This Article presents the first systematic empirical study of “conclusory pleading” as a form of plausibility analysis in the U.S. courts of appeals following Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which critics argued would harm plaintiffs by creating excessive demand for information before discovery, and by increasing judicial subjectivity and ideology in decision-making in Rule 12(b)(6) decisions, particularly in civil rights litigation. Contrary to the canonical two-step account of plausibility pleading, courts of appeals almost never evaluate whether pleadings are conclusory fact by fact before proceeding to assess plausibility. Instead, in a one-step analysis they assess whether allegations, on the whole, are generally too conclusory to be plausible, or they render that judgment as to some particular key assertion in the context of the full complaint, without rejecting any other pleaded fact. Findings suggest that any increased judicial subjectivity after Twiqbal likely stems from aspects of plausibility doctrine other than conclusory pleading, shifts in case composition triggered by Twiqbal, or the broader politicization of pleading standards.

When Congress enacts command-and-control regulation, it chooses between implementation through litigation and courts, through bureaucracy, or through a hybrid regime. Since the late 1960s, the frequency with which Congress has relied on civil litigation for frontline enforcement of statutes grew dramatically, and with it grew rates of federal statutory litigation and the role of courts…