Iqbal & The Evolution of Procedural Scholarship

Ashcroft v. Iqbal is a doctrinally instructive case. Iqbal teaches that the test for sufficient pleadings turns on the concept of plausibility.[1] It clarifies that the previous, more permissive understanding of a sufficient pleading under Conley v. Gibson is no more.[2]Iqbal also reflects the Supreme Court’s skepticism regarding district court judges’ ability to manage complex discovery disputes effectively.[3] And it demonstrates the Court’s complex view of its rulemaking role—changing procedural rules by opinion. Yet, for civil procedure scholars, Iqbal also marks a shift in our approach to the scholarly enterprise. This Essay will explore three scholarly trends that can be derived from the academy’s response to the Iqbal decision. First, a vast array of scholars responded swiftly to Iqbal, with many civil procedure scholars taking an empirical turn. Second, Iqbal emboldened a burgeoning area of civil procedure scholarship focused on non-federal court procedure and adjudication. Third and finally, Iqbal sharpened scholars’ critical focus on procedure. While a strong “access-to-justice” perspective existed in procedural scholarship before Iqbal, that work focused less intently on immutable characteristics such as race.

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