]; Allan, supra note 23; Bank, supra note 23, at 1–2.

   [147]. Allan, supra note 23, at 2; Bank supra note 146, at 2.

   [148]. Allan, supra note 23, at 6.

[149]. Id.; Minamata Convention on Mercury, Controlling Mercury-added Products under the Minamata Convention on Mercury 9–10 (2024), https://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/Draft%20Article%204%20Training%20material%20with%20notes-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KGY-4E23].

   [150]. Allan, supra note 23, at 6; Minamata Convention on Mercury arts. 3, 6, 10–11, Oct. 10, 2013, T.I.A.S. No. 17-816, 3201 U.N.T.S. 3.

   [151]. Minamata Convention on Mercury, supra note 150, art. 7.

[152]. Id.; Feinberg, Jiskra, Borrelli, Biswakarma & Selin, supra note 67, at 200.

   [153]. Minamata Convention on Mercury, supra note 150, art. 7.

[154]. National Action Plans, supra note 73.

[155]. See id. (listing thirty-seven publicly available National Action Plans pursuant to Article 7.3 of the Minamata Convention).

   [156]. Minamata Convention on Mercury, supra note 150, at Annex C.1(a).

[157]. Id. at Annex C.1(d).

[158]. Id. at Annex C.1(c).

[159]. Id. at Annex C.1(k).

   [160]. GEF is a multilateral fund that aims to financially support environmental and sustainability projects. Global Environment Facility, Minamata Convention on Mercury, https://minamataconvention.org/en/implementation/gef [https://perma.cc/2YYK-LLS3].

[161]. Minamata Convention Initial Assessments (MIAs), Minamata Convention on Mercury, https://minamataconvention.org/en/parties/minamata-initial-assessments [https://perma.cc/F8AE-8KNU]; Minamata Convention on Mercury: MIAs, Biodiversity Rsch. Inst., https://briwildlife.org/global-mercury-inventories/mias/ [https://perma.cc/2ZHU-AZLM] [hereinafter BRI, Minamata Convention on Mercury].

[162].BRI, Minamata Convention on Mercury, supra note 161.GEF also supports NAP financing. Global Environment Facility, supra note 160.

[163]. See, e.g., About the Programme, planetGOLD, https://www.planetgold.org/about [https://perma.cc/3ZG8-ZWE6].

[164]. Id.

[165]. Id.

   [166]. Federl & Nicas, supra note 26.

   [167]. Many hotspot countries for ASGM issues have notable time lapses between signing and ratifying the Minamata Convention. For example, Colombia signed the treaty in 2013 but did not complete ratification until 2019. See Parties and Signatories: Colombia, Minamata Convention on Mercury, https://minamataconvention.org/en/parties/col [https://perma.cc/5UWN-XCH6]. Similarly, the Philippines signed the treaty in 2013 but only ratified it in 2020. See Parties and Signatories: Philippines, Minamata Convention on Mercury, https://minamataconvention.org/en/parties/phl [https://perma.cc/Z3S7-L973]. NAPs are not required until after ratification, and a pre-ratification MIA (an initial assessment by design) may not be enough to speed up the on-the-ground impact. See The Minamata Convention on Mercury and the Global Environment Facility: Partners from the Start,Glob. Env’t Facility (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.thegef.org/newsroom/news/minamata-convention-mercury-and-global-environmental-facility-partners-start [https://perma.cc/523W-WZGS].

[168]. See, e.g., United Nations, Ch. XXIII Law of Treaties: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXIII/XXIII-1.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DLC-JMJ9] (showing that several years often elapse between treaty signatures and ratification).

[169]. See Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 312–14; Galvis, supra note 5, at 123.

   [170]. SeeAbout the Programme, supra note 163 (explaining planetGOLD’s focus on supporting formalization, building awareness programs, connecting communities with new technology, and financing gaps).

   [171]. See generally Minamata Convention on Mercury, supra note 150.

   [172]. The United States’ sanctions on Venezuela serve as an example of how national sanctions effectively impede illegal gold smuggling. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Venezuela’s State Gold Mining Company and its President for Propping Up Illegitimate Maduro Regime (Mar. 19, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm631 [https://perma.cc/HVZ6-J8JQ]; Pardo-Herrera, supra note 123, at 17. However, many geopolitical complexities make sanctions, particularly through the United Nations, potentially unappealing. Sanctions can stir up unintended political tensions, potentially shifting dynamics on other United Nations votes and Security Council veto actions. Sanction skeptics contend that such unproductive tensions outweigh the positive effects of the sanctions. Seegenerally Maya Ungar, Political Divides Drive a Reassessment of UN Sanctions, Int’l Crisis Grp. (Aug. 26, 2024), https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/political-divides-drive-reassessment-un-sanctions [https://perma.cc/S2QD-DVYC]; InHindsight: UN Security Council Sanctions, Sec. Council Rep. (Nov. 30, 2023), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2023-12/in-hindsight-un-security-council-sanctions.php [https://perma.cc/84GF-NHBZ]; Peter Nadin, Sanctions: And Why They Don’t Work (Very Well), United Nations Univ.: Our World (Sept. 5, 2014), https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/sanctions-and-why-they-dont-work-very-well [https://perma.cc/TFP7-9DNM].

[173]. See generally Martti Koskenniemi & Ville Kari, Sovereign Equality, in The UN Friendly Relations Declaration at 50, at 166 (Jorge E. Viñuales ed., 2020) (discussing the fundamental principle of sovereign equality).

[174]. See, e.g.,Elena Katselli Proukaki, The Problem of Enforcement in International Law 1–2(2010). See generally Minamata Convention on Mercury, supra note 150.

   [175]. For example, the UN Human Rights Council scrutinized South Sudan in 2025, alleging that road infrastructure projects supported by oil revenue and development funds were fraudulently funneling such funds to political elites. See generally Hum. Rts. Council, Comm’n on Hum. Rts. in S. Sudan, Plundering a Nation: How Rampant Corruption Unleashed a Human Rights Crisis in South Sudan, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/60/CRP.5 (2025).

   [176]. Parties and Signatories, Minamata Convention on Mercury, https://minamataconvention.org/en/parties [https://perma.cc/E3BG-JLB6].

[177]. See generally Gobierno del Cambio, supra note 31, at 65–67.

[178]. Id. at 14.

[179]. Id. at 57.

[180]. Id. at 65–67.

   [181]. Id. at 12–13.

[182]. See, e.g., Projects, Minamata Convention on Mercury, https://minamataconvention.org/en/projects/list[https://perma.cc/LX5Z-3NRP].

[183]. See, e.g., Gold,Responsible Mins. Initiative, https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/minerals-due-diligence/gold [https://perma.cc/7YKY-62VN] (exemplifying the types of due diligence collected in gold sustainability certification schemes).

[184]. See, e.g., Responsible Sourcing, LBMA, https://www.lbma.org.uk/responsible-sourcing [https://perma.cc/M7ZV-3MDY] (discussing one such independent third-party certification auditor that requires refiners to document their due diligence for responsible metal sourcing).

[185]. Id.

[186]. See, e.g., Open Letter to LBMA on Concerns That Responsible Sourcing Programme Fails to Curtail Human Rights Abuse and Illicit Gold in the Supply Chain, Glob. Witness (Mar. 9, 2021), https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/open-letter-to-lbma-on-concerns-that-responsible-sourcing-programme-fails-to-curtail-human-rights-abuse-and-illicit-gold-in-the-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/2QKA-2CPE]; see also Minamata Convention on Mercury, supra note 150, at Annex C(2) (“Each Party may include in its national action plan additional strategies to achieve its objectives, including the use or introduction of standards for mercury-free artisanal and small-scale gold mining and market-based mechanisms or marketing tools.”).

   [187]. Galvis, supra note 5, at 137–38; Swiss Better Gold, https://www.swissbettergoldassociation.ch/ [https://perma.cc/VCD9-QTTL]; What is Fairmined?, Fairmined, https://fairmined.org/what-is-fairmined/ [https://perma.cc/6TN7-SD7F] (providing an assurance label for responsible ASGM to guarantee that associated gold is traceable, mined using the best practices for mitigating environmental harms, and aligned with mining community well-being).

[188]. See, e.g.,Matthew Allen, Swiss Gold Industry Oversight Too Weak, Say Auditors, Swissinfo.ch (June 23, 2020), https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/swiss-gold-industry-oversight-too-weak-say-auditors/45855324 [https://perma.cc/Y7DA-F42N].

[189]. SeeInterview of the Month: Diana Culillas from Swiss Better Gold Association, Sustainable Fin. Geneva, https://sfgeneva.org/interview-of-the-month-diana-cullilas-from-swiss-better-gold-association [https://perma.cc/6FTB-9PXG].

   [190]. Pardo-Herrera, supra note 123, at 66; Wagner, supra note 58, at 19.

[191].Pardo-Herrera, supra note 123, at 66; Wagner, supra note 58, at 19.

   [192]. Pardo-Herrera, supra note 123, at 8.

   [193]. This practice is also common in Peru. For example, the Peruvian Environment Division of the National Police staged Operation Mercury in 2019 to dismantle such illicit gold aggregation in Madre de Dios. Id. at 11. The Peruvian National Police subsequently uncovered “a large-scale illegal mining operation, carried out by over 10,000 illegal miners who sold their produce to 3,000 foremen, who in turn sold the aggregated gold to some 65 financial centers along the Inter-Oceanic highway connecting Peru and Brazil. Using forged documents and a complex network of shell companies, these financial centers would send the gold to Lima, Brazil and Bolivia and the money would flow through legal financial channels.” Id.

[194]. Id. at 8.

[195]. See generally LBMA, https://www.lbma.org.uk/ [https://perma.cc/9E4E-FK5W].

[196]. A Call to End the Global Trade in Tainted Gold on the London Market, RAID (Mar. 18, 2024), https://raid-uk.org/call-to-end-global-trade-in-tainted-gold-on-the-london-market-lbma-responsible-sourcing-greenwashing/ [https://perma.cc/G5UJ-9GXM]; Press Release, Glob. Witness, New Global Witness Investigation Reveals How One of the World’s Leading Gold Refiners, Switzerland’s Valcambi, Sources From UAE’s Kaloti, Which Is Linked to Sudanese ‘Conflict Gold’ (July 16, 2020), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/new-global-witness-investigation-reveals-how-one-of-the-worlds-leading-gold-refiners-switzerlands-valcambi-sources-from-uaes-kaloti-which-is-linked-to-sudanese-conflict-gold/ [https://perma.cc/5HZA-V822]; The UK Has a Role to Play in Tackling Illegal Gold Mining, Cath. Agency for Overseas Dev. (Mar. 9, 2023), https://cafod.org.uk/news/campaigning-news/uk-role-in-tackling-illegal-gold-mining [https://perma.cc/WK3Q-TV4R].

   [197]. A few gold refineries account for a majority of gold processing worldwide. These refineries, such as those in Switzerland, often use regulatory trade loopholes that make country of origin information ambiguous to LBMA. This process involves using a broad legal definition to categorize many gold streams as recycled. Thus, LBMA may falsely understand the country of origin to be whichever region recycled the imported gold stream. See, e.g., Tom Eckett, LBMA Responsible Gold Not ‘Free Of Human Rights Abuses’ and ‘Conflict Trade,’ ETF Stream (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.etfstream.com/articles/lbma-responsible-gold-not-free-of-human-rights-abuses-and-conflict-trade [https://perma.cc/9UHF-ATZS]; Fabian Federl, How Does Gold With Illegal Origins Get into the Legitimate Gold Supply Chain?, Pulitzer Ctr. (Apr. 25, 2025), https://pulitzercenter.org/resource/how-does-gold-illegal-origins-get-legitimate-gold-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/Z9SR-QMAE]; Stefan Mbiyavanga, New Working Paper on Swiss Gold Refineries and Money Laundering Regulations, Basel Inst. on Governance (Dec. 11, 2019), https://baselgovernance.org/blog/new-working-paper-swiss-gold-refineries-and-money-laundering-regulations [https://perma.cc/3AGS-MLQ8].

   [198]. This case appears ongoing and may have critical legal implications for whether a certification body can be held legally culpable for issues within their certification processes in the UK. See London Bullion Market Association Drops Challenge to Groundbreaking Human Rights Claim Proceeding in UK Court, Leigh Day (June 17, 2024), https://www.leighday.co.uk/news/news/2024-news/london-bullion-market-association-drops-challenge-to-groundbreaking-human-rights-claim-proceeding-in-uk-court/ [https://perma.cc/DK8D-JRHS].

   [199]. See generally LBMA, Annual Report: 2022 (2022).

[200]. Id.; Industry Push on Global Gold Centers Can Reduce Conflict Gold Trade – Advocacy Groups, Impact (Nov. 25, 2020), https://impacttransform.org/en/industry-push-on-global-gold-centers-can-reduce-conflict-gold-trade-advocacy-groups/ [https://perma.cc/AW5L-MMKN].

   [201]. Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, Status Document, Mar. 4, 2018, 3388 U.N.T.S. No. 56654, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/-Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXVII/XXVII-18.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HVC-DSVU] [hereinafter Escazu Status Document]; The Escazu Agreement, Env’t-Rts.Org, https://environment-rights.org/the-escazu-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/W669-65YL].

[202]. The Escazu Agreement, supra note 201.

[203]. Id.

[204]. What Makes the Escazú Agreement Historic for Conservationists?, Nat’l Comm. of the Neth. (May 12, 2022), https://www.iucn.nl/en/blog/what-makes-the-escazu-agreement-historic [https://perma.cc/LT63-K3ZX].

[205]. Who Are Environmental Defenders?, United Nations Env’t Programme, https://www.unep.org/topics/environmental-law-and-governance/who-are-environmental-defenders [https://perma.cc/MPB3-F496].

[206]. See id.; Victory: Colombia Strengthens Environmental Democracy with the Constitutionality of the Escazú Agreement, Ctr. for Int’l Env’t L. (Aug. 29, 2024), https://www.ciel.org/news/victory-colombia-escazu-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/TDA5-Q7AX] (quoting Luisa Gómez Betancur, Senior Attorney at the Center for International Environmental Law).

   [207]. Escazu Status Document, supra note 201, at 1; The Escazu Agreement, supra note 201.

[208].Escazu Status Document, supra note 201, at 1.

   [209]. Colombia’s Treaty-Making Process: Constitutional Framework and International Commitments, Org. for the Study of Treaty L.,https://treatylaw.org/colombias-treaty-making-process-constitutional-framework-and-international-commitments/ [https://perma.cc/WN2E-Q85F]; Victory: Colombia Strengthens Environmental Democracy with the Constitutionality of the Escazú Agreement, supra note 206.

[210]. Luisa Gómez Betancur, a Senior Attorney at the Center for International Environmental Law, commented that the Court’s unanimous affirmative holding sent “a clear message: violence against environmental defenders must end.” Victory: Colombia Strengthens Environmental Democracy with the Constitutionality of the Escazú Agreement, supra note 206.

[211]. Escazú Agreement: Protecting Environmental Defenders in Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations Hum. Rts. Off. of the High Comm’r (June 5, 2025), https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/06/escazu-agreement-protecting-environmental-defenders-latin-america-and-caribbean [https://perma.cc/6A7L-RHUG].

[212]. See id.

[213]. See id.

   [214]. Kathy Price, Land and Defenders Face a New Wave of Deadly Threats in Colombia, Amnesty Int’l (Mar. 4, 2024), https://www.amnesty.ca/features/land-and-water-defenders-face-a-new-wave-of-deadly-threats-in-colombia/ [https://perma.cc/CU89-KJ3Y]; Colombia: The Deadliest Country for Environmental Defenders, C.R. Defs. (Sept. 13, 2024), https://crd.org/2024/09/13/colombia-the-deadliest-country-for-environmental-defenders/ [https://perma.cc/CGG2-R73T].

[215]. See id.

[216]. See Escazu Status Document, supra note 201, at 1.

   [217]. U.N. Conference on the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. CBD/COP/DEC/15/4 (Dec. 19, 2022).

   [218]. The agreement also aims to establish a system for equitably and fairly managing digital sequencing information and other genetic resources. Id.; Aime Williams, ‘Paris Agreement for Nature’ Raises Biodiversity Hopes and Doubts, Fin. Times (Dec. 20, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/5edf7c0b-f399-4d85-8c89-324e8caae2a0 [https://perma.cc/NEJ5-LFVB].

[219]. The Global Biodiversity Framework – What’s Next for Financial Policy and Regulation?, United Nations Env’t Programme: Fin. Initiative (Feb. 2, 2023), https://www.unepfi.org/themes/ecosystems/the-global-biodiversity-framework-whats-next-for-financial-policy-and-regulation [https://perma.cc/WW65-4MNC]. See generally World Econ. F. & PwC China, The Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and What it Means for Business (2023), https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Biodiversity_Targets_for_Business-_Action_2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU4X-CBZX].

[220]. The Global Biodiversity Framework – What’s Next for Financial Policy and Regulation?, supra note 219.

[221]. Id.

   [222]. World Econ. F. & PwC China, supra note 219, at 25; Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 217, § H.3, Target 19; The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework Explained, WWF (Oct. 1, 2023), https://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?9995891/The-Kunming-Montreal-Global-Biodiversity-Framework-explained [https://perma.cc/8SAF-R2G8]; Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, UN Trade & Dev., https://unctad.org/topic/trade-and-environment/biotrade/kunming-montreal-global-biodiversity-framework [https://perma.cc/RY9Z-VCD5].

[223]. See sources cited supra note 222.

[224]. The Global Biodiversity Framework – What’s Next for Financial Policy and Regulation?, supra note 219.

[225]. See supra Part I.B.

[226]. See Espinosa & Beyeler, supra note 21, at 7–8; Luisa Gómez-Betancur, The Rights of Nature in the Colombian Amazon: Examining Challenges and Opportunities in a Transitional Justice Setting, 25 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Affs. 41, 55 (2020); Galvis, supra note 5, at 18–20, 130.

[227]. See Duke Study Finds Devastating Effects of Mercury from Gold Mines, Duke Glob. Health Inst. (Jan. 13, 2015), https://globalhealth.duke.edu/news/duke-study-finds-devastating-effects-mercury-gold-mines [https://perma.cc/2TTG-4DTG]; see also Allison R. Aldous, Tim Tear & Luis E. Fernandez, The Global Challenge of Reducing Mercury Contamination from Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM): Evaluating Solutions Using Generic Theories of Change, 33 Ecotoxicology 506, 507–08 (2024).

[228]. See, e.g., Price, supra note 53; Kippenberg, Wurth & Conde, supra note 47; Wagner, supra note 58, at 27–36; Jones, supra note 58.

[229]. See supra Part I.

   [230]. Research on this topic generally discusses mercury use in ASGM as an environmental and human rights problem or focuses on formalization of the ASGM industry to mitigate environmental and human rights problems. But there is no literature that questions whether prioritizing mercury elimination in ASGM would have rippling impacts on human and environmental protection in the industry. Future studies should consider these potential impacts of mercury regulation. See, e.g., Sonny N. Domingo & Arvie Joy A. Manejar, Philippine Inst. for Dev. Stud., Bottlenecks to formalization of small-scale mining in PH (2020), https://pidswebs.pids.gov.ph/CDN/PUBLICATIONS/-pidspn2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/LWV3-JLHL]; Malehase, Adegbenro & Okonkwo, supra note 17, at 218; BAN Toxics, BANNING MERCURY: A short documentary on the mercury flows in the ASGM sector in the Philippines (YouTube Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAutV6IJ4ug&t=1s (on file with the California Law Review); Irvine,supra note 74; Amiel Ian Valdez, Government Responsibility to Remediate Mercury-Contaminated Sites, a Philippine Perspective, Centre for Int’l L. Nat’l U. of Sing., https://cil.nus.edu.sg/government-responsibility-to-remediate-mercury-contaminated-sites-a-philippine-perspective-by-amiel-ian-valdez/ [https://perma.cc/4YTU-9Z7X]; Galvis, supra note 5.

   [231]. As noted in Part II.A.1, estimates suggest that gold is Colombia’s fifth largest export, with the Colombian ASGM sector accounting for approximately 60 percent of gold extraction. Vera, supra note 75. Economic considerations that sway political decisions can also be personal. For example, in Ghana, evidence suggests some government officials’ ties to the ASGM sector create a conflict of interest that undermine sector progress. See Eduful et al., supra note 21, at 9.

[232]. See, e.g., supra Part II; Enoch Randy Aikins, Ghana Must Stop Galamsey Before It Sinks the Country, Inst. for Sec. Stud. (Sept. 24, 2024), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ghana-must-stop-galamsey-before-it-sinks-the-country [https://perma.cc/PCR7-R82C]; Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 312–14.

[233]. See Federl & Nicas, supra note 26. See generally Malehase, Adegbenro & Okonkwo, supra note 17, at 218 (discussing unsuccessful introductions of mercury-free technology through various initiatives in the first years of Minamata Convention implementation).

[234]. See Galvis, supra note 5, at 40.

[235]. See Berg, Ziemer & Kohan, supra note 121.

   [236]. From 2008 to 2018, the largest mercury importer known to Colombia was Mexico, followed by Spain, the Netherlands, the United States, Germany, Peru, Kyrgyzstan, Japan, Russia, China, and Hong Kong. Gobierno del Cambio, supra note 31, at 25. However, some sources believe that mercury in Colombia primarily originates from waste recovery and illegal imports from China and Mexico via Peru and Bolivia. Galvis, supra note 5, at 42, 48–49; Madureira, supra note 81; Gonzalez, supra note 81.

[237]. See Galvis, supra note 5, at 33; Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 312.

[238]. See Gobierno del Cambio, supra note 31, at 50.

[239]. Id.

[240]. Id.

[241]. SeeAccelerate Minamata Convention Compliance Through Improved Understanding and Control of Mercury Trade in Latin America, Glob. Env’t Facility, https://www.thegef.org/projects-operations/projects/11047 [https://perma.cc/7C7N-88EY].

[242]. Id.; Glob. Env’t Facility, GEF-8 Project Identification Form (PIF) 4 (2023), https://www.thegef.org/projects-operations/projects/11047 [https://perma.cc/RBA5-3HH7].

   [243]. Glob. Env’t Facility, supra note 242, at 5–7.

[244]. See Glob. Env’t Facility, STAP Screening: Accelerate Minamata Convention Compliance Through Improved Understanding and Control of Mercury Trade in Latin America 1 (2022), https://www.thegef.org/projects-operations/projects/11047 [https://perma.cc/2T5Y-X3RD] [hereinafter STAP Screening]; Glob. Env’t Facility, supra note 140, at 16; Glob. Env’t Facility, GEF-8 Request for CEO Endorsement/Approval 74 (2024), https://www.thegef.org/projects-operations/projects/11047 [https://perma.cc/ETK9-VQTV] [hereinafter GEF-8 Request for CEO Endorsement/Approval].

[245]. See supra Introduction.

[246]. See supra Introduction.

[247]. See supra Introduction.

   [248]. The organization planetGOLD maintains a repository of papers on its Technical Solutions webpage that document its numerous initiatives exploring mercury substitutes. See, e.g., Technical Solutions, planetGOLD, https://www.planetgold.org/technical-solutions [https://perma.cc/7JQG-72PN].

   [249]. Technological adoption graphs tend to follow a bell curve pattern, with few early adopters, a marked uptick mid-lifecycle, and eventual tapering. See generally Stephen L. Parente, A Model of Technology Adoption and Growth, 6 Econ. Theory 405 (1995).

[250]. See, e.g., Making Mercury History in Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining Technology Transfer Experiences in the planetGOLD Programme, planetGOLD, https://www.planetgold.org/making-mercury-history-artisanal-and-small-scale-gold-mining [https://perma.cc/R5XN-P8MM]; Competitions, Artisanal Mining Grand Challenge: The Amazon, https://www.artisanalminingchallenge.com/competitions [https://perma.cc/XCD7-DX76].

   [251]. In Colombia, planetGOLD appears to be rolling out short-term pilot projects on alternative mining technology to mercury, which supports demand-side needs. See, e.g., Colombia, planetGOLD, https://www.planetgold.org/es/colombia [https://perma.cc/R75D-6ZHX]. Also, cyanide is a common alternative to mercury use in ASGM that generates a different slate of environmental and human health risks. While cyanide is not a sustainable substitute, planetGOLD provides program guidance and resources to help cyanide users reduce associated risks in ASGM operations. See, e.g., D. Stapper, K. Dales, P. Velasquez & S. Keane, planetGOLD, Best Management Practices for Cyanide Use in the Small-Scale Gold Mining Sector (2021), https://www.planetgold.org/sites/default/files/CN%20Best%20Practices%20in%20ASGM_Final_Dec%2016%202021_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M5Z-76QX].

[252]. Competitions, supra note 250.

[253]. See Feinberg et al., supra note 67, at 207; Malehase, Adegbenro & Okonkwo, supra note 17, at 220.

[254]. See, e.g.,Birgette Stoffersen, Peter WU Appel, Leoncio D Na-Oy, Asta Selloane Sekamane, Ivan Zahinos Ruiz & Rasmus Køster-Rasmussen, Introduction of Mercury-Free Gold Extraction to Small-Scale Miners in the Cabo Delgado Province in Mozambique, J. Health & Pollution, Sept. 2018, at 1, 2 (describing the use of borax in the gold smelting process for mercury-free ASGM); Pure Earth, ASGM Eliminating the Worst Practices (YouTube, June 5, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vKr_GGlghWA&t=112s (on file with the California Law Review) (highlighting mercury-free best practices, including direct smelting and chemical leaching). Notably, planetGOLD also provides information on safer cyanide processes but does not actively advocate for cyanide use in gold mining due to toxicity risks. See Daniel Stapper, Can Cyanide be a Responsible Alternative to Mercury for planetGOLD Communities?, planetGOLD (Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.planetgold.org/can-cyanide-be-responsible-alternative-mercury-planetgold-communities [https://perma.cc/LPE4-AP28].

[255]. See Malehase, Adegbenro & Okonkwo, supra note 17, at 220. See generally Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 308.

   [256]. Some recent Minamata–Convention actions focus additional resources on such demand-side interventions to function in tandem with supply-side interventions. For example, in a screening of the GEF project plan mentioned in Part III.A, analysts flagged that a cross-border mercury control plan cannot focus purely on supply-side management but also needs to address demand-side economic impacts. See GEF-8 Request for CEO Endorsement/Approval, supra note 244, at 10–11; STAP Screening, supra note 244, at 1.

[257]. See Espinosa & Beyeler, supra note 21, at 31.

[258]. See, e.g., Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 308 (arguing that long-established tacit rules for ASGM in Choco, Colombia undermine the adoption of new mining technological innovations and adherence to formal regulation); Borquaye, supra note 17, at 386–88 (highlighting the importance of customary law and tradition for ASGM management by chiefs in Ghana).

[259]. See Galvis, supra note 5, at 6; Irvine,supra note 74, at 20A-74.

[260]. See supra Part III.

[261]. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Litigation and Society, 15 Ann. Rev. Socio. 17, 23–27 (1989).

[262]. See, e.g., Strategic Litigation and Its Untapped Potential for Anti-corruption, CMI U4 Anti-Corruption Res. Ctr. (July 11, 2023), https://www.u4.no/blog/strategic-litigation-untapped-potential-for-anti-corruption [https://perma.cc/2YDW-VSA5].

[263]. See Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 308.

[264]. See Vallejos, Veit, Tipula & Reytar, supra note 35, at 10(“In Colombia, the law provides [I]ndigenous people the right of first refusal to exploit minerals for commercial purposes on their land. As such, [I]ndigenous people must first refuse their right to exploit mineral resources on their lands before the government can grant the mineral rights to a third party.”).

   [265]. Janvieve Williams Comrie, Ley 70: Blackness, Collectivity, and Protection, Afroresistance (Aug. 28, 2023), https://www.afroresistance.org/post/ley-70-blackness-collectivity-and-protection [https://perma.cc/9M6W-XRD6].

[266]. See Rebecca Bratspies, ‘Territory is Everything’: Afro-Colombian Communities, Human Rights and Illegal Land Grabs, Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.: Online (May 27, 2020), https://hrlr.law.columbia.edu/hrlr-online/territory-is-everything-afro-colombian-communities-human-rights-and-illegal-land-grabs/ [https://perma.cc/9CBD-LXP5].

[267].Vallejos, Veit, Tipula & Reytar, supra note 35, at 6.

   [268]. For example, some stakeholders advocate for no-mining zones on behalf and in protection of certain isolated Indigenous communities or otherwise focus on Indigenous territorial protection through legal land recognition. See, e.g.,Steven Grattan, Without Stronger Protections, Uncontacted Indigenous Groups Could Vanish Within a Decade, Experts Say, PBS News (Oct. 27, 2025), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/without-stronger-protections-uncontacted-indigenous-groups-could-vanish-within-a-decade-experts-say [https://perma.cc/8HWL-NRMR]; Danielle Martin, Should Mining Companies Consider No-go Zones Where Isolated Indigenous Peoples Live? (Commentary), Mongabay (Jan. 16, 2025), https://news.mongabay.com/2025/01/should-mining-companies-consider-no-go-zones-where-isolated-indigenous-peoples-live-commentary [https://perma.cc/F6DC-Y6AG].

[269]. See supra Part II.B.3.b.

[270]. See supra Part II.B.2.

   [271]. As previously discussed, gold is a profitable export for countries like Colombia, which can create perverse incentives to deregulate ASGM despite known sustainability issues. See supra Part II.A.4; see also Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 309; Vera, supra note 75.

[272]. See Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 316.

[273]. See Plummer, supra note 129, at 492–96.

[274].Glob. Witness,Missing Voices: The Violent Erasure of Land and Environmental Defenders 14 (2024), https://gw.hacdn.io/media/documents/Missing_Voices_-_Global_Witness_land_and_environmental_defenders_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW29-57EM].

[275]. Id.

[276]. See generally Wagner, supra note 58.

[277]. See James Rochlin, Obstacles to Mining Formalization in Colombia, Res. Pol’y, Oct. 2021, at 1, 4.

[278]. See Pardo-Herrera, supra note 123, at 33; Dominic Raab, World Gold Council, Silence is Golden: A Report on the Exploitation of Artisanal Gold Miners to Fund War, Terrorism and Organised Crime 21–23 (2024), https://www.gold.org/esg/artisanal-and-small-scale-gold-mining [https://perma.cc/P4W6-YTUT]; Wagner, supra note 58, at 19, 31–35.

[279]. See supra Part II.B.3.a.

[280]. See Gillian Caldwell, Environmental Defenders are Under Threat. Here’s what USAID Can Do to Help, Land Links (Jan. 17, 2023), https://www.land-links.org/2023/01/environmental-defenders-are-under-threat-heres-what-usaid-can-do-to-help [https://perma.cc/EQ2K-6FUD].

[281]. See id. Notably, the future of U.S. government efforts to support environmental defenders is uncertain after the second Trump administration moved to dismantle USAID in 2025. See Ari Daniel, Farewell to USAID: Reflections on the Agency that President Trump Dismantled, NPR (July 1, 2025), https://www.npr.org/sections/goats-and-soda/2025/07/01/g-s1-75222/usaid-trump-humanitarian-rubio-musk [https://perma.cc/Y7BA-DHF6]. Meanwhile, the American Bar Association currently is implementing a twenty-four-month program, Supporting Environmental Defenders in Latin America, under its Rule of Law Initiative (ROLI). Supporting Environmental Defenders in the Amazon Region, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/global-programs/what-wedo/programs/environmental-defenders-amazon-region/ [https://perma.cc/MPK9-J8MR]. The program teaches and supports environmental defenders through regional exchange events to facilitate information sharing, response strategizing, and networking. Id. For physical protection, the program works to bolster monitoring of human rights conditions of defenders, promote defender engagement with legal clinics, improve other advocacy processes, and support a “Protect your Rights” campaign. Id.

[282]. See Protect Those Who Protect Us, Amnesty Int’l(Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/09/colombia-human-rights-defenders/ [https://perma.cc/D4WJ-8Q9J]; Yuly Andrea Velásquez Briceño, We Continue To Risk Our Lives Defending Colombia’s Rivers and Wetlands, Amnesty Int’l (Dec. 1, 2023), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/we-risk-our-lives-defending-colombias-rivers [https://perma.cc/RYE3-YG7M]; Women Defenders of the Land and the Environment: Silenced Voices, Oxfam Int’l, https://www.oxfam.org/en/women-defenders-land-and-environment-silenced-voices [https://perma.cc/VR2J-4Q5H].

   [283]. Support Women Defenders in Colombia, Oxfam Int’l, https://actions.oxfam.org/international/women-defenders/petition/en/ [https://perma.cc/79AQ-EP7W].

   [284]. Education can be a way to help communities understand their rights and their own capacity to become environmental defenders, creating power in numbers. See, e.g., Femke Wijdekop, Nat’l Comm. of the Neth., Environmental Defenders and Their Recognition Under International and Regional Law -An Introduction 21 (2021) (discussing efforts to “expand the awareness of the criminalization of nature’s defenders”); Supporting Environmental Defenders in the Amazon Region, supra note 281 (working “to make visible and compile the content of the ‘Protect your Rights’ campaign”).

   [285]. Some research also suggests that environmental defenders could use Colombia’s newly established “Right of Nature,” protecting the right to the Amazon rainforest for future generations, as a lens to protect against forest degradation brought on by illegal gold mining. See Gómez-Betancur, supra note 226, at 67–70.

[286]. See supra Part II.B.2.

[287]. See supra Part II.B.2.

[288]. See supra Part II.B.2.

[289]. See Minamata Convention on Mercury, supra note 150,art. 7. Notably, ecosystem modeling for mercury is more complex than other comparable pollutants, and it is hard to achieve strong model validation. However, to account for these scientific challenges, establishing regional centers with diverse expertise—akin to the Basel and Stockholm Convention Centers—could assist in improving mercury modeling and support technology transfers. See Bank, supra note 23, at 5.

[290]. See LBMA, https://www.lbma.org.uk/ [https://perma.cc/2AF4-3JFQ].

[291]. See supra Part II.B.2.

   [292]. Local governments, especially in Colombia, are somewhat reluctant to invest in geological research related to mercury monitoring. See Lara-Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 314–15.