The concern raised by David Strauss’s Essay might be addressed by positing an alternative, broader conception of judicial review than the one he proposes, which is inspired by the influential footnote in the Carolene Products case. My alternative view on the scope and nature of judicial review does not grow out of experience with American Constitutional history (which I am no expert on), but rather from a philosophical perspective grounded in liberal and democratic theory and from a comparative constitutional experience drawn from the European and Israeli contexts. I will present my position through a defense of two distinctions that seem essential to me.

Professor David Strauss attributes the U.S. Supreme Court’s reactionary jurisprudence to a breakdown of elite consensus. He observes that lawyers and judges disagree about the proper “victims” of our political process: Are they Black, Brown, and LGBTQ+ people or, instead, Whites, Christians, and gun owners? Under such elite “polarization,” Strauss worries the jurisprudential approach that emerged from Carolene Products allows for judicial intervention on behalf of groups loaded with political power. Even then, he insists on the classic liberal defense of the courts: that courts serve as an important if imperfect check against the majoritarian domination of minorities. But critical to such defenses is the unstated conjecture that elites are more enlightened than popular majorities.

In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization and Obergefell v. Hodges, the Justices who attack substantive due process law equate it with Lochner. Today, crying “Lochner” has so much force that it is often unclear what the objection itself entails. “Lochner” warns federal judges to defer to a legislature’s judgments in enacting ordinary social and economic legislation. But the modern substantive due process cases do not concern such legislation. In this Essay, we supply an answer to the Lochner objection by demonstrating how judicial review of substantive due process claims can be democracy-promoting.

Among law students, lawyers, jurists, and legal academics, the reasoning contained in Supreme Court opinions forms the indispensable object of examination. The centrality of those opinions is instilled from the very first moments of law school, as professors direct their students to scrutinize this key paragraph, that critical sentence, even the odd momentous footnote. The rationales undergirding various Supreme Court opinions receive not mere study, but valorization, worship, and occasionally even ridicule. However, this Essay contends that such claims wildly exaggerate the actual significance of judicial opinions.

Once upon a time, not that long ago, we had a pretty good explanation for why judicial review exists. The premise is that, for the most part, important decisions in a nation like ours should be made by politically accountable officials, not by courts. Unavoidably, though, there will be defects in the democratic political process. The role of the courts is to correct those defects, to the extent they can. One such defect is that some groups may not have their fair share of political power. If that is true, then the courts should intervene to protect that group. But this account is not quite right, and it is incorrect in a way that suggests a deep problem with judicial review today.

Efforts to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment have resurged, and for the first time in nearly forty years, three new states have ratified the ERA. But there are several reasons to reconsider these efforts. Most importantly, the ERA’s substance is insufficient to address ongoing inequities. This Article argues that advocates should instead focus efforts on writing a new amendment constitutionalizing equality aimed at rectifying the constitutional Founding Era’s treatment of people of color, women, and other subordinated groups.

Data breach—the improper exposure of consumers’ personal information held in corporate databases—costs consumers and businesses hundreds of billions of dollars each year. Despite scrutiny, the scale and severity of breaches has rapidly increased. This Note lays out a policy framework for overcoming the intense industry opposition and political paralysis that has consistently derailed data breach reform efforts over the past decade.

The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act entitles many workers to “reasonable accommodations” for pregnancy-related medical conditions—so long as they do not impose an “undue hardship” on their employer. This Article addresses how the chaotic Americans with Disabilities Act doctrine will impact the PWFA’s implementation. The Article proposes a framework for litigants and courts assessing claims under the PWFA.

Scholars’ framing of Section 1983 as a “constitutional tort” and their focus on the qualified immunity doctrine miss the fundamental issue of Section 1983's transformation into a fault-based tort. This Article demonstrates how the judicial rewriting of Section 1983 has undermined its effectiveness and diverged from the Reconstruction Congress’ intent. The Article argues that Section 1983 should be interpreted as a strict liability statutory tort.

Past-due child support debt cannot be forgiven or discharged in bankruptcy. This policy is grounded in the assumption that all child support debt goes to a parent taking care of a child. However, billions of dollars of unpaid child support debt are instead owed to the government. Welfare debt often leads to a cycle of incarceration and criminal fines. This Article argues that for the bankruptcy system to uphold its normative principle of forgiving burdensome debt for the most economically vulnerable individuals, welfare debt must be forgiven.

“Suicide by cop” refers to encounters in which civilians intentionally provoke a lethal response from law enforcement. Police and their advocates have developed suicide by cop into junk science that serves as a broad defense against liability. This Article explores the origins and use of suicide by cop, and argues that police should be required to exercise a higher duty of care to protect people from excessive use of force.